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ABSTRACT 
 
This doctoral research critically analyses third party protection in the carriage of 
goods by sea. The author is motivated to evaluate the rationale behind the protection of third 
parties in the carriage of goods by sea in the light of a new theoretical framework. The research 
takes into account the fact that the carriage of goods by sea is presently part of the supply chain 
and third parties, together with the parties of the contract, form what the author calls a 
multilateral common enterprise. 
The existing literature in the area focuses on the legal framework of the topic but fails 
to consider the fact that third parties can and should be seen under a different light. This work 
is driven by the idea that such a topic must be tackled with a deeper understanding of the 
rationale and by adding modern theory to a long-established practice. Changing the perspective 
will provide the necessary scope to make the law more appropriate for present times. 
Thus far, third parties have been considered merely a risk for the parties to the 
contract of the carriage of goods by sea; this research contends that they are a factual part of it 
and should henceforth be treated as such. They should receive protection for what they 
represent in the shipping industry, not just for what the main parties to the contract choose to 
extend to them. 
The thesis analyses the legal framework of third party protection through the lens of 
the supply chain. No longer is the carriage of goods by sea an isolated part of the trade; it is 
fully integrated within it. To date, the law – contractually, internationally and domestically – 
has acknowledged this issue, but it has not addressed it in an appropriate manner regarding 
third party protection. The aim of this thesis is to do just that and, in doing so, to make a 
significant contribution in the field.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Foundation 
 
 
Everyone who has a part, large or small, to play in 
the evolution of commercial law must surely always have regard 
to two principles as paramount. First, that law should be 
certain. Second, whilst being certain it must be adaptable 
to the changing needs of the particular period.  
Those two principles are not contradictory. On the contrary, 
they are complementary.1 
 
  
 
 
  
                                                        
1 Lord Roskill, ‘Half a Century of Commercial Law 1930–1980’ (1982) 7 HLR 1. 
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This chapter outlines the fundamental basis of this research. This will delineate the 
issues subsequently analysed, establish why these issues are worth exploring, and explain how 
they are addressed in the study. The first section of the chapter presents the background to the 
research; the second section examines the justification for the research; the third explores the 
methodology behind it, including a theoretical framework, the research question, limitations 
and delimitations of the research, and a legal framework; the final section is dedicated to the 
structure of the thesis.  
 
1.1 Research background 
 
This research revolves around the protection of third parties in the carriage of goods 
by sea.2 The crucial question – frequently asked by both the shipping industry and the research 
community – is as follows: Is someone who is not party to the contract allowed to benefit from 
the protection of the contract? More specifically, for the purposes of this research: Is someone 
who is neither the carrier nor the shipper entitled to benefit from a protection provision in a 
carriage of goods by sea contract? 
By way of an example, consider the following scenario. The shipper (X) contracts 
with the carrier (Y), a shipowner or a charterer. Y then carries X’s goods from port A to port B. 
In the contract, there is a provision that Z (someone who is not X or Y and who could, for 
instance, work at port A or B) will not be liable and will benefit from a limitation of liability if 
sued. The problem is that, strictly speaking, Z has a contract only with Y and has nothing to do 
with X. Moreover, in the carriage of goods by sea, Z does not fall into only one category; there 
are usually different categories of parties that, although in the same commercial position as Z, 
are not mentioned specifically in the contract. Are they entitled to the same protection enjoyed 
by Z? 
The issue of third party protection has been present for a long time in maritime law. 
Originally, this problem centred on certain categories of third party (for instance, the 
shipowner in the Elder Dempster case,3 and the master and boatswain in The Himalaya case).4 
Over time, however, the issue has expanded to include other categories of third party such as 
independent contractors.5 Furthermore, the situation has recently become more complex with 
                                                        
2 The author also uses the term ‘shipping’ to refer to the carriage of goods by sea in this thesis. 
3 Elder, Dempster & Co. Ltd v Paterson, Zochonis & Co. Ltd (Elder Demspter) (1924) AC 522 (HL). 
4 Adler v Dickson (The Himalaya) (1954) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 267; (1955) 1 QB 158. 
5 Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd (Scruttons) (1961) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 365.  
9 
 
vessels being sued as a third parties6 and relying on protection clauses in a contract or third 
parties completely outside the maritime world (such as the inland carrier in the Kirby case).7 
This frequently happens because it is in the interest of one of the parties to the contract to avoid 
the limitation of liability that the other party has under the contract; third party therefore 
becomes the target of a suit. Though it seems unfair, this is what actually happens in practice. 
The claimant cannot sue the carrier in tort to circumvent the contract, since the carrier will be 
able to rely on a contract and on its legal protection. As Viscount Finlay stated in Elder 
Dempster: 
 
When the act is done in the course of rendering the very services provided for in the 
bill of lading, the limitation on liability therein contained must attach, whatever the 
form of the action and whether owner or charterer be sued. It would be absurd that 
the owner of the goods could get rid of the protective clauses of the bill of lading, in 
respect of all stowage, by suing the owner of the ship in tort.8 
 
The target of the suit who, a century ago, might have been a shipowner or a master or 
boatswain, could nowadays be literally anyone involved in the relevant supply chain. The real, 
factual context of the shipping industry has changed, creating what the author calls a 
‘multilateral common enterprise’. 
A variety of solutions to the problem have been proposed, but as yet there is a great 
deal of disparity and very little uniformity. Carriage has changed dramatically over the last 
century; its status in the trade has been altered, and boundaries have been eroded. On the 
occasions when third party protection has been allowed, the rationale behind the decision to do 
so has invariably been different. Vicarious liability, for instance, has in some cases been used 
to justify the protection of certain categories of third party (such as employees), while in others 
it has provided the basis for commercial or insurance advantages or merely autonomy of 
parties. From an international perspective, the latest convention on the carriage of goods by sea 
– the Rotterdam Rules9 – although not yet ratified, takes into consideration the fact that it is 
currently not only a carrier who performs the job but also several other parties, referred to as 
‘performing parties’. The convention defines a performing party as any person who performs 
                                                        
6 Mazda Motors of America, Inc. v M//V Cougar Ace (Mazda Motors) (2009) 565 E3d 573; 2009 AMC 1220 (9th 
Cir. 2009). 
7 Norfolk Southern Ry. v James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd. (Kirby) (2004) 543 US 14. 
8 Elder Dempster (n 3) 
9 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (2008). 
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or undertakes to perform any of the carrier’s responsibilities under a contract of carriage and 
acts, either directly or indirectly, at the carrier’s request or under the carrier’s supervision or 
control.10 Although in principle the approach of the Rotterdam Rules is in line with the concept 
of multilateral common enterprise, the convention still considers a third party to be an 
appendix party to a contract.11 Moreover, the Rotterdam Rules set geographic boundaries for 
such protection. Conversely, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in the aforementioned 
case of Kirby12 has defined and advanced a commercial approach to the problem. It is believed 
that this approach represents a sturdy pillar on which to construct a new way forward. 
The thesis argues that the carriage of goods by sea – especially the segment 
specifically related to the container sector – is currently part of a more expanded enterprise 
where all the parties perform their obligations not exclusively depending on one principal 
party, but rather in accordance with a more extensive factual framework. This factual 
framework is created by the integration of the carriage of goods by sea with the whole supply 
chain. In this context, the research considers the supply chain as not only a process but also and 
especially a network; a common enterprise between different participants. Therefore third party 
protection should be considered from a supply chain perspective, not solely from a transport 
perspective. This work evaluates the rationale beyond this outlook and offers a new framework 
that does not rely merely on freedom of contract, autonomy of party and commercial 
convenience. This thesis proposes an original academic scheme using the factual context as a 
theoretical framework. Referring to the scenario outlined above, this thesis argues that, in the 
carriage of goods by sea, protection should now move from the willingness of the parties (X 
and Y) to the consideration that not only Z (but all the other parties that participate in the 
multilateral common enterprise) should rely on the protection as they are part of the common 
enterprise. This thesis suggests giving default protection to parties who help to move the cargo, 
regardless of their relationship with the main formal parties to the contract, the nature of their 
business, or the geographic area where they perform the business.  
The thesis will identify some of these categories of third party that could benefit from 
such protection. However, the list is not intended to be exhaustive; instead it should serve to 
add practical instances to the default position. 
 
                                                        
10 Article 1 (6). See also generally Tomotaka Fujita, ‘Performing Parties and Himalaya Protection’ (2009) 
Colloquium on the Rotterdam Rules 21 September 2009. 
11 The explanation of ‘performing party’ under the Rotterdam Rules, for instance, states that they perform any of 
the carrier’s obligations under the contract of carriage.  
12 Kirby (n.7) 
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1.2 Lack of theory and justification for a new research 
 
Although third party protection in the carriage of goods by sea is not a new topic, 
there is insufficient investigation regarding the rationale underpinning current thinking. As this 
chapter will show, third party protection has been written about extensively in the context of 
contract clauses, international conventions and domestic approaches, but an exhaustive 
explanation has not yet been given. The primary reason seems to be the very concept of a ‘third 
party’, which is unusual and unstable, and has evolved continuously and simultaneously with 
developments in commerce and transport.  
As explained by Tseng, Yuen and Taylor, in the past half century the role of 
transportation has been increasingly linked with logistics chain management. Consequently 
there has been considerable research in the area.13 The problem however has traditionally been 
viewed more from an economic perspective less from a legal perspective. Furthermore, 
examination of the literature from the perspective of the supply chain integration (with the 
shipping trade considered a substantial component of this) shows that this type of research has 
traditionally been focused on the bilateral relationships between two players in this chain. In 
particular, research into the issue has tended to lean towards the perspective of the carrier and 
the port, particularly where economic concerns are prioritised; scant research has been 
undertaken that considers the system as a network.14 This chapter seeks to identify gaps in this 
research and, in doing so, provide a theoretical basis for developing the research methodology. 
In terms of doctorate research in law, the concept of multilateralism is mentioned by 
Hoeks15 with reference to the law applicable to a multimodal carriage context, and by Besong16 
regarding the modern role of liability in transport law. In contrast, this thesis looks at the 
problem from a supply chain perspective rather than a multimodal perspective. 
 From a purely legal standpoint, third party protection is a grey area, not well-defined 
or easily definable. Its nuanced character and the descriptive nature of so much of the relevant 
                                                        
13 Yung-Yu Tseng, Wen Long Yue and Michael A P Taylor, ‘The Role of Transportation in the Logistic Chain’ 
(2005) 5 Proceedings of the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies 1657.  
14 Shang-Min Lin, Andrew Potter, Stephen Pettit and Rawindaran Nair, ‘A Systems View Of Supply Network 
Integration In Maritime Logistics’ (2014) 19th Logistics Research Network Conference (Huddersfield, UK, 3–5 
September 2014). 
15 Marian Hoeks, The Law Applicable to the Multimodal Contract for the Carriage of Goods (Kluwer Law 
International 2010). 
16 Christine Besong, ‘Towards a Modern Role for Liability in Multimodal Transport Law’ (PhD thesis, University 
College London, 2007). 
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research provided sufficient impetus for the author to undertake this research.  
Thus far, the problem has been examined according to exculpatory and limitation of 
liability clauses,17 commenting on specific cases,18 specific categories of third party,19 
international conventions,20 and problems that different jurisdictions have in accepting third 
party protection.21 There is not, however, any research that conceptualises the protection of 
third parties, considering and linking all the aspects mentioned above in order to ask whether 
there is a sound, current theory to justify the protection. This thesis does not merely describe 
the problem but also analyses validity as a solid protection for third parties, using the 
theoretical framework as a reference. It has been noted that although there is material on this 
topic, there is insufficient rationale to date. 
De Vellis, quoted by Woo states: “to conceptualise a concept or phenomenon by 
identifying components of the concept or phenomenon is crucial when they are, in nature, 
abstract, or hard to define, or in lack of definition”.22 Third parties are not an easily definable 
category and this sentence has therefore served as a constant source of inspiration throughout 
this research. There is a lack of definition regarding third parties and where definitions exist 
there is an even greater lack of consensus. Thus, conceptualising as outlined by De Vellis has 
been necessary. Third party issues in the carriage of goods by sea have been a focus of general 
research since the 1950s and 1960s. In this period, the two leading cases were Adler v Dixon (a 
British case from which the Himalaya clause takes its name) and the United States case of 
                                                        
17 Among others: Chen Liang, ‘Benefits and Burdens of Third Parties Under Exception Clauses in Bills of Lading’ 
(1999) 24 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 225; J.C. Sweeney, ‘Crossing the Himalayas: Exculpatory Clauses in 
Global Transport – Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v James N. Kirby’ (2005) 36 Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce, 155.  
18 Among others: Haylin Low, ‘Shipowners’ Liabilities: Elder Dempster Revisited’ (1998) 13 Maritime Law 
Association of Australia and New Zealand Journal, 42. (1998) 13 MLAANZ Journal – Part 1; William H Theis, 
‘Third-Party Beneficiaries in Multimodal Contracts of Carriage. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v  James N. Kirby, 
Pty Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 385, 2004 AMC 2705 (2004)’ (2005) 36 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 201. 
19 Per Zerman, ‘Liability for Stevedore Damage Claims’ (Skuld Copenhagen, 13 February 2012) 
<http://www.skuld.com/topics/legal/defence/liability-for-stevedore-damage-claims/> Accessed 10 March 2014; D 
R Owen, R B Acomb Jr and J J Donovan, The MLA Report (The Maritime Law Association of the United States, 
1984) Report Document 652 (The MLA Report); Edwin Anderson III, ‘The Status and Associated Liability of 
Ocean Freight Forwarders’ (2009) 36 Transportation Law Journal 121. 
20 Francesco Berlingieri, ‘A Comparative Analysis Of The Hague-Visby Rules, The Hamburg Rules And The 
Rotterdam Rules’ (Paper delivered at the General Assembly of the AMD, Marrakesh, 5–6 November 2009); Fujita 
(n 10); The CMI International Working Group on the Rotterdam Rules, ‘Questions and Answers on The 
Rotterdam Rules’ (Ver. 2009.10.10); Anomi Wanigasekera ‘Comparison of Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules’ 
(Messrs Julius & Creasy, 1 November 1992)  
<http://www.juliusandcreasy.com/inpages/publications/pdf/comparison_of_hague_and_hamburg-AW.pdf> 
Accessed 13 April 2014. 
21 Tan Pei Meng, ‘Circumventing the Privity Rule in Malaysia’ (2009) 4 International Journal of 
Information Technology and Decision Making 262; Fernanda Ruiz, ‘Legal Study of Sea Carrier Limitation of 
Liability According to Brazilian Law in Comparison to the Hague-Visby Regime’ (2010) 1 Lawinter Review 1, 
144. 
22 Su-Han Woo, ‘Seaport Supply Chain Integration and Orientation, And Their Impact on Performance’ (PhD 
thesis, Cardiff University, 2010).  
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Herd v Krawill. As a starting point for the advancement and development of the role of third 
parties in the carriage of goods by sea, this area makes for engaging investigation.23  
The concept of the carriage of goods by sea as an expanded network of interests – 
rather than as a bilateral relationship – has been explored according to the position of 
shipowner and charterer24 by Tetley, who has been one of the major exponents in the theory of 
third party protection. In his work Marine Cargo Claims, Tetley explains that the carriage of 
goods by sea is a ‘joint venture’ between shipowner and charterer with regard to cargo 
interests. 
 
Carriage of goods by sea can be characterised as a joint venture between the 
shipowners and the charterers, because they share the responsibilities of a carrier 
under the HVR, which cannot be contracted out of in virtue of Article 3(8) HVR. As a 
result of the shared responsibilities, the carrier and the charterer should be held 
jointly and severally responsible as carriers.25 
 
It is often reaffirmed that Courts should consider charterers and shipowners as both 
the carrier.26 This thesis accepts this concept and seeks to develop it through the assertion that, 
in the current state of carriage of goods by sea, the common enterprise exists amongst a variety 
of different players and not only between shipowner and charterer. Tetley is among the 
scholars who have written most about the concept of third parties. His works include serious 
                                                        
23 This research commenced in 2011 and the signing of the Rotterdam Rules only two years before demonstrated 
the willingness of the international community to accept the carriage of goods by sea as a multilateral system 
(performing parties). The Kirby case (n 7) was decided in 2004, opening the door to the commercial approach in 
identifying third party protection and outlining the carriage of goods by sea as a complex network of interests 
reaching beyond the sea’s boundaries. In the 1999, the UK (which has historically always been involved in 
shipping law and is relatively the most reluctant to accept third party protection) enacted the Contract (Right of 
Third Parties) Act 1999. On the basis of these three developments, which represent a significant change in the law 
relating to third parties (respectively from case law, statutory law and international law), the author decided to link 
these aspects with a theoretical argument. 
24 The problems between shipowner and charterer have been the subject of long and protracted discussion in the 
carriage of goods by sea field. It is one of the first examples of third parties seeking protection (as stated in Elder, 
Dempster (n 3). The issue is that under the charter party, only one of the two parties is a carrier. Therefore, the 
other (namely the shipowner) has to be treated as a third party in order to enjoy protection. In order to understand 
this topic, some background on charterparties may be useful. As Spurin describes, “a charterparty is a contract for 
the hire of a vessel. The vessel may be hired for a voyage (Voyage Charterparty) or for a period of time (Time 
Charterparty). The hire may be simple, that is, the shipowner remains in control of the vessel and retains 
responsibility for it, or the hire may be by demise or bare boat, whereby the charterer becomes the temporary 
owner of the vessel and thus responsible for it”. Corbet Spurin, ‘The Law of International Trade and Carriage of 
Goods’ (Ch 1, Nationwide Mediation Academy for NADR UK Ltd 2004) 
<http://www.nadr.co.uk/articles/published/shipping/001CHAPTERONETRADE.pdf> Accessed 17 March 2013. 
25 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Ch 10, 4th ed. Editions Yvon Blais 2007). According to this thesis the 
concept of joint venture, as expressed by Tetley, is expanding to other participants.  
26 William Tetley, Case Comment: The House of Lords decision in The Starsin (2004) 35 JMLC 121-139. 
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attempts to propound the concept of third party protection enshrined by the Hamburg Rules, as 
well as numerous articles on Himalaya clauses in contracts. Tetley defines the Himalaya clause 
as, “an ingenious, short-term solution to a difficult problem, but … a solution which raises 
infinitely more problems than it solves”.27  
Regarding the protection of third parties from international conventions of the carriage 
of goods by sea, Fujita, amongst the others, has outlined the substantial distinction between 
maritime and non-maritime performing parties and the legal consequences that flow from such 
a distinction.28 Furthermore, Chuah advances the concept that third parties should be now seen 
in the context of a broader and integrated framework, examining the specific complex position 
of the Terminal Operators in the Rotterdam Rules.29 Additionally, in support of the concept of 
multilateral common enterprise, Merkin explains that: 
 
The law of contract as perfected in the nineteenth century was based on a model of 
bilateral transactions. The reality is, and to some extent was at the time, that many 
commercial contracts form part of a wider set of arrangements or chain of 
relationships.30 
 
The same author asserts that contracting is about allocating risks between parties of 
the contract.31 It follows, therefore, that once third parties are considered to perform part of the 
contract, then the allocation of risks must also consider third parties. As this thesis explains, 
third party protection therefore falls into a broader discussion of risk allocation between parties 
to the contract, and whether a third party is factually an outsider or actually part of such a 
contract. 
This work acknowledges that the law in this respect is already moving towards 
sectoral regulation, and that multilaterality is not a completely unexplored topic in academia. 
Recognising this, it is reaffirmed that the role of third parties is central and cannot be left to the 
will of the two main contracting parties. The originality of this research lies in its 
rationalisation and explanation of the significance of the role of third parties in the carriage of 
                                                        
27 William Tetley, ‘The Himalaya clause – Revisited’ (2003) 9 Journal of International Maritime Law 40. The 
same concept is also expressed in William Tetley, “The Himalaya clause: Heresy or Genius?” (2003) 9 Journal of 
Maritime Law and Commerce 111, 113. 
28 Fujita (n 10). 
29 Jason Chuah, ‘Impact of the Rotterdam Rules on the Himalaya clause: the Port terminal Operators’ Case’ in D 
Rhidian Thomas (ed), The Carriage of Goods by Sea Under the Rotterdam Rules (Informa 2010). 
30 Robert Merkin, Privity of Contract, Privity of Contract: The Impact of the Contracts (Right of Third Parties) 
Act 1999 (Oxford, Taylor & Francis 2013) 67.  
31 Ibid. 
15 
 
goods by sea through the lens of the supply chain as a whole. 
This new approach towards the nature of third party protection is more up-to-date and 
thus better suited to considering the contemporary nature of the carriage of goods by sea. 
Therefore, the premises of this research are as follows:  
 
1) The factual context of the shipping industry has been reshaped. 
2) As a result, third parties are part of the enterprise and not someone outside it. 
3) The law (although moving towards a more contemporary sectoral approach) is still 
related to an outdated approach. 
 
Under the innovative light of the multilateral common enterprise, and using the 
rationale of third parties in the carriage of goods by sea as a conceptual thread, this research 
provides a more current rationale for the protection. The research question at the heart of this 
thesis is the result of a consideration that third parties should – at least in the carriage of goods 
by sea – be a norm of a contract. It follows that third parties should not, therefore, be a party 
sitting outside the contract, but rather a third party to the contract.  
It seems appropriate here to highlight the lack of uniform definition of a third party, 
both in domestic law and in international conventions. The Oxford dictionary states that a third 
party is, “a person or group besides the two primarily involved in a situation”.32 For the 
purposes of this thesis, the definition provided by the Contract (Right of Third Parties) Act 
1999 shall be used. The Act defines a third party as anyone outside the contract.33 In this 
specific research, delimitation has narrowed this definition to contracts, international 
conventions and domestic and international law related to the carriage of goods by sea. 
As a conceptual construct of the author’s making, there is currently not an existing or 
widely-held understanding of the term ‘multilateral common enterprise’. A full description will 
thus be provided later in the thesis. 
The idea for this research emerged while the author was researching the electronic bill 
of lading. Through that research, it became apparent that, in a bill of lading, third parties are 
still not considered part of the contract. Instead they are seen as an outsider, although they 
perform most of the carrier’s duties. It also became clear that, even when the industry makes 
significant technical or logistical progress – as in the development of the electronic bill of 
lading – the law is often not able to keep up. This sparked a desire to test the assumption of the 
                                                        
32 Oxford Dictionary, ‘Third Party’ (2015) <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/third-party> 
Accessed 27 April 2015. 
33   Precisely, Article 1(1) of the Act defines a ‘third party’ as a person who is not a party to a contract. 
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traditional rationale behind third party protection in the carriage of goods by sea, particularly 
since it appeared not to have been fully addressed. The author also believes that the nature of 
the shipping industry itself is responsible for the discrepancy between the factual context of the 
carriage of goods by sea and the rationale behind third party protection within it. The shipping 
industry tends to be a very practical field, generally averse to change and more focused on 
simply finding a solution to a problem rather than providing a justification for that solution as 
well. However, the author strongly believes that this is something that can be undertaken by the 
academic research community in order, ultimately, to provide implementation of an accepted 
practice. As such, throughout the thesis, the rationale behind the protection of third parties in 
the carriage of goods by sea is stressed and the originality of a sound current theory why they 
should be protected is demonstrated. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
It is strongly believed that the solution to third party protection in the carriage of 
goods by sea lies in addressing the lack of theoretical framework, the lack of a multilateral 
approach, and the lack of rationale.  
The methodology applied to this research is based on the interrelation of distinct 
factors assembled in order to support the validity and the innovation of the research question. 
The methodology is explained in this chapter as follows: First, this chapter will construct the 
fundamentals of the theoretical framework and research question; second, it will comply with 
delimitations; third, the legal framework on which, during the thesis, the theoretical framework 
is applied, will be delineated.  
 
1.3.1 Theoretical framework and research question 
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis starts with the assumption that the role of 
third parties has changed as a result of the integration of the carriage of goods by sea with the 
supply chain more broadly. It is argued that currently the protection of third parties should 
derive more from a factual context than autonomy of party. More precisely, this research 
argues that the trend of autonomy of parties in the carriage of goods by sea should be the result 
of the factual context defined as multilateral common enterprise.  
It is based on the idea that, although related to the carriage of goods by sea, its role 
should be considered within a macro perspective of the supply chain, where third parties are to 
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be accepted as part of the whole structure. Thus, the concept of third parties should no longer 
exist solely as defined by the traditions and legalities of the carriage of goods by sea in 
isolation. 
Within the traditional frameworks that govern thinking about the carriage of goods by 
sea (i.e., tackle-to-tackle34 and port-to-port35) it is easy to understand who is part of the process 
(carrier and shipper) and who is outside (third parties). With the more recent door-to-door 
framework, the circle of actors has become bigger, but still possible to define. Within the wider 
picture of the supply chain – with transport being part and parcel of – third parties have lost 
their role as third parties and have become stakeholders in the chain. 
The fact that modes and processes of carriage are continuously evolving represents the 
first peculiarity and difficulty in the issue of third parties in the carriage of goods by sea. 
National and international legal instruments are not always fast enough to deal with such 
evolutions. In recent decades, containerisation and technological developments have facilitated 
multimodal carriage requiring uniformity and harmonisation in terms of legal framework. Such 
carriage evolution from tackle-to-tackle to door-to-door has exposed the inadequacy of 
previous regulatory instruments, leaving the trade with some uncertainties.36 The ‘status’ of 
third parties is a prime example; it has changed considerably since the time when carriage was 
tackle-to-tackle or port-to-port. As a matter of fact, with the lengthening of the transport chain 
and the complex of interests involved, the position of third parties in the carriage of goods by 
sea is presently highly ambiguous and complicated in definition. The lack of uniformity and 
ensuing confusion raised by the many and substantially different conventions on the carriage of 
goods by different modes do little to encourage possible solutions.  
Though insufficiently modern from a commercial perspective, tackle-to-tackle and 
port-to-port systems solve innumerable problems, covering detectable specifics of carriage and 
providing better-defined roles. 
                                                        
34 J. Bes and N. Lopez, Bes’ Chartering And Shipping Terms (11th edn, Barker & Howard Ltd 1992) defines 
tackle-to-tackle as “when the loading commences, that is, when the vessel’s cargo-handling equipment is attached 
to the goods, and ends when the goods have been discharged from the vessel or removed from its cargo-handling 
equipment”.  
35 Port-to-port means from loading port to discharging port. Bes defines port to port transport as “the traditional 
form of carriage of goods by sea where one carrier carried the goods from one port to another port” (ibid.) 
However, there are no official definitions of ports and interpretation of the meaning is left to national legislations, 
which often creates problems.  
36 See generally, Renato Midoro and Francesco Parola, Le Strategie delle Imprese di Linea nello Shipping ed 
Intermodalita: Dinamiche Competitive e Forme di Cooperazione (Franco Angeli, Italy 2013), who in this regard 
explains that the world economy has changed dramatically. The open market and globalisation have affected the 
transport sector and containerisation has engendered a complete transformation through the introduction of 
multimodalism as a new concept. Ports have had to change from being locations of mere loading and discharging 
to becoming an integrated system network of transport.  
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Although it matches the new transport requirements from a commercial point of view, 
the fact that the carriage of goods by sea is part of a broader supply chain creates problems 
such as mandatory liability systems to be applied to the different stages involved in the 
transport of goods, as well as expanded periods for which each carrier is responsible. These can 
clash with other liability systems that might be applied to the carriage of goods by other 
means.37 Today, because contracts rarely operate on a tackle-to-tackle basis, the types of 
people for whom the carrier is responsible are considerably more numerous than they were in 
the middle of the last century. Goods being traded internationally are usually handled by 
multiple carriers, using a variety of forms of transport.  
Considering such inconsistencies between commercial demand on the one hand and 
legal frameworks on the other, this research evaluates the lack of certainty as to the law 
applicable to the position of third parties in the carriage of goods by sea. The matter will be 
addressed by means of analysis of the current legal framework in relation to third parties and 
an evaluation of how, within this framework, the law applicable to a third party may be 
uncovered.  
It is appropriate to mention here that, although in the past the roles of ‘carrier’ and 
‘shipper’ were easily identified and defined, the same is no longer true. The carrier used to be 
someone who entered into a contract of carriage with a shipper. The definition has since been 
gradually expanded to comprehend (according to contract and international conventions) first 
the actual carrier, performing carrier and performing party. Nowadays, the job of carrier is 
often arranged by a freight forwarder or a non-vessel operating common carrier (NVOCC). The 
situation is the same for the concept of the shipper. In the past, the shipper was defined as “an 
owner or person for whose account the ocean transportation is provided or the person to whom 
delivery is to be made”.38 In recent years a variety of entities emerged as intermediaries 
between the shipper of the goods and the provider of the transport services, taken in this case to 
be the ocean carrier, including shippers’ associations, NVOCCs, transportation brokers, freight 
forwarders and export trading companies. Identifying the shippers in modern-day supply 
chains is not always straightforward; many service providers and suppliers contribute to the 
process of transporting cargo across international borders. Historically, the distinction between 
shipper and consignee was more easily drawn; buyers and sellers would handle shipments 
directly, with the assistance of, for example, a port terminal and the carrier. Invariably, trade 
                                                        
37 Tomotaka Fujita, ‘The Comprehensive Coverage of the New Convention: Performing Parties and the 
Multimodal Implication’ (2009) 44 Texas International Law Journal 3, 349. 
38 For the definition of carrier and shipper see Bes & N. Lopez (n 34). 
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today is far more complex; identification of the actual manufacturer, shipper, and final 
consignee is less clear-cut. Changes in payment methods and the various means of 
transportation have also expanded the liability and risk factors, as logistics services 
(particularly multimodal transportation) are central to effective supply chain management.39 
In the past, the carrier and the shipper were the most economically and legally 
powerful parties. Presently, after much commercial and economic evolution, revolution and 
market cycles, the circumstances are totally different. The industry is much more capital 
intensive rather than labour intensive. In particular, in the carriage of goods by sea, the carrier 
cannot perform all of the activities concerned with the carriage but it nonetheless assumes 
responsibility for the whole leg.40 Moreover, with longer contracts, parties to the contract 
request higher and more specific levels of protection. The problem therefore hinges on the 
conflict between the commercial need for the parties to contract with third parties in order to 
carry out their duties and the fact that, once involved, the third party will require a certain legal 
protection. 
The higher speed which nowadays allows cargo to move more quickly from one port 
to another and consequently from one jurisdiction to the other, has alarmed the Chamber of 
Shipping that has stated that the applicable law should be the same and that the international 
community needs certainty and uniformity in order to reduce confusion and avoid increasing 
insurance and legal costs.41 
The impact of electronic solutions and information technology on the shipping 
industry have also had their effects. The electronic platforms created from companies working 
at the electronic solutions and the general automatization of the shipping industry increase the 
                                                        
39 R. Masakorala (2012) ‘Who is a ‘shipper’ on a bill of lading?’, Daily FT, >http://www.ft.lk/article/99753/Who-
is-a-%E2%80%98shipper--on-a-bill-of-lading?>, Accessed 5 April 2016. 
40 See Chuah (n 29) referring to the Australian case of Chapman Marine Pty Ltd v Wilhemsen Lines (1999) FCA 
178 at para 67. Midoro and Parola (n 36) argue that, in general, carriers moved away from using labour 
contractors such as stevedores. Instead, these carriers became highly capital-intensive parties who wielded serious 
sway in negotiations. Before the end of the 1960s, private capital did not have any kind of role in the port sector; 
only a few nations permitted it. Over the last 20 years, however, this has changed substantially. Several capital 
investment entities warrant mention here: AIG Highstair Capital – a combined venture of five private equity funds 
– is responsible for more than 50 ports across the United States and South America (the Ports America Group); 
Goldman Sachs Infrastructure Partners own 49% of SSA Marine and 23% of Associated British Ports; Macquaire, 
the Australian banking group boast a total throughput of 4.8 million TEU; Deutsche Bank holds shares different 
ports such as of New York, Prince Rupert, Liverpool and Clydeport (with a throughput of 3.2 million TEU). Also 
relevant here is the fact that cargo owners now require Value Added Services (i.e., transport and logistics) in 
addition to multimodal transport. Moreover, this move towards capital-intensity has been accompanied by a 
growth in information intensity. The whole sector is now much more reliant upon – and affected by – electronic 
data interchange (EDI).  
41 FIATA Position on the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly 
by Sea (The “Rotterdam Rules”)’, (UNCITRAL 11, Doc. MTI/507 Annex II August 2009) 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/transport/rotterdam_rules/FIATApaper.pdf> Accessed 1 September 
2011. 
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integration of the shipping sector in the supply chain.42 
The port community system must be taken into account. The various participants in 
the carriage of goods by sea look to ports as physical centres of integrated infrastructure, 
providing loading and unloading, land access, quays, facilities for storage, physical security, 
and so on. Ports continually invest in this infrastructure to improve efficiency and remain 
competitive, and, as such, these factors have been key drivers in deciding where and how to 
inject such investments. Ports also function as centres of ‘infostructure’ integration; computer 
and information systems connecting players across the logistics community help to improve 
the monitoring of operational processes, from start to finish.43 This does little, however, to help 
the protection of third parties in the carriage of goods by sea. 
Taking the above into account, this research does not analyse simply the protection of 
third parties in the carriage of goods by sea. It also analyses and justifies its argument by 
demonstrating that it is inappropriate to consider a third party in the carriage of goods by sea to 
be any party ‘outside’ the legal framework. Instead, the research shows, it is now appropriate to 
consider third parties as an integral third part of the system. Consequently the legal protection 
in this regard should not simply emerge as an extension of the main parties’ protection but 
should instead be considered and justified as a protection to which third parties are entitled by 
virtue of their part in the multilateral common enterprise. 
 It is argued that third party protection is significant for the future of the trade. As will 
be shown in detail, determination of the available protection is currently left to the contractual 
clauses and party autonomy. The problem must be tackled and understood from the roots 
upward, and not allowed to be subject to the instability of contract clauses.  
As already discussed, the carriage of goods by sea is already moving to a sectoral 
regulation. However, this research argues that the boundaries of this sectoral regulation 
regarding third parties are not adequately defined in order to justify the role that third parties 
currently have in the carriage scenario. In particular: 
 
1) The carriage of goods by sea (as per contracts) is still broadly regulated bilaterally. 
                                                        
42 As Martin Christopher explains, “the whole nature of logistics management has been dramatically changed by 
the information technology revolution.” Martin Christopher, M., Logistics and Supply Chain Managment (2nd 
edn, Prentice Hall 2011) 231. 
43 On the topic see generally International Port Community Systems Association, ‘Port Community Systems’ 
(2014) <http://www.epcsa.eu/pcs> Accessed 3rd December 2015; Alan Long, ‘Port Community Systems’ (2009) 
3 World Customs Journal; United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, ‘How to develop a Port Community 
System’ (2011) <https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trade/Trade_Facilitation_Forum/BkgrdDocs/HowToDe-
velopPortCommunitySystem-EPCSAGuide.pdf> Accessed 3 December 2015. 
21 
 
The multilateral approach has not been introduced as it has in other fields.44  
2) International Conventions (specifically the Rotterdam Rules) acknowledge 
multilateralism. However, the Rotterdam Rules have not been ratified and in any case 
this thesis argues that their geographic approach is not appropriate; the conventions 
currently in use (Hague/Hague Visby Rules45 and Hamburg Rules46) approach the 
issue mainly from a bilateral perspective as it will be detailed in Chapter 3. 
3) Domestic law (both case and statutory law) from major shipping jurisdictions (that 
this thesis will analyse) show a disparity of decisions and lack of uniformity. As 
reported by Sweeney, the rationale for approval and limitation of Himalaya clauses in 
England now differs from the rationale in the United States provided by the Kirby 
decision and this divergence demonstrates the need for an international solution to this 
major trade problem.47 The Kirby decision in the United States appears to be a first 
step towards some harmonization, (for example, deciding to allow the train company 
the benefit of the bill of lading in question) giving justice to a commercial approach. 
 
It is believed that the solution has to go beyond mere contractual and insurance 
considerations. The global nature of the business must be taken into account, not only from a 
geographical perspective but also from a chain perspective; from manufacturer to consumer.  
This research therefore attempts to redraft the boundaries of this multilateralism. This 
research is invaluable as it raises concerns and clarifies certain aspects in order to find a more 
adequate protection for the lege ferenda of the transport. 
 
1.3.2 Limitations and delimitations 
 
The limitations of this research derive mainly from the fact that it borrows an 
economic theoretical framework to be applied to the law of the carriage of goods by sea. The 
intention is not to enter into economic discussion regarding supply chains or economies of 
scope and scale. Instead the thesis applies existing economic literature on the topic as a 
foundation for the theoretical framework.  
                                                        
44 This is not considered as an anomaly. However, as it will be shown later on in the thesis, there are other systems 
showing a more network approach towards contracts.  
45 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading (1924); First 
Protocol (1968); Second Protocol (1979).  
46 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978).  
47 Sweeney (n 17). 
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The research is also limited by certain identified factors. For example, there is lack of 
clear definition for the term ‘third party’, which, as previously stated, it is not a term of art. 
Moreover, it is very difficult to find a solution provided by law since the supply chain, in 
contrast to carriage, is not currently seen as a formal structure. Though controlled by many 
regulations, there is no single law regarding supply chains. 
Further limitations also arise from the application of doctrinal legal research to an 
innovative theoretical framework mainly based on a factual context, and the difficulty of 
delineating a framework of legal protection in an industry that is constantly evolving.  
The thesis focuses specifically on the legal protection of third parties in a bilateral 
relationship between carrier and shipper in the carriage of goods by sea. It does not consider 
the protection that third parties provide for themselves but only the protection currently 
extended to them by the carrier and shipper under current legal framework.48  
 Particular attention has been paid to the relationship with the carrier’s third parties 
because it is this relationship that seems to raise the most issues. The shipper’s position is not 
outside the scope of this thesis,49 but it is of lesser concern. This is primarily because, in recent 
decades, the advent of multimodalism and the consequent vertical integration of supply chains 
have completely changed the roles of third parties, but the protection offered to them has 
remained substantively the same. Recently, innovations in this sector have centered around the 
vertical expansion of carriers and their involvement in port activities and logistic functions 
affecting the relationship between carrier and third parties.  
The research herein is focused on both breaking bulk and multimodal/containerised 
types of transport. Recently, however, problems have tended to relate more to the latter due to 
the type of carriage; there is a closer relationship between carrier and third parties and more 
conflict between sea and land operators. Although the issue of third party protection in the 
carriage of goods by sea is tackled as a whole, this thesis acknowledges that the problem 
occurs more in the container market and therefore has a greater effect on this portion of the 
shipping industry.50 
                                                        
48 In this context, as reported in W. David Angus (‘Legal Implications of “The Container Revolution” in 
International Carriage of Goods’ (1968) 14 McGill Law Journal 395), there are highly evolved insurance scheme 
for instance in order to legally protect the interests of categories of parties such as stevedores, freight forwarders 
and terminal operators. However, this thesis deals only with the protection that third parties have from the main 
parties to the contract.  
49 Chuah (n 29) explains that the protection of third parties is important for both carrier and shipper. In a tackle-to-
tackle type of arrangement, it is probable that the port terminal operator is actually the shipper’s independent 
contractor. 
50 In this regard, data compiled by Clarkson Research Services (reported in Shipping Review and Outlook (2015) 
108–109 <http://www.crsl.com/acatalog/shipping-review-and-outlook.html> Accessed 12 June 2015 show that as 
of 1 January 2015, the world fleet of container ships totalled 5,106 ships with a deadweight capacity of 227.9 
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Furthermore, work has been restricted to private law. The public aspect of third party 
protection has been left outside the scope of the research. The reason is that the factual current 
rationale of the theoretical framework relies on the private nature of the relationship between 
carrier, cargo interests and third parties.  
The research is not looking at the problem from a multimodal perspective but from a 
perspective of the carriage of goods by sea and its current role in the supply chain. This thesis 
acknowledges multimodalism, but does not take it as a benchmark. This is because 
multimodal/door-to-door carriage is considered a natural evolution of the carriage of goods by 
sea. In fact despite the expansion of the multimodal framework, it is still between two parties 
(the multimodal carrier and the shipper), even though third parties exist. On the other hand, the 
integration of the transport with the supply chain, seen from the network of parties performing 
it, is considered a revolution.51 Accordingly, this thesis analyses the gap between the fact-based 
outline where the carriage of goods by sea is part of the supply chain, and the impossibility (at 
least for the foreseeable future) of changing the legal instrument scenario.  
Analogies with civil law will be drawn, but this work addresses common law 
jurisdictions primarily, because of the difficult approach to third party protection in the carriage 
of goods by sea. Although this research is based mainly on a doctrinal approach, work based 
on the collection of statistical data has also been carried out.52 
In the final chapter, recommendations will be made for areas that are rich with 
possibility for future research. The research has drawn a methodological delimitation on the 
topic mentioned for future investigation. These topics have been analysed and evaluated for 
what is the main research question in this thesis.53 The thesis applies these analogies to 
supplement the theory herein, and although delving deeper into each argument might prove 
interesting, it lies beyond the scope of this examination.  
                                                                                                                                                                               
million deadweight tonnes (DWT). Container ships are usually expressed in TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) 
capacity but for the purposes of comparison with the world fleet of all ships of all types, deadweight is used as this 
is the common measurement for the other ship types. The entire world fleet of all commercial merchant ships on 1 
January 2015 amounted to 89,426 ships of 1746.6m DWT. Therefore, the container ship fleet’s deadweigh t 
capacity comprised only 13% of the entire world fleet’s deadweight capacity. 
51 It obviously has to be acknowledged that containerisation and multimodalism are among the main causes of the 
expansion of carriage into part of a broader scheme. 
52 The thesis provides an original empirical and comparative study of courts and judicial decisions in United States 
so as to understand which third party was involved, for which protection and if there are any reference to the 
concept of multilateral common enterprise. The statistical table attached is not intended to be exhaustive, 
especially given the vast number of cases on the topic. Rather, it aims to add a more detailed outlook of the cases 
mentioned in the United States section of Chapter 4.  
53 Amongst the others, multilateral protection from a different industry as well as multilateral insurance and the 
perspective of civil law will be suggested. 
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This thesis does not aim to impact on discussions of the carriage of goods by sea as a 
whole. Instead, it offers a different alternative regarding specific cases where parties (carrier, 
cargo interests and third parties) wish to regulate their positions in a different way.  
The research boundaries of this study consider the economic and risk reallocation 
linked to transport and, in turn, their impact on third party protection. This issue is dealt with in 
the next chapter. It is appropriate, however, to re-iterate the fact that the major impact stems 
from the integration of the carriage of goods by sea with the broader supply chain.54 
As Heaver states, the global sourcing and outsourcing of logistics functions have 
required the transportation industry to provide integrated logistics services covering wider 
geographical extension.55 These challenges have moved and integrated the transport industry 
into global supply chains.56 In this context, there have been different processes of integration 
(both vertically and horizontally).57 It is widely held that, in this commercial factual revolution, 
third parties have the most complicated position. Analysis of third parties is thus particularly 
engaging because their locus has shifted from the peripheries of the carriage of goods by sea to 
an integral part. The issue is to what extent third parties should be allowed the same protection 
as the traditional contract parties. Such allowances are bounded by several factors that will be 
deeper analysed during the work. Such as the fact that third parties have to be mentioned 
somewhere (e.g., contracts, international conventions, or statutory law), and, specifically from 
the perspective of the carriage of goods by sea, they have to perform one of the carrier’s duties 
under the contract and often the duty has to be of “maritime nature”.  
The problem emerges because the sphere of the carriage of goods by sea has expanded 
but the regulations have not. Accordingly, this research argues that third parties today need 
legal protection because they are a de facto part of the enterprise, even if formally they still 
reside outside it. The underlying problem of the existing legal system is that for too long it has 
been linked to the mode-by-mode basis and considered transport as a separate entity from the 
supply chain; something that is no longer the case.58  
The problem of limiting the protection only to specific categories has been taken into 
account. The author has firstly considered ‘the third party beneficiary rule’ (otherwise known 
                                                        
54 Woo (n 22). 
55 T. Heaver, H. Meersman and E. Van de Voorde, ‘Co-Operation and Competition in International Container 
Transport: Strategies for Ports’ (2001) 28 Maritime Policy and Management 3, 293.  
56 Woo (n 22). 
57 Heaver et al. (n 55). 
58 As stated by Paul Stephen Dempsey, ‘The Law of Intermodal Transportation: What It Was, What It Is, What It 
Should Be’ (2000) 27 Transportation Law Journal 367. 
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as Melvin Eisenberg’s approach). As specifically reported by Hevia, according to this approach 
third-party beneficiaries should be allowed to enforce a contract only if: 
 
1) “Allowing the beneficiary to enforce the contract is a necessary or important means 
of effectuating the contracting parties’ performance objectives, as manifested in the 
contract read in the light of surrounding circumstances. 
2) Allowing the beneficiary to enforce the contract is supported by reasons of policy or 
morality independent of contract law and would not conflict with the contracting 
parties’ performance objectives”.59 
 
As Eisenberg sees it, the former helps parties to pursue their own interests. Permitting 
a third party to enforce a contract guarantees that contracting parties’ objectives are prioritised, 
rather than simply affording them such benefit.60 The research takes into account this concept 
but extends it from the benefit of the main parties to the benefit of all the parties in need.  
In doing this, the thesis could be exposed to the following question: what is the limit 
of the protection? The Neighbour principle states that: 
 
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably 
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? 
The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act 
that I ought reasonably to have them in my contemplation as being so affected when I 
am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.61 
 
‘Who is my neighbour’ is a test within tort law that essentially attempts to understand 
to whom a principle can apply. In this context, someone could ask: who is then in the 
multilateral common enterprise my neighbour? However, in applying the neighbour principle, 
there is a risk of repeating the mistakes made so far in the carriage of goods by sea, i.e., 
attempting to force definitions and draw lines. This thesis does not seek to understand ‘who is 
my neighbour’62 in the context of third party protection in the multilateral common enterprise. 
Instead, this thesis is based more on substance than label and the aim is to extend the protection 
                                                        
59 M Hevia, Reasonableness and Responsibility: A Theory of Contract Law (Springer Science & Business Media 
2012). 
60 Ibid. 
61  Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) AC 562, 580 per Lord Atkin (HL(Sc)). 
62 Ibid.  
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to whoever is ‘in need.’ In this respect, a general causal connection between the claimant’s 
claim and the defendant/third party (sufficient for a claim to exist) will allow protection to be 
extended to the defendant/third party. 
 
1.3.3 Legal framework 
 
Once the boundaries of the theoretical framework have been defined, it will be applied 
to the existing legal framework for the purposes of analysis and rationalisation. This thesis will 
analyse the legal efficiency of the status of third party protection in contracts, international 
conventions and domestic laws, rationalising the protection in relation to the argument of the 
research and making the consequent conclusions for each chapter. 
The objective is to engage the legal framework (i.e., what does the law say about third 
party protection) with the theoretical framework based on factual context (i.e., the current 
adequate rationale behind the protection). In particular, different theoretical aspects will be 
applied to the existing legal framework of contracts, international conventions and domestic 
law.  
Regarding contracts specifically, the thesis investigates whether the contract of the 
carriage of goods by sea protects third parties and to what extent the contract of the carriage of 
goods by sea is ready to receive protection as a multilateral system. 
Regarding international conventions, this thesis argues that they should follow the 
commercial approach rather than a geographic one. This will be analysed especially with 
regard to the maritime performing parties and the problem with the geographic approach of the 
Rotterdam Rules. 
On a domestic front, this thesis evaluates both the statutory law and case law of the 
two countries that have the greatest impact on the law governing the carriage of goods by sea: 
England63 and the United States.64 Investigations are made into the role and the importance of 
the substantive law in third party protection in shipping, despite the increasing dependence on 
private remedies and international solutions. This aspect is of crucial importance because it 
depicts the substantive framework of shipping today, and shows how this can affect third party 
protection at present. 
                                                        
63 The thesis supplements the English legal framework with an original theoretical approach on contract theory, 
designed to enhance third party protection in the carriage of goods by sea, and using the factual economic and risk 
contexts of the shipping industry as ballast for the argument. Moreover, a modern bailment approach on carriage 
of goods by sea will be advanced.  
64 As anticipated, the United States’ vast case law on the topic will be scrutinized through statistical work. 
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1.4 Structure 
 
Chapter 2 provides an outline of third party protection extant within the current 
contractual system and bilateral relationship between the parties of a two-party scheme. 
Specifically, third party protection is considered with respect to the allocation of risk between 
parties of a contract. The chapter also aims to familiarise the reader with precisely who is 
considered to be a third party under a contract of carriage of goods by sea, and to provide an 
outline of legal framework of the third party protection stated in clauses in contracts. An 
overview of how this protection has been regulated under clauses in contract of carriage of 
goods by sea will be given.65 In the second part of the chapter, the concept of multilateral 
common enterprise will be introduced and more fully explored. The current economic context 
of shipping is analysed in order to develop the theoretical framework of this research as a 
justification for the future of third party protection in the carriage of goods by sea. In particular, 
examination of the supply chain and the forms of shipping integration (both vertical and 
horizontal) will be undertaken. Furthermore, an overview of third parties, their role and 
importance in the carriage of goods by sea, and the significance of third parties (terminal 
operators, stevedores, freight forwarders, etc.) will be given. 
In Chapter 3, focus will turn to the international community’s perspective on the issue, 
i.e., dealing with third party protection in international conventions on the carriage of goods by 
sea. Starting with the history of the Harter Act, the chapter assesses the evolution of this 
perspective, noting that, at the time of the Act, there was no mention of third parties in the 
context of the carriage of goods by sea. Following the passing of the Harter Act, protection has 
become increasingly detailed and widespread with the introduction of the Hague Rules and the 
Visby Protocol, and even more so with emergence of the Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal 
Convention.66 Last but not the least, the Rotterdam Rules (not yet ratified) will be scrutinised. 
Specifically, these Rules show an innovative and highly criticised approach to the problem of 
third party protection, preferring a geographic rather than commercial approach.67 Chapter 3 
will also deal with the types of defences and limits accrued by the carrier, which third parties 
usually seek to acquire themselves through protection clauses from the Harter Act to the 
                                                        
65 Limitation and exculpatory provisions in contracts specify to whom the legal protection of liability extends, as 
well as representing – together with provisions in international conventions and domestic laws – the core of legal 
protection. In the context of the carriage of goods by sea, these identify various parties in addition to the carrier 
who may be expected to take part in the completion of the contract and who will thus benefit from the same 
protection. 
66 The United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods 1980 has never been ratified.  
67 This thesis differs in opinion. 
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Rotterdam Rules. Moreover, there will be further explanation of the rationale for recognition of 
third parties in international conventions on the carriage of goods by sea and what effects 
multimodal and containerisation have had on third parties. 
Chapter 4 will address the issue in the context of domestic legal systems. The 
common law tradition receives particular attention because it seems to have suffered the most 
problems. The juridical basis for the protection clauses under the common law system will also 
be analysed. This chapter considers the evolution of statutory and case law in recognising the 
growing importance of third parties. Furthermore, attention is paid to the change of emphasis 
within English law from consideration to consent, and whether the Contract (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999 is comprehensive, or if there is still the need for an implied contract. Third 
party protection in United States law will be analysed with specific reference to the evolution 
of domestic case law on the topic. 
Chapter 5 provides remarks and an outline for possible future research. In particular, 
the concept of channelling liability, multilateral insurance will be advanced as possible 
solutions and the various pros and cons framed for putative researchers. Moreover, a case is 
made for using civil law protection of third parties to assist with common law understanding 
and to shape future research. 
 
Chapter conclusion 
 
This chapter establishes the foundation for a profound and much needed evaluation of 
the third party protection framework. It further highlights the importance of perceiving third 
party protection through a modern, commercial lens, appropriate to the industry today. In turn, 
it is useful to understand how the shipping industry will be affected in years to come as the role 
of third parties continues to changes significantly.  
Once the theoretical aspects have been set and the issue framed from a conceptual 
perspective, all the players in the shipping industry could benefit from it. 
Furthermore, this chapter contends that, in contrast to current approaches, the 
framework of third party protection should not be based on the central role of the carrier and 
shipper in the carriage of goods by sea. This thesis argues instead that the position of third 
parties is constantly changing. Their role in the carriage of goods by sea is currently very 
different from the past, but the protection afforded them by the law has not changed 
commensurately. This lack of understanding creates inefficiency and calls for a replacement of 
the bilateral approach of protection with a multilateral approach. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The role and the evolution of third party protection in 
the carriage of goods by sea: From the bilateral to the 
multilateral system 
 
 
 
The completed transaction from seller’s warehouse to buyer’s warehouse now 
involves other participants in the processing and movement of the goods-participants 
who are land based and whose services were either unnoticed or unused in the past, 
and it is these new non-maritime participants for whom the protections of the ocean 
carrier are sought to be extended by Himalaya clauses.68 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
68 Sweeney (n 17). 
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2.1 Chapter background 
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is built on a fundamental notion; that the role 
of third parties in the carriage of goods has changed substantially. This change is due to the 
carriage of goods by sea (and carriage in general) being subsumed within a broader, common, 
factual system. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify and redefine the role of third parties in 
the carriage of goods by sea and, in particular, in the environment within which transportation 
currently resides in the aforementioned system.69 
This chapter will introduce the reader to the concept of third party protection in the 
carriage of goods by sea. It will also continue the theoretical thread and further develop the 
research question of this thesis. To support this argument, the rationale behind third party 
protection in the carriage of goods by sea is appropriately elaborated.  
The difficulty of this research – and thence its originality and validity – lies in the fact 
that, in reality, a supply chain is a de facto scenario that, at the moment, does not merit or 
demand proper regulation. In this chapter, the research considers the position of third parties in 
the carriage of goods by sea; previously at the edge of the traditional structure, third parties are 
now a fully integral part of the contemporary structure. The concept of ‘multilateral common 
enterprise’ is therefore proposed to develop a current and more adequate approach to third 
party protection in the carriage of goods by sea. This proposal derives from an analysis of the 
current shipping economic context and allocation of risk. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. Part A explains the role of the protection of third 
parties in the carriage of goods by sea when viewed as a bilateral system, as has been the case 
to date. Specifically: 
 
 An introduction to the limitation of liability; 
 its importance in the carriage of goods by sea; 
 how it has been extended to third parties as a tool to implement the allocation of legal 
and economic risk between the two parties of a contract; 
 how the risk of third parties has been managed; 
 the contractual legal framework. 
 
                                                        
69 To achieve it, this chapter will link the practical aspects of the shipping industry in order to explain the new 
factual context within third party protection should be enhanced. 
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Part B outlines the current factual context and how the role of third parties has 
changed as a result of its development. This part will, from a macro perspective, analyse how 
carriage has changed within the context of the supply chain as a result of integration, and how 
the role of third parties has changed accordingly. 
Here, it is appropriate to make an important distinction. On one hand, there are 
categories of third party that relate to the carrier and the vessel because they function as 
employees or servants of the carrier. These were already part of the problem surrounding third 
party protection when the issue first arose, between the beginning and the middle of the last 
century. On the other hand, contemporary third parties have emerged over recent years such as 
freight forwarders, terminal operators, non-vessel common carriers and inland carriers (these 
are mainly independent contractors). This thesis argues that the first group is now essentially 
incorporated within the position of carrier, and therefore no longer constitute third parties. The 
role of parties within the second group is not subsidiary to the carrier but is rather a proper, 
defined, specific role in the chain. Thus, this role cannot be defined as a third party anymore 
either.70  
This thesis defines third parties as ‘the third part of the enterprise’ to reflect the fact 
that they do not fit the classic perception of third parties.71 That is to say, they are not, in 
carriage of goods by sea, “a person or group besides the two primarily involved in a 
situation”.72  
 
  
                                                        
70 The Rotterdam Rules, as will be explained in the next chapter, apply a proper division of employees of the 
parties (including Master and Agents, who were previously considered third parties) and performing parties. Thus 
indicating that, strictly in this regards, the rules represent an improvement; see Carlo Corcione, ‘The Evolution of 
Third party protection in Carriage of Goods by Sea: From the Himalaya clause to the Himalaya Protection’ 
(2014) 49 European Transport Law Journal 3, 271.  
71 As it has been elaborated in the past. 
72 Oxford Dictionary (n 32).  
32 
 
CHAPTER 2 PART A 
Third party protection in the carriage of goods by sea: risk allocation and management in 
the bilateral system 
 
 
2.2 Background of the concept of legal protection in the carriage of goods by sea (i.e. 
limitation of liability and exclusion clauses) 
 
Even though, in terms of the parties involved, carriage is very complex business, the 
‘official’ perspective is that there are still only two main parties to a carriage contract. First, the 
carrier, who is the party that offers to transport goods in exchange for a price.73 Second, the 
owner of the cargo being transported. 
Shipping goods from one country to another involves risk of damaging goods.74 The 
carriage of goods by sea has always been an allocation of risks between carriers and cargo 
interests.75 As Sweeney explains, this bilateral scheme has now lost its clarity.76 A crucial 
premise of this thesis is that, factually, the carriage of goods by sea has changed from a simple 
bilateral operation to an unequivocally multilateral operation. Particularly from the perspective 
of the carrier, the structure has changed from a single category of participants performing the 
work (i.e., the carrier), to a multi-faceted group of participants.  
Protection clauses in international contracts are essential for the risk allocation 
between parties. As argued by Rajski, protection clauses have increasingly become tools for 
establishing how risk inherent in international operations (including specific legal risks) should 
be divided amongst the parties.77  
                                                        
73 Under bills of lading is, ‘freight’; under charter parties, ‘hire’. See also Sweeney (n 17). 
74 This thesis will deal with the allocation of liability between carrier and shipper in international conventions in 
the next chapter. 
75 This allocation has changed, as will be explained later in the chapter. 
76 According to Sweeney, ‘slot charters’ (a type of agreement covering vessel-sharing) prevent shippers from ever 
contracting with actual shipowners, let alone with the owner of the carrying vessel. Ocean carriage by sub-
contract is now performed for non-vessel-owning common carriers as well as traditional ocean carriers. As an 
entity, a non-vessel-owning common carrier is likely to function as a shipper to shipowners or a carrier to cargo 
owners. By the same token, many (if not all) operations traditionally carried out as part of ocean carriage – 
weighing, measuring, documentation, pre-loading, loading, fumigation, stowage on board, unloading, 
examination, warehousing, storage – are likely to be carried out, even if not entirely, by the carrier’s sub-
contractors. As a result, the notion of “carrier” on which modal frameworks have historically been based has “lost 
most of its traditional meaning” (n 17), 171–72). 
77 Jerzy Rajski, ‘Limitation of Liability and Exclusion Clauses in International Contracts’ (2002) 3 International 
Business Law Journal 4, 321.  
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It is common knowledge that an international transaction typically involves different 
parties.78 The carriage of goods by sea, however, has not always been seen as part of this 
enterprise. There was a time when the shipowner was also the carrier of the vessel,79 the cargo 
owner, the captain and his own insurer. There were not any banks and there were not any 
lenders. Law was not elaborate in this sense and therefore there was no regulatory regime.80 
Stevedores and port terminals were not structured companies. The field was mainly labour and 
not capital intensive. Nowadays, each transaction requires the involvement of many interests. 
Limitation and exculpatory clauses help these transactions to go smoothly.  
Understanding how the limitation of liability in the carriage of goods by sea started 
and evolved is essential in introducing the concept of third parties. As Wyatt reports: “Under 
general maritime law, the ocean carrier was liable as an insurer of the goods; excused from 
cargo loss or damage only by an act of God, the shipper, public enemy, or by an exception in 
the contract of carriage”.81 Additionally, it is important to understand the significance of the 
evolution of the relationship between the carrier and third parties.  
Liability protection is an essential part of the trade and, in the carriage of goods by 
sea, has a substantial impact between the carrier and the shipper. As Besong appropriately 
reports, the questions that invariably come up in carriage cases are: How much am I liable for? 
What is my exposure and limit? Who pays for what damage?82 
Contractually, these clauses are referred to differently: limitation clauses, exculpatory 
clauses, exception clauses, and so on. For ease, this thesis refers to them as ‘protection 
clauses’. Allocation of liability is essential and ancillary for trade operations. Without 
limitation of liability, there would probably not be any trade, or at least there would not be 
trade, as it is known today. According to Brunner: “No trade, no goods, no shipping, no 
ships”.83 This thesis goes one step further: no limitation of liability, no trade, no goods, no 
shipping, no ships. 
                                                        
78 Buyers, sellers, forwarders, carriers, bankers, lenders, insurers and various regulatory authorities amongst the 
others.  
79 This goes back to medieval times when merchants generally opted to sail with their goods. In the nineteenth 
century, specialisation changed everything. The all-purpose merchant disappeared and opposing interests of the 
corporate shipowner and the cargo owner emerged. Raphael Brunner, ‘Electronic Transport Documents and 
Shipping Practice Not Yet a Married Couple’ (PhD thesis, University of Capetown, 2007);  Sik Kwan Tai, Ownen 
Tang, Peter Wong, ‘Note and Comments on the first decision based on the Chinese Regulations on International 
Maritime Transportation Concerning Terminal Handling Charges’, (2007) 38 J. Mar. L. & Com. 111. 
80 The first regime in the field was the Harter Act 1893. 
81 Marva Jo Wyatt, ‘Contract Terms in Intermodal Transport: COGSA Comes Ashore’ (1991–1992) 16 Tulane 
Maritime Law Journal 177. 
82 Besong (n 16). 
83 Brunner (n 79).  
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Providing an essential framework, Raisky acknowledges that there are a number of 
ways in which liability can be limited: 
 
1) Applying financial caps on liability regarding the maximum amount recoverable. 
2) Imposing time limitation. 
3) Procedural or other restriction on a party’s grounds to claim. 
4) Exclusion of certain categories of loss such as indirect loss, unforeseeable loss or 
consequential loss.84 
 
When analysing this protection in relation to contracts regarding the carriage of goods 
by sea, there is one immediate doubt that should be clarified: the main convention on the 
carriage of goods by sea currently in operation is the Hague-Visby Rules. Article 3(8) of the 
Hague Visby Rules invalidates any clause that “purports to relieve or lessen the responsibilities 
of the carrier and the ship as they are set out in the Rules”.85  
As the Article states, the Hague-Visby Rules have in themselves limitation provisions 
for the carrier and for the carrier’s third parties. Therefore the Hague-Visby Rules do not allow 
any other limitation provision other than what they expressly provide. In other words, they do 
not allow the carrier to limit their liability in a different way.  
Another immediate distinction that should be pointed out is that there is a difference 
between limitation and exemption. The difference between these two provisions appears here 
to be fundamental; while exclusion clauses are often considered contrary to the policy of 
international trade and unusually employed,86 limitation clauses are nonetheless a way to make 
contracts and relationships easy. The word ‘crucial’ has been used by The Ninth Circuit of the 
United States in Tessler Bros. (B.C.) v Italpacific Line, to define the difference between the 
two: 
 
The distinction between a limitation on liability and an exemption from liability is 
crucial because if on one hand is true that the carrier (and consequently third parties) 
                                                        
84 Rajski (n 77). On the topic see also Patson Wilbroad Arinatiwe, Risk Allocation in Oil and Gas Service 
Contracts (Lambert Academic Publishing 2014) 24.  
85 William Tetley, ‘Limitation, Non-Responsibility and Disclaimer Clauses’ (1986) 11 Maritime Law 203. 
Specifically Article 3(8) states, “Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier 
or the ship from liability for loss or damage to, or in connection with, goods arising from negligence, fault, or 
failure in the duties and obligations provided in this Article or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided 
in this Convention, shall be null and void and of no effect. A benefit of insurance clause in favour of the carrier or 
similar clause shall be deemed to be a clause relieving the carrier from liability”. 
86 Rajski (n 77). 
35 
 
cannot immunise himself from responsibility, he can on the other hand, limit his 
liability.87 
 
In Bisso, the Supreme Court offered the following explanation for its disapproval of 
exculpatory provisions: 
 
The two main reasons for the creation and application of the rule have been (1) to 
discourage negligence by making wrongdoers pay damages, and (2) to protect those 
in need of goods or services from being overreached by others who have power to 
drive hard bargains.88 
 
Limitation of liability and general protection clauses have been essential for the 
relationship between the two parties of the contract. However, as stated in the chapter’s 
preamble, the parties of the carriage have immediately felt the need to protect their contractors 
and auxiliaries as well.  
 
2.3 Third parties risk for the bilateral system 
 
Protection clauses and their extension to third parties are addressed in this first part of 
the chapter in relation to their involvement in the allocation of risks in the carriage of goods by 
sea. The thesis discusses their importance in supporting the risk allocation between the two 
parties of the contract. Specifically in this context, it discusses how their protection has been 
managed as part of the allocation of risk between carrier and shipper. 
Starting with the definition of risk, in business risk is: “a probability or threat of 
damage, injury, liability, loss, or any other negative occurrence that is caused by external or 
internal vulnerabilities, and that may be avoided through pre-emptive action”.89  
Additionally, Megens defines a risk as, “hazard, exposure to mischance or chances of 
bad consequences or the probability of an event occurring coupled with the consequences if it 
                                                        
87 Tessler Brothers (BC) Ltd. v Italpacific Line and Matson Terminals, Inc. 494 F 2d 438 para 18. For a similar 
analysis see Thomas R Denniston, Carter T Gunn and Alfred E Yudes, ‘Liabilities of Multimodal Operators and 
Parties other than Carriers and Shippers’ (1989–1990) 64 Tulane Law Review 517. 
88 Sweeney (n 17). 
89 Anon., ‘Risk’ (Business Dictionary, 2014) <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/risk.html> Accessed 
8 January 2014. 
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does occur”.90 In the carriage of goods by sea, risk has always been between carrier and 
shipper. In the context of this thesis it is referred to economic and liability risks. 
Hallebeek has defined the protection of third parties in the carriage of goods by sea as 
a natural way to give justice to the economic and risk allocation of a contract between cargo 
interests and carrier. The ratio decidendi can be summarised thus: 
 
It would have been unfair if the cargo, once agreed on terms and took into account 
economic and liability risks, could just ignore all of it suing someone who is 
commercially related to the carrier and for whom the carrier is (in one way or 
another) responsible.91 
 
Their protection has so far been viewed as part of a risk allocation and management 
between the two parties of the shipping operations.  
Risk is an essential part of shipping life; it cannot be avoided but instead has to be 
managed.92 There is not any business without risk but there would not be any business without 
managing the risk. Risk management is the systematic process of understanding, evaluating 
and addressing these risks in order to maximise the chances of achieving objectives.93 
The major forms of risk management strategies are summarised as follows: 
 
1) Risk avoidance.  
2) Risk control. 
3) Risk retention. 
4) Risk transfer.94 
 
Risk avoidance means the avoidance of risk by not engaging in any activity with risk. 
Risk retention as its name clearly indicates, is when risk is contained and born by only one 
individual or company.95 
                                                        
90 Peter Megens, ‘Different Perspectives of Construction Risk: How Should it be Allocated?’ (1996) 15 Ampla 
Bulletin 179, 179–180.  
91 Jan Hallebeek and Harry Dondorp, Contracts for a Third-Party Beneficiary: A Historical and Comparative 
Account (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 121. 
92 Anon., ‘About Risk Management’ (Institute of Risk Management, 2015) <https://www.theirm.org/about/risk-
management/> Accessed 4 May 2015. 
93 Ibid, Accessed 8 January 2014. 
94 Muhammad Masum Billah, Effects of Insurance on Maritime Liability Law A Legal and Economic Analysis 
(Springer Science & Business Media 2014). 
95 David Frederick Ross, Distribution Planning And Control; Managing In The Era Of Supply Chain Management 
(3rd edn, Springer 2015). 
37 
 
Naturally, risk avoidance and risk retention are not relevant to this study. What is of 
pertinence and are analysed for this thesis are the concepts of risk control and risk transfer.  
Billah argues convincingly that no degree of precaution measures can entirely and consistently 
preclude serious and unpredictable losses and thus avoidance and retention enjoy a close 
relationship. Risk control cannot be the sole complete risk management strategy.96  
In shipping, risk management is very common and vital for shipping companies and 
participants. Risk control is the first step but alone it is not enough. Therefore, risk transfer is 
essential. The main risk transfer is insurance.97 In essence, and again quoting Billah, anything 
we do now to avoid a future risk is a risk management strategy.98 Focusing on the context of 
the carriage of goods by sea, risk allocation has been defined as a problem as old as maritime 
law itself.99  
In accord with this research, risk management comprises several elements. First, those 
who would seek to manage risk should evaluate identifiable risks. Second, they should 
determine the best method of mitigating each risk as far as is possible. Third, they should 
identify which party is in the best position to implement mitigating strategies. A party’s 
readiness to take on a transfer of risk is likely to be contingent upon the degree of control they 
can exert over said risk, and also the ability to offset potential risk against potential gain.100 
David Lowe explains that today’s risk management strategies emerged almost half 
century ago as a way of responding to systemic economic changes. He contends that the party 
who is best positioned economically to control, manage or insure against any such 
consequences should bear the cost of risk101 and handle the risk associated with commercial 
relationships between venturing parties.102 The parties of a carriage of goods by sea contract 
rely on limitation clauses in contracts to mitigate their respective risks.103 
                                                        
96 Billah Ch 2 (n 94). 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Jan Lopuski, ‘Liability for Damage in Maritime Shipping under the Aspect of Risk Allocation’ (1979–80) 10 
Polish Yearbook of International Law 177. The idea of spreading the risk of maritime adventure lies in the roots 
of ancient Greek and Roman concepts of Maritime Law, such as foenus nauticum or lex Rhodia de iactu and 
various forms of ‘community of interests’ in medieval shipping. It also lies in the roots of limitation of 
shipowners’ liability deriving from the latter period. See also Lord Diplock (in ‘Conventions and Morals: 
Limitation Clauses in International Maritime Conventions’ (1969–1970) 1 Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce 525). 
100 Arinatiwe (n 84) 19. 
101 David Lowe, Commercial Management: Theory and Practice (Wiley-Blackwell 2013). 
102 Ibid. 
103 Rajski (n 77).  
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This work argues that, in the carriage of goods by sea, third party protection has been 
seen as a tool to allocate the transportation of risk between the parties involved in the 
operation.104  
Taking the above into consideration, there are two main approaches to managing risk 
in shipping. The first is controlling it through the mechanism of contract; with the limitation of 
liability as a tool of allocating the risk.105 The second is transferring the risk to an insurance 
provider. Regarding the first, third parties can affect the result of a contract since they are a risk 
for the contractual party responsible for them. According to Arinatiwe, contracts are still the 
primary means of forestalling negative outcomes, even though other risk allocation 
mechanisms (such as insurance) still exist. The lower the degree of precision offered by a 
contract, the greater the level of risk to which contracting parties are exposed.106 Contractual 
risk allocation is actually considered part of risk management and one of its primary aims.107 
The contract is the foundation of risk control. Additionally, the allocation of risk from 
a contractual perspective has been considered as one of the most essential characteristics of a 
contract, together with the definition of the responsibilities of the parties, and the determination 
of the effective payment terms.108 
As will be explored later in the chapter, shipping has been heavily dependent upon the 
contract mechanism to allocate risks, not only between the parties of it but also between parties 
not formally part of the contract. 
Downie extensively lists the way of allocating the risk in an agreement, in the 
following way: 
 
 The obligation undertaken by the parties. 
 The warranties given by the parties. 
 The extent to which the parties exclude or limit the damage that would otherwise be 
recoverable for breaching the agreement. 
 Indemnities given with respect to particular events.  
 Requiring one or more parties to take out specified levels and types of insurance.109 
                                                        
104 José Vicente Guzmán, ‘The Limitation of Liability of the Carrier from an Allocation of Risks Point of View’ 
(Comité Maritime International 2012) http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Rotterdam%20Rules/Paper%20 
of%20Jose%20Vicente%20Guzman.pdf Accessed 24 March 2014. 
105 Contract management is a way of monitoring the allocation and making sure nothing untoward happens. 
106 Arinatiwe (n 84) 15. 
107 Ibid. 19. 
108 Lowe (n 101). 
109 See David Downie, Contractual Risk Allocation (Inter Alia Publishing, 2012). If an agreement is silent on 
liability then each party’s liability under the agreement is considered to be subject to the law of the agreement. 
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Regarding the second component of managing risk (i.e. transferring to insurance), 
Buglass deems it “unnecessary” to say that the principle of limitation of liability is important to 
marine insurance and that marine insurance industry relies on it. Underwriters stipulate 
insurance contracts with shipowners relying on the right that the shipowners have to limit their 
liability benefiting the underwriters. The same author points out that liability insurance 
premiums might increase almost by one third if shipowners – and in turn underwriters – were 
deprived of this protection.110 The aforementioned right to limit affects the P&I Club and 
shipowners’ relationship111 as well as shipowners coverage and related costs under the Hull 
and Machinery market.112 Essentially, limitation clauses help the assured in obtaining its policy 
in a more easily and more cheaply way.113 
Regarding an analysis of the limitation of liability in relation to the insurance, the first 
consideration is the ‘cost argument’ that insurers usually attribute only to shipowners, rather 
than those who, through negligence or sheer bad luck, have caused an accident.114 
Billah highlights a negative aspect of limitation of liability, explaining that “lower 
liability leads to lower precaution. Limitation of liability thus encourages negligent 
navigation”.115 Billah also defines limitation of liability as the opposite concept of full liability; 
the existence of one would reduce the effect of the other. If full liability is necessary to create 
optimal deterrence, such deterrence would be so effective that the extent of liability would be 
reduced due to a limitation of liability.116 From a specific degree, limitation of liability is also 
seen as a cause of social loss because it does not induce to have the proper care.117 
Tetley’s view on the matter is clear: “it is a fundamental principle of good business 
practice and of efficient, fair and low-cost insurance that persons who are responsible for losses 
should be held accountable, in some way, for those losses”.118 On the other hand the concept of 
limited liability may encourage settlements and save in litigation costs while without it, parties 
to a lawsuit may wait for the trial outcome.119 
                                                        
110 Leslie J Buglass, ‘Limitation of Liability from a Marine Insurance Viewpoint’ (1979) 53 Tulane Law Review 
1364.  
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid.  
113 Rajski (n 77). 
114 Erik Roseg, The Impact of Insurance Practices on Liability Conventions, originally published in legislative 
approaches in maritime law. Proceedings from the European Colloquium on Maritime Law: Lysebu, Oslo, 7-8 
December 2000. Marlus No 283. 
115 Billah Ch 3 (n 94). 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 William Tetley (n 26). 
119 Billah Ch 3 (n 94). 
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The importance of limitation of liability for the insurers is aptly given by de la Mare, 
who explains the commercial mechanism of the limitation: 
 
Without limitation of liability, ocean carriers and insurers would face enormous 
claims for damages in cases where goods are damaged. In order to bear these risks, 
the carrier will increase the rate of the carriage. In other words, shippers allow 
carriers to have limitation and in exchange receive more affordable shipping rates.120  
 
The position of the insurance in the role of limitation of liability in the carriage of 
goods by sea is crucial. An example is in a contract between the carrier and the shipper. The 
shipper carries cargo insurance for the event that cargo is damaged. Should the cargo be 
damaged, the shipper recovers from their insurer. The insurer is then subrogated to the rights of 
the shipper and would proceed to sue the carrier. The carrier has the protection and indemnity 
insurers (P&I) cover which (if the carrier is liable) will pay (under deductible) on behalf of the 
carrier.  
According to Lord Diplock, the allocation of liability is “eventually an allocation of 
liability between cargo insurers, P&I for a loss incurred through neither’s fault”.121 As 
Hellawell summarises: “What superficially may be regarded as an allocation of risk between 
the Carrier and Shipper is in reality between the carrier’s insurers and the shipper’s 
insurers”.122 
However and taking into account the above, the shipping industry has gradually taken 
into consideration the risk of parties ‘outside’ the bilateral relationship and therefore the 
necessity of extending them their legal protection.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
120 William T.J. de la Mare, ‘Jurisprudential Problems of Attribution of Liability in the Area of Admiralty 
Contracts for Carriage Following Norfolk Southern Railway v Kirby’ (2007) 22 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law 203. 
121 Lord Diplock (n 99). 
122 Robert Hellawell, ‘Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and Carrier’ (1979) 27 American Journal Of 
Comparative Law 357. 
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2.4 The extension of the protection to third parties (i.e. vicarious liability, 
commercial convenience and autonomy of party) 
 
As expressed by Sturley, whoever is involved in the contract of carriage but is not a 
party to the contract can be sued. As we have seen, bringing an action against them instead of 
suing the contractual parties can have an economic benefit.123 
Currently, third parties are protected by the main parties to a contract because they 
affect them. The justifications for this have been vicarious liability, commercial convenience or 
simply autonomy of parties. Tetley, in one of his main article states that: 
  
The basic problem is to find a way to permit third parties who are neither agents nor 
servants to limit their liability; specifically, to find a way to allow stevedores and 
terminal operators, whom the carrier declares are not his agents or servants but 
independent contractors, to nevertheless benefit under the contract of carriage.124 
 
This clearly helps to define the problem of finding a way to make a third party benefit 
from a contract.125 The purpose of third party protection clauses is to extend the carrier’s legal 
defences to independent contractors such as stevedores.126  
With carriage expanding, the protection from the carriage of goods by sea (as further 
explained in Chapter 4) has also been sought by third parties outside the carriage of goods by 
sea. This is a particularly pertinent issue, the best-known recent example of which derives from 
the Kirby127 case. In Kirby, the essential question was whether a contract, to which the 
maritime shipper was not a party, nevertheless limited the rights of the shipper against a land 
carrier, namely, a railroad. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, protected the railroad 
(this case is analysed in greater detail in Chapter 4).128 
Sweeney further expresses the concept of expansion of the carrier’s job:  
 
                                                        
123 Michael F Sturley, ‘An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case’ (1996–1997) 21 
Tulane Maritime Law Journal 263. 
124 William Tetley (n 26). 
125 However, for the sake of clarity, it has to be said that the problem is not only one of finding a way for third 
parties to benefit from the contract but also understanding how this could be permitted within international 
conventions (this is covered in Chapter 3) and, domestic law (this is covered in Chapter 4). 
126 When the Himalaya clause was first drafted, employees of the carrier also had to be protected. With time, these 
categories of third parties have been automatically included in the international conventions regulating carriage of 
goods by sea (as discussed in the next chapters), leaving only the difference between employees and independent 
contractors.  
127 Kirby (n 7). 
128 Sweeney (n 17). 
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The completed transaction from seller’s warehouse to buyer’s warehouse now 
involves other participants in the processing and movement of the goods-participants 
who are land based and whose services were either unnoticed or unused in the past, 
and it is these new non-maritime participants for whom the protections of the ocean 
carrier are sought to be extended by Himalaya clauses. Today, road or rail carriage 
from the seller’s warehouse to the buyer’s warehouse are necessary parts of foreign 
trade and competition is forcing traditional ocean carriers to be involved in services 
outside their familiar areas of maritime operations. The sub-contracting of cargo-
related services has developed to such an extent that the traditional ocean carrier is 
now sub-contracting even the ocean carriage itself.129 
 
As explained, the carrier contracts with the shipper but then has to delegate all or part 
of this job to other parties (being an employer or independent contractor). As previously 
mentioned, with the evolution of carriage, more persons are now involved and consequently 
the carrier responsible for them.130 The reason often lies in the concept of vicarious liability for 
which the carrier is responsible for any fault committed by its servants or agents during the 
performance of the contract,131 or for commercial agreements between the carrier and third 
parties. In this regard Liang expands the concept of the carrier’s interests in protecting third 
parties: 
 
Even if there is an exception clause that excludes the vicarious liability of the carrier, 
he may face the same situation when the cargo owner brings a direct action in tort 
against its servants or agents for their personal fault in the performance of the 
contract. If the carrier’s servants or agents lose the legal battle, the carrier may 
ultimately have to compensate them for the loss as a matter of business practice or of 
good labor relations. Same result if a direct action is brought against an independent 
contractor with whom the carrier has contracted.132 
 
The concept of vicarious liability, (specifically regarding a carrier and third parties), 
has been discussed by Viscount Cave in Elder Dempster.133 His theory states that an agent is 
                                                        
129 Ibid. 
130 Liang (n 17). 
131 Vicarious liability: legal responsibility and liability of an employer for the wrongful acts of its employees. 
Definition in Spurin (n 24) 10. 
132 Liang (n 17). 
133 Elder Dempster (n 3). 
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entitled, while performing the contract, to any immunity conferred on his principal. This is 
known more commonly as vicarious immunity. This theory was later much criticised because it 
was considered “a departure from a fundamental principle in English Law namely, one who is 
not party to a contract cannot acquire rights under it”.134 
As Chapter 4 addresses in detail, this protection has always found obstacles in a 
principle of English law (that states a stranger to a contract cannot enjoy the benefit of an 
exception clause embodied in the contract) originated in Tweddle v Atkinson135 and confirmed 
by the House of Lords in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v Selfridge and Co..136 
As far as the contract of the carriage of goods by sea is concerned, a third party is not 
simply the crew (including, as Liang says, the master and the stevedores) but can include many 
other categories of participant.137 The vicarious liability concept affects the difference between 
employees and independent contractors. According to Sweeney:  
 
Actual employees of carriers and agents of carriers create liability for carriers 
because of ‘respondeat superior’, without eliminating the personal liability of such 
employee or agent, although the recovery of money damages from uninsured crew 
members, including officers (as in The Himalaya, supra), may prove futile. 
Consequently, cargo plaintiffs usually disregard the crew members or agents despite 
their personal fault. The general maritime law, like the common law, assumed the 
liability of shipowner employers for the damage-causing faults of employees.138 
 
However, for what it concerns the position of independent contractors they seem not 
to have a strong justification on why they have to be protected from the parties of the contract. 
Mankabady’s assessment is as follows: 
 
In their view a contractor who is independent of the carrier should not, by the mere 
fact that he performs duties which the carrier himself might have performed, become 
entitled to the limitation and exceptions of the Rules. Therefore, a distinction should 
                                                        
134 Samir Mankabady, The Hamburg Rules on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Brill Archive, London 1978) 66. 
135 (1861) EWHC QB J57. 
136 (Dunlop) (1915) AC 847. 
137 Liang (n 17). 
138 Sweeney (n 17). 
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be drawn between, on the one hand, the carrier, his servants or agents and, on the 
other, the independent contractor.139 
 
Before entering into details of distinct categories, a further specification has to be 
drawn between servants and agents on one hand and independent contractors on the other. The 
background of this is crucial in understanding the evolution of the protection that as previously 
stated at first was limited to master, servant and agent but now extended to independent 
contractors.  
As reported by Mankabady, referring to the Hague Rules: “The servants and agents 
should be protected for social reasons and should have the benefits of the Rules whereas these 
reasons do not apply to the independent contractor, who should thus not have this benefit”.140 
According to Burnett, the distinction between an employee and an independent 
contractor often lies in a difference of contract. On the one hand, a contract of service, made 
between employer and employee. On the other, a contract for services, made between principal 
and independent contractor. Traditionally, this contractual difference emerged from a 
difference in control; independent contractors were typically instructed to generate an end 
result but given a degree of self-determination when carrying out the work, whereas employees 
were usually told what to do and exactly how to do it.141 
In the book, The International Law of the Shipmaster, Carter, Fiske, and Leiter give an 
explanation for the reason behind the division: 
 
The Visby protocol to the Hague Rules added a provision whereby the carrier’s 
servants or agents shall be entitled to avail themselves of the defences and limits of 
liability available to the carrier in respect of damage to goods covered by a contract 
of carriage whether the action be founded in contract or tort. However, the servants 
or agents lose the benefice of such defences or limits of liability if it is proved that the 
damage resulted from an act or omission of the servant or agent done with the intent 
to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably 
result. These provisions were added into the original Convention as a result of the 
many problems generated by suits based on negligence against the master and agents 
                                                        
139 Samir Mankabady, ‘Rights and Immunities of the Carrier’s Servants or Agents’ (1973–1974) 5 Journal of 
Maritime Law and Commerce 111.  
140 Ibid. 
141 Jonathan Burnett, ‘Avoiding Difficult Questions: Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors in Sweeney v 
Boylan Nominees’ (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 163. 
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of the carrier to bypass the carrier’s limitation of liability based on the privity of 
contract. Following the Adler case, carriers inserted Himalaya clauses extending the 
benefice of the carrier’s defence and limitations of liability to their servants, agents 
and independent contractors, such as the stevedores. Although the independent 
contractors have been left out of the orbit of the protection afforded by the Hague-
Visby Rules and therefore need to rely on Himalaya clauses, the masters, as a servant 
of the carrier, are liable towards third parties within the same limitations and with the 
same defences as their principals. The Hamburg rules have adopted a similar 
provision.142 
 
The topic has also been addressed from a case law perspective (see Chapter 4). As 
reported by Smeele quoting Denning judgment in The Himalaya case, there is a distinction 
between a carrier’s servants and agents (both categories in fact are protected by the mandatory 
liability regime of the Hague-Visby Rules) and independent contractors (left from the same 
protocol to their own devise).143 Minichello defines a sub-contractor as: 
 
1) One who takes a portion of a contract from the principal contractor or another sub-
contractor. 
2) One who has entered into a contract, express or implied, for the performance of an 
act with the person who has already contracted for its performance. 
3) One who takes from the principal or prime contractor a specific part of the work 
undertaken by the principal contractor.144 
 
The above analysis is essential in addressing the evolution of the protection of the 
categories of third parties. At the beginning of the last century parties to be protected were 
mainly carrier’s servants, and the master. Some categories of third parties were not even well 
distinguished: 
 
In the first American case in which a terminal operator claimed the protection of a 
Himalaya clause, the court of appeals struggled with the differences between 
                                                        
142 John Carter, Richard Fiske and Tara Leiter: The International Law of the Shipmaster (2009) Informa Law from 
Routledge.  
143 Frank Smeele, ‘The Maritime Performing Party in the Rotterdam Rules 2009’ (2011) European Journal of 
Commercial Contract Law 1. 
144 Quoting Black Dictionary, Dennis Minichello, ‘Who and What Are You Insuring? Cargo Transportation 
Liability Exposures Are Changing’ (2008–09) 21 University of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal 2, 167. 
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stevedores and terminal operators, but eventually came down in favour of protecting a 
stevedore who was acting as terminal operator at the time the goods were lost.145 
 
In summary, third parties have often received protection in the past for the commercial 
convenience of doing so. This has been supported by principles such as respondeat superior 
and vicarious immunity.146 
With an explanation of the orthodox reasons behind third party protection firmly 
secured, the next section provides an overview of the contractual framework necessary to 
extend carrier protection to third parties. 
 
2.5 Contractual framework to extend the carrier protection to third parties 
 
This contextual framework is achieved through clauses in contracts. It gives protection 
to third parties but it is also important for carriers because, as explained by the MLA report: 
 
While carriers are free to decide whether or not to extend their defences limitation 
and immunities under COGSA to stevedore, terminal operators and other parties, the 
use of these particular clauses to accomplish that purpose should substantially reduce 
third party litigation between carriers and their independent contractors in cargo 
damage cases. Moreover the widespread use of these clauses will help to promote 
certainty and uniformity in the law of carriage of goods – a goal sought by shippers, 
carriers, stevedores and terminal operators alike.147 
 
The carrier shall be entitled to sub-contract on any terms the whole or any part of the 
carriage, loading, unloading, storing, warehousing, handling and any and all duties whatsoever 
undertaken by the carrier in relation to the goods.148 
The Himalaya clause is the most frequent aiming to dissuade cargo owners from 
imposing any liability upon a stevedore or terminal operator for damage to the goods greater 
than the liability which the carrier has under the terms of the bill of lading. 
Literature on cases involving Himalaya clauses is vast, but the essential principles 
stated by courts regarding Himalaya clauses can be summarised thus: 
                                                        
145 Sweeney (n 17). 
146 See Corcione (n 70). 
147 The MLA Report (n 19).  
148 Instel Corp. v M/V Antonia Johnson (Antonia Johnson) 1983 A M C 1153 (W D Wash 1982).  
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 The parties to a bill of lading may extend a contractual benefit to a third party only by 
clearly expressing their intent to do so. 
 The benefits may be extended to agents and sub-contractors only with respect to their 
actions in the performance and fulfilment of the principal contract. 
 
The Himalaya clause for servants and agents of the carrier, was accepted by the 
international community in the Hague Visby Rules of 1968. The same result of Himalaya 
clauses, as explained by Hooper, relates to bailment law (see Chapter 4).149 Generally, the 
intent of the parties, as expressed through the clarity of the language used in the provision,  
controls the determination of whether a third party is an intended beneficiary.150 
Additionally, the International Group of P&I Clubs (IGP&I)151 and The Baltic and 
International Maritime Council (BIMCO) 152 recognise not only that Himalaya clauses are 
complicated, but also that it is extremely difficult to outline a clause that works on every 
situation and in every jurisdiction. Therefore the IGP&I and the BIMCO have been working to 
produce a clause which should be recognised and effective at least in most major shipping 
jurisdictions.153 
 The Himalaya clauses are numerous and different in contents. The following points 
however represent their fundamentals: 
 
 Exempt the carrier and the identified third party from liability under a contract. 
 To confer on such third party all the rights, limits, defences and exemptions from 
liability enjoyed by the carrier under the contract. 
 Impose on the other party to the contract, the obligation not to sue the third party in 
tort, bailment or otherwise. 
 Making the carrier an agent or trustee for the third party in relation to the contract, and 
that such third party is deemed to be a party to such contract. 
                                                        
149 Chester D Hooper, ‘Legal Relationships: Terminal Owners, Operators, and Users’ (1989–1990) 64 Tulane Law 
Review 595. 
150 Minichello (n 144). This (as Chapter 4 will detail) mainly depends on different jurisdictions and on courts 
approaches.   
151 International Group of P&I Club (2015) <www.igpandi.org/> Accessed 11 November 2014. 
152 Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO) (2015) <https://www.bimco.org/> Accessed 11 November 
2014. 
153 BIMCO, ‘Revised Himalaya clause for Bills of Lading and other Contracts’ (Special Circular No. 6, 17 
September 2010) <https://www.bimco.org/~/media/Chartering/Special_Circulars/SC2010_06.ashx> Accessed 11 
November 2015. 
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 To provide protection in respect of operations related to the carriage of goods but 
which are not necessarily carried out on board the ship, for example operations which 
take place before loading or after discharge from the vessel. 
 
The Himalaya clauses, even if often similar to each other, show a degree of diversity. 
Listing them would neither be possible nor add anything to the argument here. It is worth 
mentioning, however, that the search for a good practice in Himalaya clauses pushed the 
Maritime Law Association of the United States in 1983 to create a sub-committee regarding 
Himalaya clauses. As a result, it provided a report in which experts tried to draft the ‘perfect’ 
Himalaya clause, which (according to the report) states: 
 
1) The carrier shall be entitled to sub-contract on any terms the whole or any 
part of the carriage, loading, unloading, storing, warehousing, handling and 
any and all duties whatsoever undertaken by the carrier in relation to the 
goods. 
2) The terms of this bill of lading constitute the contract of carriage, which is 
between the shipper, consignee, holder of the bill of lading and authorised 
owner of the goods and the carrier, shipowner or demise charterer of the 
vessel designated to carry the shipment. It is understood and agreed that no 
claim or allegation shall be made by the shipper, consignee holder of the bill 
of lading or authorised owner of the goods against any servant, agent, sub-
contractor or independent contractor (including but not limited to the master, 
officers and crew of the vessel, all employees and representatives, all 
terminal operators, warehousemen, stevedores, watchmen and all other sub-
contractors and independent contractors whatsoever) used or employed by 
the carrier from time to time in connection with the performance of any of the 
carrier’s obligations under the bill of lading, which imposes or attempts to 
impose upon any of them any liability in connection with the goods greater 
than that of the carrier under this bill of lading, but if any such claim or 
allegation should nevertheless be made party making such claim or 
allegation agrees to indemnify the carrier against all consequences thereof. 
3) Without prejudice to any other provision hereof, it is hereby expressly agreed 
that any and all servants, agents and independent contractors (including but 
not limited to, the master, officers and crew of the vessel, all employees and 
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representatives, all terminal operators, warehousemen, stevedores, 
watchmen and all other sub-contractors and independent contractors 
whatsoever) used or employed by the Carrier in connection with the 
performance of any of the Carrier’s obligations under this Bill of Lading, in 
consideration of their agreement to be so used or employed, shall be express 
beneficiaries under this Bill of Lading or by Law, so that in no circumstances 
shall any servant, agent or independent contractor of the Carrier be under 
any liability, in contract or tort, greater than that of the Carrier hereunder. It 
is further expressly agreed that for the purposes of this provision, the Carrier 
is or shall be deemed to be acting as agent or trustee on behalf of and for the 
benefit of all who are or may be its servants, agents or independent 
contractors from time to time in connection with the performance of any of 
the Carrier’s obligations under this Bill of Lading, and that all such persons 
shall to this extent be or be deemed to be parties to the contract contained in 
or evidenced by this Bill of Lading. 
4) It is further agreed that the expression “servant, agent or independent 
contractor” in this Bill of Lading shall include direct and indirect servants, 
agents and independent contractors of the Carrier, as well as their respective 
servants, sub-agents or sub-contractors.154 
 
There has been, as always, an evolution in the way the Himalaya clauses are 
drafted.155  
Although the Himalaya clause is the core of the third party protection clauses in the 
carriage of goods by sea, other clauses are necessary in order to apply full protection to third 
parties. The ‘circular indemnity’ clause, for instance, is often used together with the Himalaya 
clause. The indemnity clause requires the cargo owner to compensate the carrier for any claim, 
made by shipper interests outside the bill of lading. In other words, under indemnity clause, the 
cargo owner cannot bring any claim against any carrier contractor or sub-contractor and in case 
such claim is brought the cargo owner has to indemnify the carrier against any loss incurred by 
                                                        
154 The MLA Report (n 19). 
155 For instance, in United States law, the importance of the language in the Himalaya clause has been pointed out 
in Herd & Co. v Krawill Machinery Corp. 359 US 297, 1959 AMC 879 (1959) (see Chapter 4). In being so 
specific, the court provided a significant opportunity to broaden the categories of third parties. If the criterion for 
protecting or not protecting a third party is merely whether or not they are mentioned in the clause, also sub-
categories such as sub-agents and sub-contractors of the carrier’s agents, for instance, could be included in a 
Himalaya clause. 
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the latest.156 However, it must be acknowledged that a circular indemnity clause has the same 
problem as a Himalaya clause concerning Article 3(8) of the Hague-Visby Rules.157 
The ‘demise’ clause is also relevant here.158 As Tetley explains, the demise clause 
regulates the liability between shipowner and charterer in the charter party. This is because the 
shipowner and the charterer share responsibilities in loading, carrying, caring for, and 
discharging cargo. In respect of third parties, they should both be the carrier. Tetley strongly 
comments that allowing them to stipulate that one of them is not the carrier is the most 
opprobrious of non-responsibility clauses.159 
The liability and the apportionment of risks between shipowner and charterer in a 
charter party has been also developed with the influence of the P&I clubs, under the Inter-Club 
New York Produce Exchange Agreement (NYPE). It is an agreement between the shipowners 
and the charterers that exists to help with apportioning the liability for cargo claims, mainly for 
NYPE signatories, but also for use with other charter parties.160  
Other relevant clauses necessary for an appropriate legal contractual framework for 
third parties are:  
 
1) The opportunity to declare a higher value clause.161 
2) One year suit limitation clause.162 
3) The choice of law clause.163 
4) The separability clause.164 
                                                        
156 Freight Transport Association, ‘Himalaya and other warranty and indemnity clauses’ (Freight Transport 
Association, 2015) <http://www.fta.co.uk/policy_and_compliance/sea/long_guide/himalaya.html> Accessed 13 
October 2015. See also “Elbe Maru” (1978) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 206. 
157 Tetley (n 26). 
158 A demise clause usually states: “If the ship is not owned or chartered by demise to the company or line by 
whom the bill of lading is issued the bill of lading shall take effect as a contract with the owner or demise 
charterer as the case may be as principal made through the agency of the said company or line who act as agent 
only and shall be under no personal liability whatsoever in respect thereof”. 
159 William Tetley, ‘Case Note: Homburg Houtimport B.Vv Agrosin Private Ltd. (The Starsin) (2003) 1 Lloyd’s 
571, 2003 AMC 913 (HL) 121 (Bills of Lading)’ (2004) 35 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 1.  
160 Draft Charterparty Clause Promoting the Use of the Inter-Club New York Produce Exchange Agreement 1996 
(As Amended September 2011) http://www.shipownersclub.com/media/2016/05/Draft-Charterparty-Clause-
promoting-Inter-Club-New-York-Produce-Exchange.pdf accessed 21 June 2016; Stefan Bjarnelöf-Sovtic, ‘The 
Inter-Club Agreement: Certain Aspects’ (Master’s Thesis, University of Lund 2006). 
161 The MLA Report (n 19). This clause originated in Tessler Brothers (n 74) where the Court held that in order to 
take advantage of the USD 500 package limitation, the carrier has to give the shipper notice of the limitation and a 
fair opportunity to declare a higher value for its good. 
162 “In any event, the carrier and the ship are discharged from all liability for loss or damage to the goods unless 
suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. 
It is hereby agreed that suit shall not be deemed brought until jurisdiction have Suit shall not be deemed “brought” 
unless jurisdiction is obtained over the Carrier by service of process or by an agreement to appear”. 
163 “It is hereby agreed that this Bill of Lading shall be construed, and the rights of the parties thereunder 
determined, wherever possible, according to the law of the United States of America”. 
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On one hand, the contractual scheme of third party protection can be considered 
pragmatic and essentially functional in practice. On the other, it leaves the protection of third 
parties subject to the willingness of the two main parties and to the interpretation of the clauses 
wording. 
 
Summary of Part A 
 
This part of the chapter has introduced the concept and importance of legal protection 
between two parties of a commercial relationship as well as presenting the traditional view of 
the carriage of goods by sea as a bilateral relationship and allocation of risks between the two 
parties with third parties serving a risk. Furthermore, this section has explained why and how 
this risk has been managed so far. It is believed that, generally speaking, the contractual 
framework for third party protection in the carriage of goods by sea is acceptable mainly 
because contracts are an easy and practical way to deal with protection. The intention of the 
parties is precisely stated in clauses such as a Himalaya clause, where the parties to the contract 
essentially list all the other parties to whom they wish to extend their limitation of liability.  
It can be concluded that contract, is a very common mechanism for risk control in 
today’s shipping industry.165 Contract’s role, however, has changed dramatically, passing from 
being a purely legal necessity for protecting against possible mishaps, to becoming tools for 
optimising ongoing business relationships.166 Most pertinently for this discussion, contract 
serves to manage the risk of third parties and their contracts. Contracts have become central in 
international transactions.167 Indeed, the number of contracts drawn has increased dramatically. 
Additionally, contracts have become particularly interdependent – especially in complex, 
integrated systems – and can therefore be of the utmost assistance.  
Lowe says that contracts put forth the rights and obligations of the parties to the 
contract and describe the responsibilities and procedural roles of those named within the 
                                                                                                                                                                               
164 “If any provision of this Bill of Lading is, or is held to be, invalid under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 
the United States, or any law that is compulsory applicable, such provision shall, to the extent of such invalidity, 
but no further, be null and void. The terms and conditions of this Bill of Lading are separable, and if any term or 
condition is, or is held to be, invalid, null and void, or unenforceable, such holding shall not affect in any way the 
validity or enforceability of any other term or condition of this Bill of Lading”.  
165 National Contract Management Association (2013) 11 Journal of Contract Management <www.ncmahq.org> 
Accessed 3 January 2015. 
166 PWC, ‘Contract Management, Control Value and Minimise Risks’ (2015) <http://www.idii.com/wp/MembaPw 
ContractMgmt.pdf> Accessed 18 January 2015. 
167 Lorenz Kahler, ‘Contract-Management Duties As A New Regulatory Device’ (2013) 76 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 89. 
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contract, asserting that a common awareness of the distribution of risk within a contract is a 
key feature of, “harmonious, effective and efficient projects”.168 
As stated however, a contract alone is not enough to limit risk. Insurance helps by 
transferring risk. In comparison with insurance of the past, the structure of risks covered by 
insurance today has expanded substantially. In marine insurance, the risks covered were mostly 
external in relation to the assured: perils of the sea, wars, pirates, robbers, and so forth. 
Currently the risks are of a different nature and internal to the carriage structure and the 
relationship between the parties performing the carriage.169  
Minichello likens insurance to grease; it lubricates the entire system to ensure it 
operates in a smooth manner. Transferring risks of liabilities, which can potentially arise out of 
a contract of carriage, is crucial.170 
Rather than simply finding a solution in a contract between the parties or between the 
parties and their insurers, this thesis goes further; finding a rationale for the new protection of 
third parties. The current issue is that, for the expansion of carriage in a new dimension, third 
parties are part of a common enterprise and they now bear their own risk rather than being 
dependent on the parties contracted. 
The next part of this chapter advances the concept of the multilateral common 
enterprise, and shows that the way risk has been managed so far is now inadequate.  
 
  
                                                        
168 Lowe (n 101). 
169 Lopuski (n 99). 
170 Minichello (n 144). 
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CHAPTER 2 PART B 
The factual context of the shipping industry: the establishment of the multilateral 
common enterprise 
 
Part A of this chapter explains how third party protection in the carriage of goods by 
sea has been regulated so far. This is a crucial step in describing the existing framework on 
which this thesis applies the factual context of the multilateral common enterprise. 
Part B defines multilateral common enterprise and its position in reference to the 
carriage of goods by sea. For the subsequent discussion to make sense, it is necessary to 
understand the mechanism of an enterprise, the factual context of the shipping industry and 
combine them in order to construct the framework within which third parties operate.  
The thesis provides an explanation of the factual context that has led to the creation of 
this common enterprise, and an overview of how the carriage of goods by sea became part of 
this. Consideration is given to – and a brief introduction provided for – the changes that have 
influenced the carriage of goods by sea, rendering it a multilateral common enterprise (amongst 
the others containerisation, multimodalism, logistic, and integration). This is crucial in order to 
introduce and precisely identify the concept of the supply chain. Finally, this part will provide 
an outline of current models of integration in the shipping industry, and introduce the main 
categories of third parties who are now part of the multilateral system and should thus no 
longer be considered third parties. 
 
2.6 Multilateral common enterprise 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘multilateral common enterprise’ is used to 
describe an informal venture between more than two parties. In order to better assess the issue, 
the definitions of joint venture and joint enterprise have to be addressed as a foundation. 
Both derive from partnership law and agency law. The term joint venture refers to an 
established limited company, a partnership or an unincorporated contractual association for a 
given purpose.171 A helpful definition of joint venture is provided by Hewitt: 
 
Joint venture refers to a range of collaborative business arrangements, the 
fundamental characteristics of a joint venture being collaboration between the 
                                                        
171 Greg Gordon, John Paterson and Emre Üşenmez, Oil and Gas Law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends 
(2nd edn, Edinburgh University Press 2007). 
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participants involving a significant degree of integration between the joint ventures. 
The key element to be considered and agreed by the joint venturers is the degree and 
nature of that collaboration. Joint ventures may take the form of a contractual 
alliance, a partnership or a corporate joint venture.172 
 
A joint enterprise, on the other hand, is an informal joint venture that does not need an 
express business agreement nor an evidence of sharing profit and losses.173 This research 
borrows the concepts of joint venture and joint enterprise in order to better define common 
enterprise as featuring a collaboration between parties. The words common enterprise have 
been selected because, in order to have a proper joint venture (or joint enterprise) there has to 
be a clear intention to carry out activities together. While all members of the multilateral 
common enterprise cooperate with each other on a factual basis, they do not necessarily 
consider themselves to be part of the same project. 
As anticipated in Chapter one, a similar use of the term joint venture to express a 
factual partnership in the context of the carriage of goods by sea has already been given by 
Tetley in the context of charterparty between the shipowner and the charterer. This thesis 
expands the concept to include the whole network that nowadays constitutes the carriage of 
goods by sea.  
The thesis elaborates upon an original definition, considering the common enterprise 
as a factual alliance or more precisely, a loose collaboration between different parties. 
 
2.7 The factual context of the shipping industry: the common enterprise amongst its 
stakeholders 
 
Analysing the factual context of an industry – especially one as volatile and 
continuously evolving as shipping – is a very complicated process, especially if economic 
factors are to be taken into account. The economic factual context of the shipping industry 
currently takes into consideration variables that were not necessary to consider only a few 
decades ago, such as containerisation and multimodal operations, logistics, and supply chains. 
The key to the relationships between these processes is integration; not simply formal 
integration (as discussed later in the chapter), but above all informal, factual integration. 
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According to Panayides (quoting O’Leary-Kelly and Flores), “integration refers to the extent to 
which separate parties work together in a cooperative manner to arrive at mutually acceptable 
outcomes. Accordingly this definition encompasses constructs pertaining to the degree of 
cooperation, coordination, interaction and collaboration”.174 
The integration of transport with the rest of the chain essentially started with the 
containerisation and multimodalism that also helped the transformation of shipping from a 
labour-intensive industry to a capital-intensive industry.175 As a result of this integration, the 
carriage of goods by sea can no longer be construed as a single, well-defined leg of a multi-leg 
journey.176 Instead, it must be taken rather as a part of the journey, where third parties are not 
only vital in linking the journey’s stages of transport together, they are also stakeholders of this 
integrated system.177 
Today, transportation is the thread that runs through the whole tapestry of production; 
from manufacturing, through delivery to the final consumers, and even returns. Careful 
coordination across the whole process is essential in maximising the benefit to all parties.178 
As Christopher explains, current business enterprises are changing strategies, eroding 
internal boundaries and creating what Christopher calls the extended enterprise, which has 
changed competition between organisations.179 Christopher defines a virtual enterprise as a 
series of relationships between partners, becoming a confederation of organisations that agree 
common goals.180 Fremont explains why this is so highly applicable to the shipping industry; 
most crucial for the shipping companies is the logistics of the cargo. They therefore have 
interests in expanding their area of business, looking for integrated services. Taking this 
concept further, and again as Fremont suggests, the role of shipping related to port-to-port 
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business is nowadays probably only secondary to the business of the whole chain.181 Logistics 
and supply chains rely heavily on transportation. Approximately 33% of logistical costs are 
transport-related, and thus it is central to how logistics systems perform.182 It is agreed that this 
is a crucial point of discussion and that transport alone is not essential anymore. Hence, this 
thesis does not explore the problem from a multimodal perspective.  
A carrier’s focus on integration is likely to impact on his relationship with land 
operators. In the past, shipowners and ports used to compete with one another; now the 
competition is amongst players in the field of logistics. Van De Voorde contends that, today, 
the standalone competitiveness of these players is much less important than whether or not 
they are part of a high-performing logistics chain.183 
As previously stated, the need of integration would probably not have become so 
central without the container revolution that allowed transported of one container along the 
whole chain, thus reducing costs.184 Containerisation has created a chain of interests amongst 
the operators that handle the containers, i.e., logistics. “Logistics involves a series of activities, 
including storage, inventory management, materials handling and order processing, and 
comprises physical activities (e.g., transport, storage, etc.) as well as non-physical activities 
(e.g., supply chain design, selection of contractors, freightage negotiations)”.185 
Furthermore, logistics management is an integrative process that seeks to optimise the 
flow of materials and supplies from the organisation to the customer.186 It is reasonable to 
assert, therefore, that the parties of a chain aim to optimise their logistical system. When a 
logistics chain comprises parties that do not belong to the same structure and that differ in 
nature, it can be problematic. Therefore, a common strategy is often absent when attempts to 
improve individual yet interdependent logistical systems are made.187  
Logistical activities are utterly dependent upon a solid transportation system. A good 
system will ease implementation, shrink costs, and increase quality.188 
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Transportation is also central to the activities of logistics management. Transportation 
represents the greatest cost in logistics systems, and so the overall performance of a logistics 
system can be deeply affected by the efficiency of its transport system. Even a powerful 
logistics strategy will not reach its full potential without careful linking of transportation.189 
In order to achieve a fully integrated system, parties in a logistics chain have to share 
inventory levels, product characteristics, and available resources.190 Once the integration 
between transport and logistics has been addressed, the logistic must also be considered from a 
broader perspective of supply chain and supply chain management.191 Logistics is, in fact, only 
one part of the supply chain process that “plans, implements, and controls the efficient, 
effective forward and reverse flow and storage of goods, services, and related information 
between the point of origin and the point of consumption in order to meet customers’ 
requirements”.192 Woo defines a supply chain as “a connected series of activities which are 
concerned with planning, coordinating and controlling materials, parts, and finished goods 
from supplier to customer”.193 In the context of shipping, Woo then specifies that a maritime 
supply chain is a “connected series of activities pertaining to shipping services which is 
concerned with planning, coordinating and controlling containerised cargoes from the point of 
origin to the point of destination”.194 
This thesis uses these definitions to create new boundaries within and without which 
third parties currently operate, arguing that the carriage of goods by sea is not an isolated 
business but instead integrated into a broader supply chain. Legal protection should 
consequently have the same rationale for all the parties involved and should be seen as part of 
the management of the supply chain. To that end, it should be part of what is called supply 
chain management. 
Supply chain management is a systems-based approach to viewing the channel as a 
whole rather than as a set of fragmented parts.195 Parties within the management of a single 
supply chain in fact share the same mutual risk.196 
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Christopher enhances this concept of network integration and reports that it is 
managed as a system: 
 
A firm is at the centre of an interdependent network – a confederation of mutually 
complementary competencies and capabilities – which competes as an integrated 
supply chain against other supply chain. To manage in a such radically revised 
competitive structure clearly requires different skills and priorities to those employed 
in the traditional model. To achieve market leadership in the world of network 
competition necessitates a focus on network management as well as upon internal 
processes. Of the many issues and challenges facing organisations as they make the 
transition to this new competitive environment, the following is perhaps most 
significant: traditionally members of a supply chain have never considered themselves 
to be part of a marketing network and so have not shared with each other their 
strategic thinking. For network competition to be truly effective requires a 
significantly higher level of joint strategy development. This means that network 
members must collectively agree strategic goal s for the network and the means of 
attaining them.197 
 
The analysis above clearly shows the concepts of network and common interests but 
also confirms the concern that parties of the supply chain in reality do not consider themselves 
to be part of the network. Essential to this network is the concept of sharing, in particular the 
sharing of information and plans necessary to make the channel more efficient and 
competitive.198 Electronic commerce has played a crucial role in supporting and enhancing this 
sharing.199 Chuah agrees that cargo management has become highly computerised, and that the 
parties involved in the chain share responsibility for it.200  
Given how closely aligned the various parties in the ‘whole’ channels have now 
become – particularly in the context of third parties in the carriage of goods by sea – affording 
them different legal protection according to historical differentiations seems an outdated 
approach. This research does not aim to identify all third parties entitled to legal protection, but 
instead seeks to create a conceptual framework within which protection can be analysed in 
relation to all the parties involved. The default position ought to give protection to “all the 
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service providers who help the cargoes move”, from the starting point to the final consumer.201 
This is the concept of multilateral common enterprise. 
Globalisation itself had a profound impact on the formation of global chain that goes 
beyond maritime barriers. It is important, in fact, according to Stopford, to look beyond 
maritime operations to a broader, comprehensive perspective. The aim of the shipper is now to 
obtain better and cheaper transport over the whole distance, from origin to destination; not only 
for the sea leg.202  
Global supply chains allow people to move products to and from every corner of the 
world. As Drake reports, it is possible for a fish to be caught in the Mediterranean Sea and 
served in Japan several days later. A product manufactured deep in the interior of China can be 
delivered direct to a consumer in the American heartland within a week. This is the state of 
world-class supply chain management in the twenty-first century.203 Even consumers, 
constitute part of the supply chain management. Every time a consumer rates or comments on 
their recent service from a company such as Amazon, for example, they are helping to improve 
supply chain management. 
As mentioned previously, this thesis considers the supply chain from a network-
centric perspective. This thesis looks at the supply chain not as a process but as a factual 
cooperation and therefore from the perspective of the participants of the chain rather than the 
abstract procedure. In this respect, a supply chain is in essence a common enterprise, even if it 
is not legally identified as such. As Jephson and Morgen define it, a supply chain is a “network 
involved in the provision of product and service packages to a customer”.204 The most 
important aspect is the inter-organisational element of the network, which this thesis has 
already identified as supply chain management. The synergy between and with suppliers and 
customers are especially important in this context, in order to properly meet the end customer’s 
needs.205 
By way of explanation, consider the example of the supply chain for a basic t-shirt 
sold in the United States. As Drake has shown, the t-shirt is made with cotton grown in the 
United States and transported to China, where it is spun into thread. This thread is then turned 
into fabric, which is cut and sewn to make t-shirts. The finished articles are then sent back to 
the United States, where they are (usually) printed with a logo and finally sold. Before landing 
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on the shelves of consumer stores or e-commerce warehouses, the t-shirts essentially make two 
trips across the world. In order for this to be the preferred way making and selling t-shirts, it 
must be viable and financially attractive. That this happens at all implies not only that the cost 
of labour in China is substantially lower than in the United States (and potentially elsewhere), 
but also that the transportation of materials and products in both directions is reliable, cheap 
and efficient.206 
This is by no means a fully representative case, but it illustrates neatly the idea that, in 
a supply chain, what matters most is management of involved parties; if this is done well, there 
are no geographical barriers. To cite another example, consider the complex supply chains of a 
tennis ball used at the Wimbledon tournament in England, for example: 
 
 Clay from United States, silica from Greece, magnesium carbonate from Japan, zinc 
oxide from Thailand, sulphur from South Korea and rubber from Malaysia are all 
shipped to Philippines, where the rubber is vulcanised; 
 wool from New Zealand is sent England, where it is turned into felt before being sent 
back to the Philippines; 
 petroleum naphthalene from China is shipped to the Philippines where the balls are 
manufactured; 
 tins for the balls come from Indonesia, and once the balls have been packaged they are 
sent to Wimbledon.207 
 
Supply chains usually start with an exporter-producer such as a mine, a refinery, a 
farm, or a manufacturer. After that, there is usually a storage phase and from there a land 
transportation (e.g., a train a conveyor or pipeline), then another storage phase such as a 
warehouse, a tank, or something more specialised. Next, there is typically a cargo-handling 
phase (often using gantry cranes or a continuous loader) followed by the shipping portion of 
the journey. After the shipping comes the discharging, storage again, and then more land 
transport until the goods arrive at the importer.  
As Stopford explains, a supply chain usually consists of a sea voyage and two land 
journeys. Storage takes place in four locations: the point of origin, the loading port, the 
unloading port, and the destination. To put it more simply, the cargo is handled eight times as it 
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makes its way through the four storage areas. Moreover, there are four overland loading-
unloading operations – between the vehicles carrying – as well as loading and unloading of the 
cargo onto and from the ship. Thus, between production and consumption, the cargo is handled 
14 times.208 
According to Stopford, the cargo handling phase in a supply chain is so important that 
it affects the strategies of big manufacturing companies. He reports that it is not unusual for a 
manufacturer to relocate – or at least consider relocating – a processing plant (such as a steel 
mill) to a coastal site in order to avoid land transport of raw material. This is yet another 
example of companies belonging to the same multilateral common enterprise working together 
but without a common strategy; they are not officially part of the same corporation. Similarly, 
the cargo terminal – also without sharing in a common strategy with the other participants of 
the supply chain – tries to be as suitable as possible for the needs of its users.209 Stopford says 
that the key word is integration and that what matters is that the transport system is designed as 
a whole.210 It is argued that the whole supply chain not only transport has to be seen as a 
whole.  
Crude oil provides another helpful example:  
 
 After being extracted from an oil field, it is transported by pipeline to the coast; 
 small diameter pipes are connected to each producing well, and these pipes form a 
network that ultimately connects to bulk collecting stations; 
 these stations feed into large terminal areas with storage tanks capable of holding 
hundreds of thousands of barrels; 
 the oil is then loaded into tankers and taken to its destination where it is offloaded into 
another bulk terminal; 
 a dedicated port infrastructure is required for these tanker vessels, and the terminals – 
usually comprising an oil tank ‘farm’ for temporary storage and a jetty or single-buoy 
mooring projecting into deep water that allows large tankers to load cargo – are often in 
remote locations.211 
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The supply chain of a product can, as we have seen, be very complicated. Without a 
high level of coordination between parties, such supply chains would be at best, financially 
unappealing, and, at worst, totally impractical. 
Companies exist that specialise in the creation and streamlining of supply chain 
management, and these are known as network orchestrators. They usually work for companies 
that are seeking to outsource the management of their own supply chains to a specialist. 
Perhaps the most famous of these network orchestrators is the Hong Kong-based company Li 
& Fung.212 
Today, giant corporations (such as Amazon) often seek to create what they call a 
global supply chain, allowing one-click shipping for seamless international trade. This is a 
global shipping and logistics operation that, in terms of scale will compete with United Parcel 
Service Inc. and the FedEx Corporation. 
In fact, Amazon has already registered in the United States as an ocean-freight 
forwarding business. The aim of the project – named Dragon Boat – is to create a global 
delivery network that controls the flow of goods from factories in China and India to customer 
in the States and Europe. Amazon’s aim is to circumvent established gatekeepers, pulling 
together products from sellers around the world and then securing transit for these goods – 
whether by sea, road, or air – at substantially lower cost. Amazon will allow sellers to ship 
their products by booking online (even using phones and tablets), to create what Amazon hop 
will be a “one-click-ship for seamless international trade and shipping”. Third-party carriers 
will constitute and organize this global network in the first instance, but once there is sufficient 
volume – and once Amazon is able to run operations unassisted – Amazon will attempt to 
displace them.213  
Once the concept of integration and factual integration of transport with the supply 
chain have been addressed, this thesis illustrates two formal shipping integration models. One 
influenced by economies of scope and the other by economies of scale. 
Palmer and Degiulio have convincingly explained that, in the last decade, there has 
been a trend towards vertical and horizontal diversification of existing operators in the 
                                                        
212 Drake (n 203) 58. 
213 Spencer Soper, ‘Amazon Building Global Delivery Business To Take On Alibaba’ (Bloomberg, 9 February 
2016) <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-09/amazon-is-building-global-delivery-business-to-
take-on-alibaba-ikfhpyes> Accessed 29 February 2016. 
63 
 
traditional industry sectors of rail, truck, barge, and vessel, resulting in the formation of ‘total 
transportation companies’.214 
Fremont, quoting Panayides, suggests that such integration models permit shippers to 
focus on their primary business – and benefit from a door-to-door service – by outsourcing 
logistics. This is the core of the ‘one-stop shop’ notion: clients offered a whole range of 
services to meet their logistical needs through the worldwide network of a single container 
operator, carrier, or logistics provider.215 Furthermore, such an arrangement offers the carrier 
greater contractual bargaining power with the shipper.216  
This thesis takes advantage of existing research regarding vertical and horizontal 
integration. Vertical and horizontal integration are formal examples of venture between 
companies. They are fundamental samples of dyadic integration, very common nowadays in 
the shipping industry. 
 
2.8 Vertical integration between stakeholders of the multilateral common enterprise 
 
Recently, carriers have conducted extensive research into economies of scope.217 
Economies of scope in the carriage of goods by sea are translated to vertical integration 
between different operators of the same chain. 
Vertical integration describes the expansion of a firm’s business activities into 
upstream or downstream activities. Accordingly, examples of vertical integration in transport 
are: 
 
1) Connections established between traditional forwarders and road hauliers. 
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2) Semi-trailer operators and swap-body operators owning the load units and buying the 
haulage services from small hauliers. 
3) Container shipping lines and the shipping agencies. 
4) Intermodal transport services organised by road transport companies, operating either 
in cooperation with other hauliers or independently.218 
 
When referring to carrier and third parties vertical integration happens in shipping in 
four different ways: 
 
1) Special contractual berthing or volume agreements between a third party stevedore 
and the shipping line (e.g., virtual dedication). 
2) Minority shareholding of the shipping line in a terminal (typically below 20%). 
3) Joint ventures between the shipping line and a third party stevedore often linked to the 
dedicated use of the terminal by the shipping line. 
4) A dedicated terminal with at least a 51% shareholding by the shipping line or its 
terminal operating sister.219 
 
Matzuaka identifies the reasons for vertical integrations as increasing market share 
entering in market related to the core one.220 Fremont adds that this could also happen in order 
to reduce costs, exploiting better economies of scale,221 or for a better relationship with the 
counterpart.222 Panayides completes the concept stating that the operational integration of sea 
and inland transport was initiated by the need for greater efficiency and became feasible due to 
containerisation and technological developments.223 
The gargantuan manufacturing firms of the late-nineteenth century were the first to 
implement vertical integration. At the time, it was not unusual for big corporations to own most 
if not all stages of production; from raw materials to the finished product. In many cases, they 
would also own at least some segment of the distribution channel. The Ford Motor Company is 
perhaps the best-known proponent of such an approach. Even in the 1920s, Ford owned and 
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operated a variety of industries – glassworks, rubber plantations, forest and timber operations, 
railroads, coal and iron mines, and ocean carriers – in addition to its primary production facility 
in Michigan.224 
Narrowing to the shipping sector, vertical integration in terminal operations occurs in 
the dry bulk and general cargo markets as well as the container market.225 The tanker market is 
a notable exception; here, vertical integration has taken place to a much lesser extent, probably 
as a result of the nature of the operations involved. Invariably, transfer superstructures are not 
required, save for pipeline connections with refineries and so forth; handling and production 
are usually taken care of by the same party.226  
Frequently, the level of integration is sufficient for the dividing line between once 
separate markets for logistics services to have been blurred or entirely eroded.227 The 
advantages of vertically integrating systems were acknowledged in the early 1980s; sizeable 
investments were made in different modes and service capabilities, primarily by ocean carriers. 
Panayides identifies potential benefits for both carriers and shippers. For the former, this 
includes: 
 
1) Increased business and market share. 
2) Survival in the competitive international environment: facilitation of management and 
coordination. 
3) Economies of scale and scope that can lead to lower cost structures and higher profits 
Shared creativity along all stages of the logistical process. 
4) Capitalising on the relative advantages of the various transport modes and greater 
routing flexibility. 
 
For the latter, this includes: 
 
1) Improvements in service quality. 
2) Ease in transacting the business dealings. 
3) Simplified claims settlements. 
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4) Filing, tracing of shipment and paperwork needed for shipment. 
5) Increased control over shipment. 228 
 
It is relevant to note that eight of the top 15 terminal operating companies are 
subsidiaries of shipping companies. Maersk provides an appropriate illustration of a total 
transportation company highly involved with vertical integration through all the steps of a 
supply chain.229 Maersk is also active in road and rail and was also active (until 2005) in the air 
transport business. As the concept of supply chain management began to mature, Maersk 
became a pioneer in the development of containerisation in a broader context.230 
Towards the end of 1988, Maersk began evaluating a concept known as Maersk 
Materials Management (3M). The proposal was a computer-supported logistics system that 
would allow Maersk Line to broaden its role in transportation and logistics chains from 
supplier to ultimate receiver. The hope was that such a system would allow Maersk to actively 
participate on a profitable basis in all aspects of the land-based logistics and distribution: “The 
industries of the 1990s will demand and force the integration of the various links in the 
transportation chain, and the time when shipping lines, land transport organizations and ports 
could work independently will be gone”.231 
Maersk Logistics, formerly called Mercantile and now Damco, expanded the 
integrated logistics services business. Damco currently offers: 
 
1) Air Freight Management. 
2) Ocean Freight Management. 
3) Inland Transportation services. 
4) Warehousing and distribution services. 
5) Supply Chain Development. 
6) Supply Chain Management.232 
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Maersk is just the main total transportation company, being also a precursor of it. 
However, the other main European carriers, – MSC, CMA, and CGM – have also entered the 
stevedore business quite recently.233 
It has to be said that vertical integration in the shipping industry is realised mainly by 
integration between shipping companies and terminal operations.234 Vertical integrations, 
however, are only the latest attempt by liner carriers to pursue scope economies and network 
economies, on both the demand and the supply sides. Recently, the innovations in this sector 
have concerned the vertical expansion of carriers and their involvement in port activities and 
logistic functions.235 Additionally, shippers ask for uniformity in the carriage in order to 
maintain high quality without causing delay or defect.236  
From the perspective of vertical integration, what has traditionally been considered a 
separate third party, is now often linked with the carrier or the shipper from a corporate 
perspective. This again illustrates the importance that shipping companies attach to being 
involved in the terminal operating business, not so much for the sake of diversification, but 
rather to ensure that sufficient port capacity is available. 
The introduction of terminal handling charges represent the primary means through 
which vertical integration affects costs in shipping. The cost of sea freight includes the 
handling charges of terminal operators. More and more frequently, shippers will seek to secure 
‘all-in’ rates that cover three basic elements; sea freight, surcharges and terminal handling 
charges.237 Such comprehensive rates allow the shipper to pay the carriers directly without 
necessarily being acquainted with the third parties involved. In the container market, therefore, 
the carrier’s costs take into account the cost of third party involvement. This sheds some light 
on the reasons for certain market participants attempting to secure control over these chains, 
whether through mergers, acquisitions, or vertical and horizontal integration.238 
Lin et al. report that, in addition, those operators who choose to integrate vertically 
tend to include only the aspects that are relevant and easily incorporated. Sometimes, the 
operator will seek to take advantage of the resources (or acquire the services of their members) 
in the chain. By way of example, leading shipping carriers often invest in their terminal 
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operators to secure long-term benefits.239 Lin et al. also assert that freight forwarders are 
interested in owning and managing their own warehouses if needed, but tend not to own land 
transport fleets as they are harder to manage.240 
Once links are forged between these various operational strands, they are usually 
strengthened to maximise productivity and minimise costs. The shipping company is thus in a 
position to improve the entire chain’s productivity. Where vertical control has not been 
achieved by a shipping company, the efficacy of each action is dependent upon the relationship 
between shipping lines and terminal operators. Shipping companies will try, as a rule, to 
maximise control over the generalised cost of a given port call. If this proves hard to do, the 
most appropriate solutions would be sought, such as using a different port that will reduce the 
generalised cost.241 
Apart from the aforementioned, in some sectors where the hire rates are impossible to 
control because they are part of fixed tariffs – such as the liner/container sector – apart from 
economies of scope through vertical integrations – the only way to make a profit is by reducing 
costs with economies of scales.242 
The next part deals with economies of scale and the high position in the chain that 
certain categories of third parties acquire as a result, and more specifically the role of ports and 
its stakeholders.  
 
2.9 The modern role of ports and horizontal integration amongst its stakeholders 
 
A paper on shipping analysis prepared by PWC for the European Commission reports 
that ports and the maritime industry compete as part of the supply chains to which they belong. 
Some of these alliances are formal, as in the case of the vertical integration of shipping 
companies with port terminals. The same report shows that: 
 
1) The forms of control of the maritime industry and ports however, are likely to 
become increasingly flexible as in addition to mergers, recent developments 
include as well alliances, joint ventures and dedicated handling activities. 
2) Cooperation may involve carriers, terminal operating companies, port 
authorities, hinterland operators, and hinterland terminal operators. 
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3) As can be seen, 14 out of the top 20 container shipping companies have 
integrated vertically with port terminal operations, sometimes under an "own 
brand" name.243 
 
As mentioned previously, the integration into the supply chain of the carriage of goods 
by sea is made possible by the nature of modern ports. Within international logistics chains – 
and the networks associated with them – these ports serve as vital nodes. In isolation, a port’s 
remote location means little; what matters today is the network that connects ports to 
consumers.244 
The greater the number and depth of long-term, co-operative relationships that a port 
has, the higher its level of integration in the supply chain.245 On a smaller scale, a port can 
itself be viewed as a series of links – ship unloading, storage transport, storage, loading, and so 
forth – constituting a miniature supply chain of its own. The industry and marketplace now 
require that ports function as integrated nodes in the supply chain, bridging the gap between 
land and sea, not just sites to load and discharge cargo.246 This evolution has built new 
relationships among operators on sea and on land.247 
A logistics chain’s success is contingent upon the competitive strength of that chain’s 
seaports. The reverse is also true. The same logic is applicable to other players in maritime 
transport, such as shipowners, hinterland transport providers, and port undertakings; each is a 
stakeholder in the same venture.248 
 It is known that stakeholders, as part of the supply chain, have a direct interest; port 
and terminal integration in supply chains impacts on stakeholder operations and the satisfaction 
of their customers.249 According to Van de Voorde, this shift began in the middle of the 
twentieth century. Ports were considered prime locations for various industrial activities. As a 
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result, they became significant links in the industrial chain as well as playing a role in trade and 
transport chains.250 
Ports now occupy a new position as centres for loading, and serve as links between 
sea and land transport. This change allows carriers to select ports with the best facilities and 
most competitive costs, even if they are not the closest port to the cargo’s ultimate 
destination.251 Furthermore, the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) reports that the point at which the shipper considers the cargo delivered has 
changed.252 Traditionally, this point was deemed to be at the port; on the dock, below the ship’s 
hook. On this understanding, carriers were not responsible for or involved with the cargo prior 
to it being loaded on board his ship or after it was discharged. This point has now moved 
ashore. Shippers deliver goods to the carrier’s container freight station for consolidation and 
loading into the carrier’s container (in the event that the shipper has not already loaded the 
goods into a container beforehand). Then, either the shipper delivers the container to the 
carrier’s container yard (usually close to the port) or sometimes the carrier will take delivery of 
the container at the shipper’s factory.253 Liu, referencing Drewry, points out that: 
 
The competition between container ports was for a long time not very intensive 
because ports are location specific. However, with the increasing proportion of 
transhipment traffic within the total container port traffic the geopolitically-sensitive 
nature of container ports has been altered, and competition among ports has 
intensified. Ports are now not only competing with nearby ports, but also with ports 
relatively far away. For example, the Port of Gioia Tauro (South Italy, Mediterranean 
Sea) competes with the Port of Rotterdam (West Netherlands, North Sea) for the 
continental European market.254 
 
This factual context facilitates the integration between players. Example of port 
integration is the role of carrier-operated terminals (also known as dedicated terminals). These 
terminals are often used by ocean carriers as a way of securing and controlling terminal 
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capacity in order to improve their service reliability.255 Ports and their terminal operators are 
thus required to offer facilities that permit efficient, economic interface between vessels and 
inland transportation; without them, ports and terminals would struggle to compete in the 
containerised cargo market.256 
Carriers tend to focus their primary operations within a small number of ports as a 
result of their integration.257 This integration also involves the shipper; they are all linked by 
customer-supplier relationships.258 
Ports play an expanded role in the new era of logistics in that they function as 
components of integrated global supply chain systems.259 As far as container transport is 
concerned, the most significant port-related expenses tend to be the terminal handling charges 
and time-related costs.260 Market participants are thus encourage to strive for greater control 
over these chains.261 
Van de Voorde explains these structural evolutions within ports. Traditional stevedore 
firms have evolved into more complex terminal operator companies. Shipping companies, 
many of which have established their own terminal operating branch, often provide the external 
capital to do this. The shipping company can use these terminal operating companies as 
dedicated terminals, or they can take a more independent tack, e.g. acting as a multi-user 
terminal in order to improve utilisation rate.262 
In this sense, there are also alliances between different stevedores and terminal 
operators. For example, in their April/May 2015 issue, the specialised magazine Container 
Management (CM) reports that Rotterdam’s stevedores, APM Terminal Maasvlakte II 
(APMTM), APM Terminals Rotterdam (APMTR), European Container Terminals (ECT) and 
Rotterdam World Gateway (RWG), have made agreements with each other on transporting 
containers between their facilities at the port’s expanding Maasvlakte terminals. The purpose is 
to organise inter-terminal transport as efficiently as possible, in the interests of all links in the 
supply chain. As the port authority stated, with two new container terminals going into 
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operation at Maasvlakte, a large number of containers are expected to be exchanged in the 
coming years.263 
Another relevant article from the same magazine issue raises the question of port 
automation. The example reported by the magazine is in the port of Rotterdam where, in a few 
years’ time, the container transport in the port will be carried out by unmanned vehicles.264 
This scenario impacts on the bargaining position of ports and terminals. Nowadays, 
terminal operators can be represented by states. As reported by CM, Chinese state companies 
are investing in ports in Sri Lanka.265 In addition to state investment, there are also 
corporations investing in ports,266 and some are likely to become public companies.267 
It is not enough anymore simply to have control of a port. Because players are aiming 
to take over the entire supply chain, the distinction between where the hinterland starts and 
ends has been blurred. The result, according to Degiulio, is that proximity of a port to shippers 
and receivers is much less important than it has been in the past.268 
Ports have been described as bi-directional logistics systems; Ships deliver goods for 
distribution via land and inland waterways that carry the goods along the subsequent legs of the 
journey. At the same time, ports accept cargo delivered by land and water-based modes and 
convey them to ships for the ocean part of the journey.269  
Terminal operators are likely to be increasingly active in the supply chain in the 
future, and thus increasingly important.270 
The flow of freight is regulated primarily by transport terminals, who influence 
considerably the nature of supply chains in terms of location, capacity and reliability.271 
Moreover, logistics service providers and shippers have begun to use terminals as facilities to 
store consignments cheaply.272 Of particular relevance, according to Rodrigue and Notteboom, 
is the fact that terminals (rather than ports) are competitors in the struggle between ports. 
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Though terminals are certainly in competition with one another, this competition is not 
exclusively for tangible assets, such as port infrastructure. Instead, terminals are competing 
mainly through their offer of services adding value to their users within the supply chains.273 
Also relevant here is the concept of the ‘terminalisation’ of supply chains; this captures the 
changing role of terminals as through-locations in supply chains.274 For instance, a new trend 
defined “warehousing-derived terminalisation”, has emerged. Essentially it concerns the fact 
that the role of warehousing is transferred to the terminal. Thus, a terminal is nowadays part a 
of the supply chain also as a depository.275 
After five decades of container-based shipping, ports and terminals are no longer 
simply passive players prone to restricting capacity, reliability and efficiency. As markets, 
customers, and the needs of both evolve, the widening gap between supply chains and related 
logistics network structures is promoting a more intimate relationship between inland terminals 
and ports. Accordingly, logistics providers and terminal operators are revisiting their models 
for generating revenue, securing profits, and providing value to their customers, all of which is 
being done without neglecting the operational considerations of the terminals. In some cases, 
shippers and logistics providers use terminals to augment their distribution processes. This has 
given rise to the creation of extended distribution centres. Increasingly, inland terminals are 
being considered as the extended gates of seaport terminals; by moving cargo inland they often 
reduce the time at seaport terminals.276 
Having set the new boundaries of the carriage of goods by sea within the supply chain 
that forms the multilateral common enterprise, and having reported the formal models of 
integrations, the next section is dedicated to the parties that perform their job within these 
boundaries. The list of third parties is by no means exhaustive, but it is nevertheless important 
for understanding the involvement of third parties in the multilateral common enterprise.  
 
2.10 Illustrations of third parties categories involved in the multilateral common 
enterprise 
 
2.10.1 Terminal operators 
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Terminal operators have been defined as the matching point between sea and land. 
The following definition assesses its importance: 
 
In the eyes of the law, the terminal is the chameleon of the maritime industry. The law 
treats the terminal at various times, and occasionally at the same time, as an ocean 
carrier, an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) common carrier, a warehouse, a 
common-law bailee, an agent of an ocean carrier, an agent of an ICC common 
carrier, an agent of a cargo shipper, and an agent of a cargo consignee.277 
 
They can have liability and consequently protection as carrier, bailee, or as a third 
party. This makes them a crucial category in the multilateral common enterprise. As explained, 
terminal operators and shipping firms are currently closed related by vertical integration and 
therefore from an economic perspective (especially in the container marker), it is very difficult 
to differentiate this category of third party from the carrier.  
A Convention on the Liability of Terminal Operators in International Trade was 
produced by UNCITRAL in April 1991. The convention applies to loss or damage to goods, 
identified objectively as involved in international carriage, when the goods are in the charge of 
the terminal operator for transport-related services.278 
There has also been a convention on Terminal Operators Liability after a project 
started half century ago by UNIDROIT on warehousing contracts that had been concerned only 
with the safe-keeping aspects of the industry. Wide divergences in liability regimes were noted 
in the study, ranging from a strict and unlimited liability to total exculpation and non-liability. 
According to this convention, the definition of terminal operator excludes carriers.279 
Terminal operators have a delicate role in the chain, being very connected with maritime 
activities but substantially a land job. Before deciding to establish uniformity, Hooper suggests 
that we ask: “In relation to what does terminal liability need uniformity?”280 
Hooper considers two aspects of uniformity: first, uniformity in relation to other 
terminals; second, uniformity in relation to other modes of transportation.281 He also defines 
the different features of the job of terminal operators as follows: 
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1) As agent of an ocean carrier; 
2) as a common carrier or freight forwarder; 
3) as a warehouse; 
4) as an agent of an ICC common carrier.282 
 
Hooper suggests that terminal operators need not look solely to the carrier’s bill of 
lading to limit their liability for loss or damage to cargo.283  
The position of terminal operators is quite difficult to determine within the 
international legal framework, for the aforementioned reasons. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
terminal operators are also protected by domestic law. In the United States, for example, they 
are protected by the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), which controls the tariff of 
wharfage, dockage, warehouse and other terminal facilities. They are also protected by the 
Uniform Commercial Code.284 However, it should be restated here that this thesis does not 
look at the legal protection that third parties (as terminal operators in this case) can provide for 
themselves. 
As anticipated – and as will be further detailed – terminal operators can also face 
liability under bailment terms. The liability of the terminal operator as bailee is a matter of 
local law, which varies greatly by jurisdiction.285 
An article from the law firm Holman Fenwick and Willan observes that, currently, 
there is no international convention or national legislation which applies to traditional port 
services. Operators are free to govern their liabilities using contractual terms of their own 
negotiation. By comparison, terminal operators expanding into international distribution must 
accept the possibility that a convention will be applied; the Hague Rules or Hague-Visby Rules 
if by sea, the CMR if by road, the Montreal/Warsaw Rules if by air, or the CIM if by rail. 
These conventions contain time bars, limits of liability and defences that will probably be 
different to the contractual terms negotiated by terminal operators and, if any of the 
conventions are applicable by operation of law, it is not possible to contract outside of them.286 
This is accentuated by the fact that, presently, container terminals compete for more 
traffic with each other than do container ports. The emergence of global terminal operators 
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means that the market share is now concentrated in the hands of a few global terminal 
operators; for example, PSA, APM, P&O.287 This makes them vast corporations not only by 
means of horizontal integration but also through vertical integration with the carrier. There are 
several reasons for the flourishing of terminal operators: 
 
1) Port privatization  
2) Increase in stevedoring costs.  
3) Increasing transhipment traffic. 
4) Horizontal integration.288 
 
2.10.2 Freight forwarders 
 
As previously discussed, the orthodox notion of the carriage of goods by sea is usually 
restricted to relationships between carrier and shipper. However, the contract is sometimes 
arranged by a freight forwarder, who can act as an intermediary between carrier and shipper. 
Freight forwarders, therefore, sit in a tricky position; depending on the facts, they can be 
intermediaries, independent contractors, agents, and even principals or carriers in a contract for 
the carriage of goods partly or totally by sea.289 
That freight forwarders can be appointed by both the carrier and the shipper 
complicates matters further. In these cases, freight forwarders might seek to avoid the carrier’s 
liability but, on the other hand, without appropriate protection they can be sued in tort. Freight 
forwarders can act as the agent of the carrier signing or issuing the bill of lading to the shipper 
and they can also act on behalf of the shipper when arranging the shipment of goods.290 
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Although they sometimes fulfil a role similar to a non-vessel terminal operator, their legal 
status regarding the liability to the shipper is different. 
The case of Scholastic Inc. et al. vM/V Kitano et al. explored the main differences: 
 
[A freight forwarder] simply facilitates the movement of cargo to the ocean vessel. 
The freight forwarder secures cargo space [...] gives advice on governmental 
licensing requirements [and] proper port of exit and letter of credit intricacies, and 
arranges to have the cargo reach the seaboard in time to meet the designated vessel. 
An usual discussion is on the difference between a freight forwarder and an NVOCC, 
which, in contrast, does not merely arrange for transportation of goods, but takes on 
the responsibility of delivering the goods. The most fundamental difference between a 
freight forwarder and an NVOCC is that an NVOCC issues a bill of lading.291 
  
The case of Scholastic Inc. also offers another interesting insight: 
 
When the status of an intermediary as NVOCC or freight forwarder is disputed, the 
intermediary argues for freight forwarder status and its limited liability, while the 
plaintiff argues for NVOCC status and increased liability arising from the bill of 
lading.292 
In order to better clarify the differences, the position of the NVOCC has to be 
addressed.  
 
2.10.3 Non-vessel operating common carriers (NVOCC) 
 
‘Non-vessel-operating common carrier’ (NVOCC) is a carrier who enters into 
contracts to carry goods but who does not operate or own the vessels providing the carriage. A 
multimodal freight forwarder can also be considered an NVOCC because, although using the 
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services of sub-carriers, it is the ‘principal’ in the performance of the contract of carriage of 
goods.293 
In fact, Title 46 of the United States Code that contains the Shipping Act of 1984/6, as 
amended by the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998/7, regulates ocean carriers and 
intermediaries and defines two kinds of ocean transportation intermediaries (OTIs): NVOCCs 
and ocean freight forwarders. The NVOCC has been defined as “a common carrier that does 
not operate the vessels by which the ocean transportation is provided, and is a shipper in its 
relationship with an ocean common carrier”.294 
In order to clarify the difference with freight forwarder, Title 46 OTI states that: 
 
[A] person that (i) in the United States, dispatches shipments from the United States 
via a common carrier and books or otherwise arranges space for those shipments on 
behalf of shippers; and (ii) processes the documentation or performs related activities 
incident to those shipments.295  
 
The Ninth Circuit has given the following general description of what NVOCCs do: 
“an NVOCC is an intermediary between the shipper of goods and the operator of the vessel 
that will carry the goods”. NVOCCs will typically combine various shippers’ goods into a 
single shipment, contract with the vessel for the transportation of the goods, and deliver the 
goods to the vessel, normally in a sealed container. In this respect, NVOCCs perform a not 
dissimilar function to freight forwarders; both consolidate small shipments from multiple 
shippers into large, standardised units of cargo that can be loaded on and off ships and lorries 
or other types of transportation with relative ease.296 
 
2.10.4 Stevedores 
 
Although they mainly operate as land workers, stevedores are one of the main groups 
in the carriage of goods by sea to function as third parties.297 The stevedore is a person who 
loads and discharges goods from vessels. In the past they were known also as dockers or 
longshoremen. 
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A stevedore contract has been defined as maritime in nature and within admiralty 
jurisdiction to the extent that it relates to maritime activities. However, when a stevedore acts 
as a terminal operator, they may be exposed to land-based principles of negligence. It has also 
been reported that, if storage of cargo is merely incidental to the loading or unloading of a 
vessel, admiralty law will control. Many claims between owner and charterer refer to stevedore 
damage. Stevedore damage to vessels is commonplace when loading or discharging cargo.298 
Stevedores, along with terminal operators, fall into the category of independent 
contractors. The stevedore’s position is arguably already rather delicate; from the ‘venture’ 
between shipowner and charterer in the charterparty, the stevedores, according to the contract, 
could be appointed by the shipowner or the charterer. In this respects, it has been reported that 
the stevedore position is crucial because without a proper regulation between shipowner and 
charterer, the liability consequent a damage could create confusion between the parties.299 
In the contract Shelltime 4, for example, there is a specific clause titled Stevedores, 
Pilots, Tugs.300 Another example comes from the NYPE 1946 form of time charter, which has 
a clause called Stevedore Damage.301 
Stevedore is a category of third party that has been involved extensively in claims 
regarding the carriage of goods by sea involving protection clauses. In this sense, they may be 
the category posing the highest risk. 
                                                        
298 See generally <http://www.ukpandi.com/knowledge/article/stevedore-damage-1915/> Accessed 3 January 
2016, <http://www.nepia.com/media/72637/LP-Briefing-Stevedores.PDF> Accessed 4 April 2014, 
<https://www.steamshipmutual.com/publications/Articles/Articles/Liability_Stevedores> Accessed 18 March 
2013. 
299 The Swedish Club, ‘Slot Charter Insurance’ (The Swedish Club, 2 September 2007) <http://www.swedishclub 
.com/upload/174/02.slot-charterer-insurance.pdf> Accessed 11 October 2014. 
300 “Stevedores when required shall be employed and paid by charterers, but this shall not relieve Owners from 
responsibility at all times for proper stowage, which must be controlled by the Master who shall keep a strict 
account of all cargo loaded and discharged. Owners hereby indemnify Charterers, their servants and agents against 
all losses, claims, responsibilities and liabilities arising in any way whatsoever from the employment of pilots, 
tugboats or stevedores, who although employed by charterers shall be deemed to be the servants of and in the 
service of owners and under their instructions (even if such pilots, tugboat personnel or stevedores are in fact the 
servants of Charterers their agents or any affiliated company); provided, however, that 1) The forgoing 
indemnity shall not exceed the amount to which Owners would have been entitled to limit their liability if they 
had themselves employed such pilots, tugboats or stevedores, and 2) Charterers shall be liable for any 
damage to the vessel caused by or arising out of the use of stevedores, fair wear and tear excepted, to the extent 
that Owners are unable by the exercise of due diligence to obtain redress therefore from stevedores”. Available to 
view at <https://shippingforum.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/shelltime-4-as-revised-20031.pdf> Accessed 14 
December 2015. 
301 New York Produce Exchange Form (NYPE 46), “A) The charterers shall be responsible for damage (fair wear 
and tear excepted) to any part of the sue Owners caused by stevedores. The Charterer shall be liable for all costs 
for repairing such damage and for any time lost. B) The Master or the Owners shall notify the Charterers or their 
agents and stevedores of any damage within 24 hours, failing which the Charterers shall not be responsible. C) 
Stevedore damage affecting seaworthiness shall be repaired without any delay before the vessel sails from the port 
where such damage was caused or discovered. Stevedore damage affecting the vessel’s trading capabilities shall 
be repaired prior to redelivery, failing which the Charterers shall be liable for resulting losses. All other damage 
which is not repaired prior to redelivery shall be repaired by the Owners and settled by the Charterers on receipt of 
Owners’ supported invoice”. 
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There is a long history of American cases of stevedores acting as third parties (as the 
table of this thesis will show), the first being Carle & Montanari, Inc. v American Export 
Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc.. This is the first United States case in which the stevedore was afforded 
the defence of a bill of lading’s protection clause. Incidentally, Chapter 4 presents a long line 
of American cases where judges did not extend the protection clause.302  
In support of this thesis’s main arguments, it seems that the role of stevedores is 
currently highly integrated with other categories of parties working at the port.303 
 
2.10.5 Inland carriers 
 
The problem of inland carriers and protection in the carriage of goods by sea is that in 
order to receive the protection of the carrier in the carriage of goods by sea, a third party has to 
carry out some of the carrier’s duties or contract with the carrier. Prior to Kirby, the case law 
on the protection of rail and truck carriers by Himalaya clauses was conflicted.304 The current 
position of an inland carrier is that they have protection if mentioned in the protection clause. 
As will be explained in the next two chapters, the position of inland carriers is very 
complicated. Although fully involved in the multilateral common enterprise, the maritime 
community does not recognise them as a ‘party’ to be protected by the maritime regulations. 
This is particularly clear in the travaux preparatoire of the three major conventions on the 
topic; in all of them they have been deliberately left outside the protection of the convention. 
As it will be further detailed in the next chapter. 
 
Summary of Part B 
 
 Part B of this chapter establishes the basis for the multilateral position with regard to 
third party protection in the carriage of goods by sea. In this sense, the protection is viewed in 
light of the integration of the shipping with the supply chain. 
The fact that they are part of the supply chain is not formally proved. Instead, it is a 
loose affiliation, not an official one. Hence the author’s perception of the need to create the 
definition of a multilateral common enterprise. It is essentially a multilateral system of legal 
and commercial interests. Some of them, as explained above, are formal, as in the cases of 
                                                        
302 Sweeney (n 17). 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid. In Taisho Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v Maersk Line, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 336 (1992) a road haulier was 
afforded such protection. 
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vertical and horizontal integrations. Vertical integration is a form of dyadic formal enterprise, 
while horizontal integration is pivotal to the understanding that third parties are now likely to 
be big corporations rather than weak parties. This reflects the fact that, over the years, there has 
been substantial involvement in the shipping industry of third parties who were not previously 
mentioned, yet have ‘factually’ a specific role and do not depend on carrier or shipper. In 
certain circumstances – e.g., as freight forwarders and NVOCCs – they can even be the 
primary ‘character’ in the whole chain. 
 
Chapter conclusion 
 
In this chapter, limitation of liability and protection clauses have been explained as a 
tool to facilitate the transactions and negotiations between two parties of a business. The 
extension to third parties together with other forms of legal protection have been necessary 
since third parties have been substantially utilised to circumvent the agreement between the 
parties. Protection clauses can be criticised because they allow negligent third parties to have 
the same protection as the parties of the contract.  
It is believed that the protection of third parties from contract works and achieves its 
aim. However, it could be very different from what it is (at the moment) considered the 
commercial integrated system that nowadays constitutes the framework in which parties 
operate. Additionally, the corporate reality intensifies the need for a scheme of partnership, 
outsourcing agreement, and corporate management separated by ownership. The today’s 
system is much more complex than those of the past, in which it was easy to picture the 
divisions between companies working on the same project. In this situation the distinction of 
liabilities is also difficult to mark.305 
In the second part of the chapter, the carriage as a network was introduced. One must 
consider essential the advent of supply chain management in regulating a network of 
companies whose relationships have changed from adversarial to cooperative in order to meet 
the needs of the global market.306 
An essential part of these changes should be the uniformity and harmonization of the 
legal tutelage of the parties involved in the carriage. In order to achieve this, however, barriers 
                                                        
305 Lord Diplock (n 99).  
306 Ellram and Cooper (n 195). 
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of different national laws, different requirements and different local approaches have to be 
overcome.307 This is explained in more depth over the next two chapters. 
This chapter provides fuel for subsequent chapters – which deal with international 
conventions and domestic law – and represents the next stone in the foundation begun in the 
first chapter. It proves two essential premises of this research: first, that the factual context of 
the carriage of goods by sea has changed; second, as a result the role of third parties has 
changed. This theoretical thread continues to weave its way through the next chapters, which 
evaluate the law regulating the carriage of goods by sea and, though acknowledging this 
change, argue that said change is still inadequate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
307 Photis Panayides, ‘Economic Organisation of Intermodal Transport’ (2002) 22 Transport Reviews 4, 401. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Third parties under international conventions 
regarding the carriage of goods by sea: from the bilateral to 
the multilateral geographic approach 
 
 
No one could possibly argue that your servants or domestic staff are not your 
preposés, but when you come to build a house you employ in the loose sense of the word a 
contractor to build it and you pay him for it. No one could say that he is a servant, he is an 
independent contractor. Like the elephant it is very difficult to define, but you know it when you 
see it.308 
 
  
                                                        
308 Delegation of the United Kingdom, Hague Visby Rules Travaux Preparatoire 614. 
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3.1 Chapter background 
 
Before discussing the protection that third parties receive from international 
conventions, an excursus and explanation of the evolution of the role of third party protection 
in major international conventions regarding the carriage of goods by sea must be provided. 
This demonstrates that, from the international community’s perspective, third party protection 
has changed from being completely related to carrier and shipper to take into consideration the 
expansion of a network of parties. Therefore as the title of this chapter suggests the approach of 
the international community on the topic has moved from a bilateral to a multilateral one. In 
this sense, the Rotterdam Rules – the latest attempt to regulate the maritime venture – have 
indeed taken into consideration the multilateral nature of operators. However, this chapter 
argues that, for a more adequate protection of the multilateral common enterprise, a 
commercial rather than geographic approach should be adopted. 
This chapter therefore evaluates the Harter Act and the relating three major 
conventions: the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules, and Rotterdam Rules (not yet 
ratified).  
Continues the theoretical thread that started at the outset of this thesis, this chapter 
explains the expansion of protection from carrier and shipper to third parties. The chapter 
argues that there is a constant expansion in third party protection in conventions on the carriage 
of goods by sea, starting with the Harter Act and running through to the recent Rotterdam 
Rules. The thesis will give an explanation of the rationale behind certain provisions, whilst 
methodically examining the travaux preparatoire of the various conventions. 
As stated in the introduction, the fact that categories of third parties can find their own 
protection and are against the Rotterdam Rules will, of course, be taken into account for the 
methodology of this thesis. However, the alternative considered will be only the one offered by 
the carriage of goods by sea, and not any from other modes of carriage. As already stated, this 
thesis is trying to create a standard position for the carriage of goods by sea without entering 
into exhaustive listing of single categories of third parties. Therefore, this research does not 
take the United Nations’ (U.N.) conventions regarding terminal operators as a benchmark to 
improve the protection for terminal operators. Similarly, the U.N. conventions addressing the 
Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in International Trade never entered into force; 
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they failed to attract the required ratifications.309 Neither does the thesis give much weight to 
any conventions other than those concerned with the carriage of goods by sea. These 
conventions, together with the multimodal convention and conventions on carriage of goods 
other than by sea, will be taken into account but only in order to address specific issues and for 
possible analogies.  
This chapter provides evidence for certain assertions and premises on which this 
research undertaking is based. The first is that the carriage of goods by sea has fundamentally 
lost its boundaries. Apart from geographical boundaries (the issue is not just simply moving 
from tackle-to-tackle, and port-to-port to door-to-door), there are also conceptual boundaries to 
be taken into account. Conversely, the problem is a result of specific changes in the way in 
which international trade has been structured. Carriage is now part of a chain of commercial 
interests. The position of third parties has changed and it is therefore appropriate to consider 
how international legislation has tackled this topic. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. First, the bilateral system – from the Harter Act 
to the Hamburg rules – is analysed. In this part, it is demonstrated that the aim of these 
conventions is essentially to protect its parties (carrier and shipper). Additionally, in the 
bilateral approach, the protection of third parties (if any) is viewed in light of the protection of 
the main parties; the rationale is the dependency between the parties and the vicarious liability 
of the parties for them as well as the commercial convenience. The second part deals with the 
Rotterdam Rules. It is here that the thesis argues that the protection has changed from 
benefiting only the carrier and shipper to now defending also third parties. Moreover, the 
justification has changed from only the dependency of the parties of the convention to a 
broader concept that sees third parties as part of the convention. The third parties therefore 
need the same protection as carrier and shipper. However, the Rotterdam Rules assign the 
protection, looking at the problem merely from a transport perspective. It is argued that 
protection of these third parties should be seen from a multilateral common enterprise 
perspective and not relegated to geographic areas. 
 
  
                                                        
309 Theodora Nikaki, ‘The Statutory Himalaya-Type Protection under the Rotterdam Rules: Capable of Filling the 
Gaps?’ (2009) Journal of Business Law, 1. 
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CHAPTER 3 PART A 
The bilateral approach (from 1893 to the 1970s): origins and evolution 
 
3.2 Third parties in the Harter Act: the historical context of the beginning of the 
allocation of liability in the carriage of goods by sea 
 
The Harter Act310 has been selected for this analysis even though it is not an 
international convention and is applicable only to carriage of goods from or between ports in 
the United States and foreign ports.311 The reason for this is that the contemporary story of 
regulating the relationship between the parties interested in the venture and liabilities for cargo 
starts with the Harter Act. The act was the first attempt to draw a compromise between carriage 
and cargo interests.312 
The Harter Act is the predecessor of all modern international conventions regarding 
the carriage of goods by sea. The bilateralism of the shipping industry at that time is clearly 
reflected in the Act itself. It emerged from a peculiar factual context that existed between the 
shipowners and the cargo interests. Shipowners were financially solid and with such a high 
bargaining power were able to decrease liability against the cargo owners. They were able to 
insert substantial exculpatory clauses in the bill of lading, limiting their liability as much as 
possible. Tetley, quoting Scrutton, notes that the exemption clauses became “all encompassing, 
so much so that it inspired one commentator to remark that ‘there seems to be no other 
obligation on a shipowner than to receive the freight”.313  
Thus, the balance between the parties was substantially in favor of the carrier. As 
detailed by Reynolds in 1889, the Annual Report of the West of England P&I Club reported 
that “the Committee congratulates the members on the absence in recent years of cargo claims 
which has been brought about by the now general adoption of the negligence clause; the 
premium reduction for use of this clause is therefore discontinued”.314 
As Knaught points out, in certain areas and especially the North Atlantic, some 
                                                        
310 1983. As stated by the Hague-Visby Rules, Travaux Préparatoires at 16, the first attempts to draft a uniform 
bill of lading were made by the ILA’s Affreightment and International Bill of Lading Committee in 1882. 
311 46 USC para 190. 
312 The Harter Act 1893 was followed by other Common Law countries directly afterwards (Australia in 1904 
with the Carriage of Goods Act, New Zealand in 1903 with the Shipping and Seamen Act and Canada with the 
Water-Carriage of Goods Act 1910). 
313 Tetley (n 26). See also Vanessa Rochester, ‘The Lone “Carrier”: An Analysis of the Implications of the 
General Reluctance to Hold Parties Involved in Sea Carriage Jointly and Severally Liable’ (PhD thesis, University 
of Cape Town, 2014).  
314 Francis Reynolds, The Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules, (1990) 7 MLAANZ 
Journal. 
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shipowners were apparently excluding virtually all – or at any rate, a great deal – of their 
liability when carrying goods, “when he liked, as he liked, and wherever he liked”.315 
Cargo and related interests (including trade, financial and insurance concerns) worked 
to improve the situation, and won passage of the Harter Act in 1893.316 The act strikes a 
balance between the fact that the carrier was not allowed to contract out of liability for due 
diligence as regards seaworthiness and care of cargo, but was not liable for negligence in 
navigation and management of the ship.317 
The main aim of the Act was equalising the bargaining power of the two parties and 
allocating the risk.318 As Evans points out, the Harter Act was the solution to the issue of the 
common law rules of liability in the United States that effectively held carriers strictly liable 
for any damage to cargo that occurred during shipment.319 
After a brief overview of the Act, an analysis of the provision about third parties has 
to follow. It must be noted that almost nothing in the Harter Act concerns third parties and this 
is because – as this chapter and the thesis as a whole argues – at that time the only parties 
entitled to have relevance to the carriage were the carrier and the shipper. At that time, the 
shipping was a bilateral activity.  
The Act defines a carrier as follows: “The term ‘carrier’ includes the owner or the 
charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper”.320 This definition does not 
include any other party who may play one of the carrier’s duties under the contract for the 
carriage of goods by sea. 
The problem arises because in the Harter Act there is nothing that extends limitation 
and liability from the carrier to a third party (even though warehousemen or stevedores often 
enter in a contract with the carrier for that period).321 In fact, while the carrier in that period 
was responsible for the goods, a cargo owner could have sued a carrier’s sub-contractor or 
servant.322 Apart from the owner/manager of the vessel, the only category of third party 
inserted in the Harter Act is the agent and the master of the vessel and their responsibility is 
restricted to loading, stowage custody, care and delivery. Nothing outside the strict role of the 
ship and the people involved was mentioned. 
                                                        
315 Arnold Knauth, The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading 116 (4th ed. Baltimore 1953). 
316 Harter Act 1893, 27 Stat 445 (codified at 46 USC Appendix 190–196). 
317 Wyatt (n 81). 
318 See Grant Gilmore and Charles Black, The Law of Admiralty (2nd ed The Foundation Press 1975).  
319 See I. L. Evans, ‘The Harter Act and Its Limitations’ (1910) 8 Michigan Law Review 8, 637. 
320 Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. § 190.  
321 William Tetley, ‘Chapter 1, Application of the Rules Generally’ (Euro Marine, no date) <http://www.euro-
marine.eu/hague-VisbyRules.html> Accessed 29 June 2014. 
322 As per, amongst the others, The Himalaya (n 4), Scrutton (n 5)  
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3.3 Third parties in the Hague, Hague-Visby Rules and the Carriage of Goods By 
Sea Act of the United States (1924 to 1968) 
 
After the Harter Act, the need to allocate the risk and balance in the relationship 
between carrier and shipper has been accentuated.323 The result was in 1924, with the birth of 
the Hague Rules.324 Enacted in the United States as the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, or 
COGSA325 and subsequently the Visby Protocol,326 the Hague Rules were the first international 
regimes regarding the topic and remain the primary international tools for risk allocation 
between the Harter Act and the as yet unratified Rotterdam Rules.327 
Within the Hague Rules (as within the Harter Act), the protection of third parties in 
the carriage of goods by sea concerned only the carrier and shipper. The basic relationship 
between vessel interests and cargo interests is clearly stated in the travaux preparatoire, where 
the carriage of goods by sea law was mainly considered by the committee to be, “the law 
governing the relations of shipowners and cargo owners with regard to carriage by sea under 
bills of lading”.328 
Narrowing the focus to third parties, the provisions of the Hague Rules are even more 
‘ship-related’, being concerned only with tackle-to-tackle approaches; literally, from loading 
onto the ship to unloading from the ship. Article 1 stipulates that the contract of carriage (to 
whom the rules apply) only applies to bill of lading329 and regulates the relationship between 
the carrier and the holder of the bill of lading.330 Article 1 (e) regulates the tackle-to-tackle 
provision by saying that “carriage of goods covers the period from the time when the goods are 
loaded on to the time they are discharged from the ship”.331 
This provision is very controversial and unclear. This could create problems for the 
carrier and then for any other category of third parties working for said carrier. Although the 
Rules are expansive enough to cover the period from “when the goods are loaded on, to the 
                                                        
323 In this respect, as per Lord Diplock (n 99), the role of the conventions is essentially defining and limiting the 
liabilities of parties. 
324 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, 25 August 
1924.  
325 USC, Title 46a, Ch 28, Carriage Of Goods By Sea <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode46a/usc_su 
p_05_46_10_28.html> Accessed 1 August 2015. 
326 Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills 
of Lading, 23 February 1968, 1977 Great Britain.  
327 With the exception of the Hamburg Rules adopted in 1978, but less travelled by major shipping countries. 
328 Travaux Préparatoires (n 308) 23.  
329 Or any similar and also included in a charterparty. 
330 Article 1(b). 
331 Article 1(e). 
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time they are discharged”, a limitation is then created in the wording “to and from the ship”. 
This is a problem because goods are usually managed by the carrier or one of his auxiliaries 
before and after what is called the hook-to-hook phase. 
In the time that elapsed between the ratification of the Hague Rules and the emergence 
of the Visby Protocol, carriage started to evolve332 but third parties outside the scope of the bill 
of lading could only rely on domestic protection.333 However, the fact that shipping was 
moving ashore was already clear from the travaux, where it appears that shipping companies at 
that time were much more focused on their activities at sea and wanted to limit their liability 
only to the sea leg.334 Furthermore, the problem of the restricted scope of application was noted 
in the travaux preparatoire, as follow: 
 
It is true that the shipowner can negotiate his own terms as every other trader, on the 
other hand it is true that if not regulated, all the responsibilities (included third 
parties) will be regulated randomly. The next point, and it is one to which the British 
shipowner attaches the greatest importance, is that the Rules control only the actual 
sea carriage. They are applicable only from the time the goods reach the ship’s tackle. 
The shipowner is left as free as, but no freer than, every other trader, to make his own 
terms in regard to all other services he renders as collecting, receiving, distributing, 
and as forwarding agent, or in any other capacity.335 
 
Between the coming into force of the Hague Rules and, later, the Visby Protocol, case 
law regarding third parties underwent an impressive evolution; the cases of Adler v Dixon,336 
Scrutton,337 and The Eurymedon in the United Kingdom,338 and the case of Herd339 in the 
United States. These cases had an undeniable impact on the Visby Protocol.340  
Although the analysis of the cases and their relationship with the Himalaya clause will 
be provided in the next chapter, it is appropriate to highlight here that these cases evince that 
                                                        
332 Containerisation started in the 1960s. 
333 See the concept of bailment in Elder Dempster (n 3). 
334 In the Travaux Préparatoires (n 308) at 33 it is stated, “Speaking quite broadly, I take it that as the liners 
extended their shore organisations and undertook many duties beyond those of carrying by sea, they found it 
absolutely necessary to limit the responsibilities they assumed as against the freights they charged”. 
335 Travaux Préparatoires (n 308) 37. 
336 The Himalaya (n 4). 
337 Midland Silicones (n 5). 
338 (1975) AC 154,169. 
339 Herd & Co. v Krawill (n 155). 
340 Reynolds (n 314) explains that the Hague-Visby Rules arose from defects in the Hague Rules. Out of the five 
main defects, three were a result of English cases, one in particular from Midland Silicones (n 5) and this is dealt 
with in the scope of this thesis.  
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the Hague Rules did not protect any party independent from the carrier, leaving the cargo 
interests able to circumvent the limitation of liability with the carrier in tort or suing someone 
else. 
During the travaux of the Hague Rules, the sub-committee was aware that attempts 
had been made, often successfully, to avoid the limitations and exemptions of the bill of lading 
Convention in different ways. Thus, in some countries a contracting party may sue not only in 
accord to contract but also tort. If sued in tort, the carrier may therefore find themselves 
deprived of the benefit of limitation and of the one year prescription period, etc.. Alternatively, 
the plaintiff may prosper by suing under tort those other than the carrier (e.g., the master, the 
agent, a member of the crew etc.).  
In order to avoid the possibility of bypassing the contract and legislation based on the 
convention, the sub-committee to the Comité Maritime International recommended that the 
following new Article be adopted: 
 
1) Any action for damages against the carrier, whether founded in contract or in 
tort, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits provided for in this 
Convention. 
2) If such an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier or against 
an independent contractor employed by him in the carriage of goods, such 
servant, agent or independent contractor shall be entitled to avail himself of the 
defences and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to invoke under this 
Convention. The aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the carrier, his 
servants, agents and independent contractors in the employment of the carrier, 
in that case, shall not exceed the limit provided for in this Convention.341 
 
Taking into account this suggestion, the Visby protocol inserted Article 4 bis, which 
regulates third party protection. The Article states that if an action is brought against a servant 
or agent of the carrier (they specify that this does not have to be an independent contractor) the 
servant or the agent is entitled to the same defence and limits of liability of the carrier.342 
                                                        
341 Travaux Préparatoires (n 308) 596. 
342 Art 4 bis. This concerns the limitation of liability and time bar that third parties (through the carrier) wish to 
achieve. They are specified in Article 4, which states that the limits under the Hague-Visby Rules are 666,67 SDR 
per package or unit and 2 SDR per kilogram. Regarding the time bar, the Hague-Visby rules discharge carrier and 
ship from all liability in respect of the good unless suit is brought within one year (Art 3). 
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This is in line with the period of application that does not cover loading or 
discharging. Naturally, the carrier’s liability for third parties is confined to master, crew, 
servants and agents.343 As noted, the Article clearly excludes independent contractors from the 
provision.344 As first stated by Carver and later reported by Chuah: 
 
It is difficult to be satisfied that the self-contradictory words servant or agent of the 
carrier (such servant or agent not being an independent contractor) mean anything 
but a servant who does not work on a self-employed basis. If one acts on another’s 
behalf as an agent, not being a servant, under contract, one must be an independent 
contractor.345 
 
In order to explain the rationale behind the exclusion of independent contractors, 
vicarious liability of the carrier for their auxiliaries has to be further explored. The concept of 
the shipowner as vicariously responsible for their servant and agents comes from the early days 
of the preparatory work of the Hague Rules. It is quite impressive in this respect to note that 
the second paragraph of the first preparatory work available for research of an international 
convention on the carriage of goods by sea should state the concept of the shipowner being 
liable for his servants:  
 
The shipowner, should be liable for the faults of his servants in all matters relating to 
the ordinary course of the voyage, such as the stowage, the right delivery of the cargo, 
and other matters of this kind; The shipowner shall be responsible that his vessel is 
properly equipped, manned, provisioned, and fitted out, and in all respects seaworthy 
and capable of performing her intended voyage, and for the stowage and right 
delivery of the goods. He shall also be responsible for the barratry, faults and 
negligence, but not for errors in judgment, of the master, officers and crew.346 
 
Taking into account that the rationale is the carrier’s vicarious liability for his master, 
officers and crew and their benefit, the Hague / Hague-Visby Rules (during their preparation) 
often differentiated who is employed by the carrier and who is not.  
                                                        
343 Art 4bis (2). See Corcione (n 70) 
344 This is because the rules were meant to be only for the benefit of the parties and as such also the protection of 
third parties is related to their benefit. 
345 Chuah (n 29). 
346 Travaux Préparatoires (n 308) 611. 
92 
 
In these regards, the terms ‘agent’ and ‘servant’ have been discussed in the travaux 
and the idea of mentioning each singular category of third parties was put emphatically forward 
by Tetley, representing Canada: 
 
The term ’agents’ is extremely broad, whilst the term ’servants’ could mean almost 
any one, including a surveyor who certainly is providing service. In other words, this 
par. (2) is a source of innumerable log cases and confusion. I think this Committee or 
the Committee formed for redrafting must very carefully decide which persons in 
particular are being included. Do you include the stevedores? Do you include 
stevedores who are actually employees of the line? Let us suppose the French Line 
takes a cargo to Montreal and the crew does not see to the discharging but the 
stevedores, who are not independent contractors but actually employees of the French 
Line. Are those stevedores covered? Do you intend to cover stevedores? That is the 
problem. There will be another disadvantage to a company which does not use 
independent stevedores but its own stevedores in certain ports which is quite possible, 
incidentally, in many ports of Canada and many ports of the world. Therefore, I do 
not know if it is the duty of this Committee or of the minor Committee which has been 
formed to do the drafting but they must, I think, disregard this word “servant”, 
disregard this word “agent”, these words “independent contractor” and say exactly 
who you mean. Do you mean the Master, do you mean the Mate, all the officers, all 
the crew? Do you mean the pilot? Do you mean any stevedores? Or do you mean 
independent stevedores? Whom do you mean? Otherwise this will be a perfect cause 
and source of litigation.347 
 
The answer to Tetley’s concern is given in another passage of the travaux that shows 
the intention and the need to protect only the parties related to the carrier, since they were the 
only ones carrying the responsibility of the job: 
 
While the general principles set out above meet with the approval of the full Sub-
Committee a minority wishes to put on record that they cannot adhere to these 
provisions as far as independent contractors are concerned. In their view a contractor 
who is independent of the carrier should not, by the mere fact that he performs duties 
which might have been performed by the carrier himself, become entitled to avail 
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himself of the limitation and exceptions of the Convention. A distinction should be 
drawn between, on the one hand the carrier, his servants or agents and on the other, 
the independent contractor. The servants and agents should be protected for social 
reasons and should have the benefits of the Convention whereas, in the view of the 
minority, these reasons do not apply to the independent contractor who should thus 
not have this benefit.348 
 
In order to make matters even more clear, the United Kingdom delegation answering 
to Tetley during the travaux, stated that “agent” and “servant” are exactly the right words to 
separate parties who are employed by the carrier, and parties who are appointed for a specific 
job. In the words of Mr Miller: 
 
The suggestion is that we suppress the words ‘servant or agent’ and instead of them 
substitute a list of the servants or agents whom we mean by that. I am very much 
afraid that if this is put to the vote we shall have to be opposed to it. The phrase 
‘servants and agents’ has been used in many, many conventions. It has been used in 
the Limitation of Liability Convention, it is used, if I remember rightly, in the Nuclear 
Ship Convention. It is the way we designate persons who are employed by the 
shipowner, distinguishing persons employed regularly by the shipowner in 
contradistinction to those employed as independent contractors to do one particular 
job. No one could possibly argue that your servants or domestic staff are not your 
preposés, but when you come to build a house you employ in the loose sense of the 
word a contractor to build it and you pay him for it. No one could say that he is a 
servant, he is an independent contractor. Like the elephant it is very difficult to define, 
but you know it when you see it.349 
 
This again shows the difference between those employed by the carrier and those not 
employed by the carrier. Since the carrier was vicariously liable for his assistant and was 
therefore vulnerable, the protection of third parties must be viewed from their perspective. The 
rationale for third party protection being fully linked to the parties’ interests is explained in the 
comment of the British Maritime Law association during the travaux: 
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It has been said by some of the National Associations why should a cargo owner not 
be able to pursue his action against the man who has been negligent, such as the 
Chief officers: the officer in charge of the cargo, or the officer of the watch in case of 
a collision, the officer of the watch who gave a wrong order? To those who put 
forward this argument, it is from a practical point of view nonsense. 
 
What does the carrier want? What he thinks he can get, but I doubt very much 
whether he thinks he can get £100,000 worth out of the chief officer in charge of the 
cargo, or the chief engineer who is negligent. He knows them well not to be rich and 
he knows very well that unless the carrier stands behind the unfortunate officer, he 
will not get his shipment’s worth. That is the practical reason for these actions and 
there is no injustice in saying to the cargo owner: ‘we have made a bargain with you 
which is now embodied in the Hague Rules whereby we agree, we the carrier agree 
only for you to be allowed certain exemptions. But you, the cargo owner are not to get 
round that by saying: my chief officer is responsible and making me pay through him’. 
That is what anybody engaged in the shipping agency business knows. there are 
numerous cases in which that has been done and the result of this is that the 
shipowner has had to pay far beyond the limit to the cargo owner because the action 
was taken again. the carrier, servants or agents should be protected for the reasons 
that I have given. Actions brought against servants or agents are, in practical effect, 
against the carrier himself. We do not, however, support that this should include 
independent practice for the reason that the carrier can protect himself by contract. 
The action was against the carrier and therefore he had to be protected. But we do 
ask that the carrier be protected from or against his own servants or agents which, in 
practice, really is confined to actions against his sea-going servants, that is officers 
serving in his ship and we also think that if there could possibly arise a case in which 
loss or damage to cargo was caused by the owners’ own agents on shore – and I 
personally cannot think of such a case arising – that should be covered also. It is 
mainly the officers serving in his ship.350 
 
Shipping has changed in the meantime and what was not considered as possible by the 
British association began to be possible in the practice.  
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As previously mentioned, in the Hague Rules, the only party performing the carriage 
was the carrier. In the Hague Rules there are no provisions relating to the consequences of 
performance of the whole (or a part of the carriage) by a sub-carrier. As a consequence, the 
cargo claimant may sue the sub-carrier only in tort. The same applies with the Hague-Visby 
Rules. Article 4bis rule 2 of the Hague-Visby Rules provides that the defences and limits of 
liability provided for in the Rules shall extend to a servant or agent of the carrier as long as the 
servant or agent is not an independent contractor; i.e., sub-carrier.351 
Since the passage of COGSA,352 however, the shipping industry has evolved; carriers 
are not the only ones exposed to such differences in liability law related to the carriage of 
goods at sea.353  
The Visby Protocol sought to be up-to-date with the contemporary evolutions, through 
consideration of the commencement of the utilization of containers in international carriage of 
goods.354 This movement of transport ashore has disclosed that what may be considered a third 
party in one international convention (e.g., a maritime related one) might in reality be a carrier 
in a different sector (e.g., road, rail or air).355 Hence, the need perceived by the industry to 
expand the legislative framework in light of the movement ashore. 
 
3.4 Third parties and the advent of multimodalism and the Hamburg Rules 
 
When the Hamburg Rules were drafted, the factual context of the shipping industry 
was different from those of the Hague Rules.356 In particular, the advent of containers has to be 
underlined as having an impact on the whole trade. The carriage of goods by sea has been 
revolutionised by this invention. As this thesis explains in Chapter 2, the new shape of the 
shipping industry started with the container revolution. As Wyatt states, with the container 
travelling through different modes of transport, the relationship between shippers and all the 
parties performing the multimodalism became further complicated.357 Containers can result in 
more problems, especially when the cargo is damaged or lost. Determining not only who is 
                                                        
351 The Warsaw Convention also applies only to contractual carriers, as well as the CMR and COTIF-CIM.  
352 As anticipated, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (‘COGSA’) is the United States enactment of the 
International Convention Regarding Bills of Lading, commonly known as the ‘Hague Rules’.  
353 Notteboom and Rodrigue (n 270). 
354 Ruiz (n 21). 
355 Wyatt (n 81). 
356 Adopted in Hamburg on 31 March 1978, the Hamburg Rules were drafted largely as an answer to the concerns 
of developing nations that The Hague rules were not adequate.  
357 Wyatt (n 81). 
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liable, but also during which leg of the multimodal chain358 the cargo was damaged or lost and, 
consequently, which liability scheme is applicable are now difficult tasks.359 
It was time for a new convention. In the twelve years between 1968 and 1980, two 
conventions and one protocol had been drafted. Considering that the international community 
was quite silent for the 44 years between the Hague rules and the Protocol, this relative level of 
activity can be reasonably construed as a demand from the international community for 
clarification and updates. Haak lists the failures of trying to solve the issue of multimodalism: 
 
 Conventions drafted by the CMI; 
 1967 Genoa Rules and 1969 Tokyo Rules; 
 1972 TCM drafted by ECE/IMCO; 
 1980 MT Convention by the United Nations.360 
 
The Hamburg Rules, although not having received full support, came into force on 1 
November 1992 and were nevertheless ratified. To date, 34 states have ratified the rules; an 
important level of support but not sufficient backing to give uniformity.361 
The states that have ratified the Hamburg Rules are principally small developing 
countries that had never formally had an interest in the carriage. It is relevant to mention that of 
the twenty states that signed the Hamburg Rules, Barbados and Kenya were the only two to 
have signed either the Hague or the Hague-Visby Rules.362 
A significant development within the Hamburg Rules is the period of responsibility 
from tackle-to-tackle to port-to-port. The aim of the UNCITRAL on this point was essentially 
to overcome the problem that shipping in the meantime had become port-to-port and therefore 
the responsibility during cargo handling was left unsolved. Under tackle-to-tackle conventions, 
Wyatt explains, the parameters of the carrier’s liability under the contract of carriage were 
easier to establish. However, carriers in that period were often engaged with multimodal 
                                                        
358 Multimodal shipment is defined as the movement of cargo from point to point by various transportation modes 
on a single bill of lading, referred to as a through bill of lading. 
359 See generally Wyatt (n 81); Denniston, Gunn and Yudes (n 87). 
360 Krijn Haak and Marian Hoeks, ‘Intermodal Transport In The Field Of Conflicting Conventions’ (2004) 10 
Journal of International Maritime Law 5.  
361 Berlingieri (n 20). 
362 Albania, Austria, Barbados, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Czech Republic, Dominica 
Republic, Egypt, Gambia, Georgia, Guinea, Hungary, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Paraguay, Romania, Saint Vincent and The Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Syria, 
Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia.  
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/Hamburg_status.html 
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activities. For the purposes of this thesis, this will leave categories such as stevedores and 
terminal operators uncovered.363 
The scope of application of the Hamburg Rules and consequently the period of carrier 
responsibility364 under the Hamburg Rules has been therefore extended from tackle-to-tackle to 
port-to-port. The extension has been defined in line with modern cargo transport, where 
shippers were normally not located immediately opposite the quay.365 
In relation to the carriage of goods by sea, the reference to multimodal contracts 
present in article 1(6) of the Hamburg Rules merits discussion. This article essentially states 
that, when there is a multimodal contract of carriage, the Hamburg Rules apply only to the sea 
leg. The convention is the only sea carriage instrument that takes the possibility of multimodal 
carriage into account, thus recognising that a multimodal contract does not exclude the sea 
contract. The application of the liability regime of the Hamburg Rules covers the period during 
which the carrier is in charge of the goods at the port of loading and ending at the port of 
discharge.366 
 
3.5 Third party protection and the Hamburg Rules 
 
The Hamburg Rules make provision for the contract of carriage by sea as being when 
the carrier undertakes to carry goods by sea from one port to another.367Additionally, under the 
Hamburg Rules the responsibility of the carrier is more expansive than in the Hague-Visby 
Rules, but nonetheless confined to when the carrier is in charge of the goods at the port of 
loading, during the carriage, and at the port of discharge. 
                                                        
363 Wyatt (n 81). 
364 Art 4, Period of Responsibility, “The responsibility of the carrier for the goods under this Convention covers 
the period during which the carrier is in charge of the goods at the port of loading, during the carriage and at the 
port of discharge”. 
365 UNCTAD, ‘The Economic and Commercial Implication of the Entry into Force of the Hamburg Rules and 
Multimodal Convention’ 1991 TD/B/C.4/315/Rev 1 (‘the UNCTAD Report’). In the same period another 
Convention was drafted, mainly dedicated to multilateral transport. In this Convention (which, for comparison 
some analogies are made in this thesis) the same period of responsibility is stated as follows, “Under the MTO 
instead, the period of responsibility has been extended to cover the entire period during which the goods are in the 
change of the MTO. The convention simply brings the legal regime into line with current commercial practice”. 
366 Iara Costa Conrado, ‘Multimodal Aspect of the Rotterdam Rules: A Critical Analysis of the Liability of the 
MTO’ (PhD Thesis, Lund University 2011). 
367 As specified in the previous paragraph, art 1(6) also specifies that, “a contract which involves carriage by sea 
and also involves carriage by sea and carriage by some other mean is deemed to be a contract of carriage by sea 
for the purposes of this Convention only in so far as it relates to the carriage by sea”. 
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In terms of action to be considered, the Hamburg Rules introduce a new element not 
present in the Hague-Visby Rules. The carrier (and consequently his third parties) is liable not 
only for loss or damage but also for delay.368  
Furthermore, the Hamburg Rules introduce the concept of an ‘actual carrier’.369 This 
in turn introduces the concept of multilaterally performing the carriage; the article states that, 
in a case where the performance370 has been assigned to an actual carrier, the carrier is still 
responsible for the all carriage (including for the part performed by the actual carrier). Both the 
carrier and actual carrier are liable and their liability is joint and several.371 
Article 10 of the Hamburg Rules is in practice a precursor of the performing parties 
(and maritime performing parties) provisions of the Rotterdam Rules. However, the article 
does not precisely state that the defences and limitations of the carrier are extended to the 
actual carrier. As per the proposal of the United States mentioned in the travaux preparatoires:  
 
The United States (para. 38) notes that the ‘carrier’ and the ‘actual carrier’ are 
distinguished under article 10 of the draft Convention. Further, paragraph 2 of this 
article, which imposes responsibility on the actual carrier, does not state that the 
latter is entitled to the same benefits and limitations of liability to which the carrier is 
entitled under the draft Convention. Nor is such an entitlement referred to in any 
other article of the draft Convention. In order to clarify that the actual carrier has the 
same entitlement as the carrier, the United States proposes (para. 38) that the 
following words be added at the end of the first sentence of this paragraph: ‘and the 
defences and limitations of liability provided to the carrier according to the provisions 
of this Convention shall also be applicable to the actual carrier for the carriage 
performed by him’.372 
 
Regarding the limitation of liability, the Hamburg Rules increase the Hague-Visby 
Rules’ limitation to 835 SDR per package or unit and 2.5 per kilogram.373 As previously stated, 
the Hamburg Rules regulate (for the first time) the delay in delivery; in accord to Article 6 (b), 
this is limited to an amount equivalent to two and half times the freight payable for the goods 
                                                        
368 Art 5(1).  
369 Art 10, liability of the carrier and actual carrier.  
370 Or part of it. 
371 Art 10(4). 
372 Hamburg Rules, Travaux Preparatoire at 55. 
373 Art 6(1). 
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delayed, but does not exceed the total freight payable under the contract of the carriage of 
goods by sea. The time bar in the Hamburg Rules is two years.374 
Fujita explains that the Warsaw Convention, 1929375 (replaced by the Montreal 
Convention in 1999) also imposes liability for air carriage on contractual carriers. The same 
applies to the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road 
(CMR), 1956.376 
In the Hamburg Rules the carrier is responsible for the action of his servants or 
agent.377 In contrast to the Hague-Visby Rules, independent contractors are not mentioned in 
the Hamburg Rules. This leaves room for misinterpretation and, in doing so, actually creates 
complicacy. As per the previous paragraph regarding the Hague Rules – and as shown in the 
next chapter – the decades before the Hamburg Rules case law saw an increase of cases where 
cargo owners sued independent contractors instead of the carrier, and the independent 
contractors subsequently requested a Himalaya clause. Third party protection is regulated by 
Article 7(2), which states that:  
 
If such an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier, such servant or 
agent, if he proves that he acted within the scope of his employment, is entitled to 
avail himself of the defences and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to 
invoke under this Convention. 
 
The UNCTAD report on the economic and commercial implications of the 
multimodal convention and of bringing the Hamburg Rules into force suggests that this rule 
aims to protect the carrier. The ratio is that shippers could sue agents and servants of the carrier 
under domestic laws. As it often happens in the commercial world the carrier might be bound 
under his contract with the agents or servants to hold them harmless from claims by the cargo 
interests. Therefore, without Article 7 (2), the carrier could be, although not in a direct way, 
subject to liabilities beyond those incorporated in the Convention.378 
The rationale behind Article 7(2) is given by Berlingieri in being related again to the 
benefit of the carrier:  
                                                        
374 Art 20. 
375 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw 
on 12 October 1929, quoted in Fujita (n 10).  
376 Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) (Geneva, 19 May 1956) 
quoted in Fujita, ibid. 
377 Art 5(1). 
378 The UNCTAD Report (n 365) 187.  
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Claims against servants and agents of the carrier are normally actions in tort because 
the servants and agents are not parties to the contract. This rule is intended to protect 
the carrier. Without such a provision, cargo interests could be entitled to claim 
compensation under national law from agents and servants of the carrier in cases 
where the carrier would be able do disclaim liability owning to his ability to invoke 
defences under the Hamburg Rules; or, the cargo interests might be able to claim 
higher amounts of compensation than could be recovered from the carrier under the 
Hamburg Rules. The carrier might be bound under his contract with agents or 
servants to hold them harmless from claims by the cargo interests. Thus, without a 
provision such as that in Article 7 (2) the carrier could be indirectly subject to 
liabilities beyond those contained in the Hamburg Rules.379 
 
The Hamburg Rules do not specifically exclude independent contractors; to do so was 
regarded as superfluous, even ambiguous. ‘Independent contractor’ is primarily a common law 
term. In the common law system, however, servants and agents are never independent 
contractors. Chuah specifies that: 
 
The Hamburg Rules attempt to improve on the Hague-Visby Rules by specifically 
deleting the reference to independent contractors. Article 7 rule 2 provides that if an 
action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier in respect of damage, loss 
or delay, that third party shall be entitled to avail himself of the defences and limits of 
liability which the carrier is entitled to invoke under the Rules. The question should 
not be perceived as a matter of fact but of law; the concept of an independent 
contractor will be evaluated on the basis of the applicable law of the contract.380 
 
According to Liang, any third parties under the Hamburg Rules – whether they be 
servants, agents, or independent contractors – are on the same footing. They are able to enjoy 
the same defences and limitations as the carrier. Likewise, there can be no dispute as to 
whether the servants of an independent contractor can enjoy the same defences and limitations 
                                                        
379 Berlingieri (n 20).  
380 Chuah (n 29). 
101 
 
as the carrier under the Hamburg Rules. As a result, Liang argues that the Himalaya clause is 
not needed under the Hamburg Rules.381 
This is seen as imprecise. Failing to address the term ‘independent contractors’ leaves 
a degree of uncertainty. Case law on the topic (as detailed in Chapter 4) has shown that, with 
some exceptions, courts have placed enormous emphasis on exactly who the provision aims to 
protect. The word independent contractor has frequently been judged as too generic.  
 
Summary of Part A 
 
The first part of this chapter outlined the approach of international conventions from 
the last century in dealing with third parties. It also showed that this approach is weighted 
towards bilateralism. The issue, however, has now evolved. 
This evolution started with the need to regulate the relationship between carrier and 
shipper, beginning with the Harter Act and followed by the Hague Rules and their various 
protocols. Further developments occurred with the arrival of multimodalism in the 1970s and 
an ensuing acknowledgement from the industry that regulation of this area was in need of 
updating. 
Up to that point, the reason for protection of third parties so far was simply protecting 
the carrier because those third parties were related to him. They were protected for practical 
reason and for vicarious liability. The Hamburg Rules improved the situation by citing the 
actual carrier. Additionally, the various categories of third parties have also evolved. 
Previously, the problem was for third parties such as first officer and captain.  
The Hamburg Rules, although not ratified by many countries, may improve third party 
protection. They take into consideration the position of the actual carrier, providing that all the 
provisions of the Convention governing the responsibility of the carrier also apply to the 
responsibility of the actual carrier for the carriage performed by them.382 
Similar provisions have been adopted by other international conventions related to 
carriage.383 The Hamburg Rules, which provide that the period of responsibility of the carrier 
covers the period during which the carrier is in charge of the goods at the port of loading, 
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383 Art 270 of the Uniform Rules Concerning International Carriage of Goods by Rail 1980; Appendix to the 
Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail, as amended by the Protocol of Modification of 1999 
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during the carriage and at the port of discharge. Nevertheless, the situation was still far from 
resolved: 
 
None of the existing instruments applies to the whole contract period when the carrier 
undertakes to take the goods in charge at the door of the shipper and to deliver them 
at the door of the consignee, as gradually has become more and more frequent with 
the advent of containers.384 
 
Thus, the need for a new convention; the Rotterdam Rules. 
 
 
  
                                                        
384 Berlingieri (n 20). 
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CHAPTER 3 PART B 
The Rotterdam Rules and the multilateral geographic approach 
 
3.6 Geographic vs commercial approaches: the shore is no longer the place at which 
the line is drawn; should it be the port?  
 
The previous part of this chapter explained the evolution and the problems of the 
bilateral approach of the conventions in the carriage of goods by sea. These international 
conventions are inadequate primarily because they only address the problem from the 
perspective of the main parties. Even the protection of third parties is cast in the light of the 
benefit to the main parties.  
 It is anticipated that the Rotterdam Rules will still emerge as a convention focusing 
largely on the relationship between carrier and shipper. The performing party is simply 
someone who performs any of the carrier’s obligations.385 The thesis argues that the geographic 
approach proposed by the Rotterdam Rules does not give justice to the concept of the 
multilateral common enterprise and thus a more conceptual approach should be taken. 
 
3.7 Historical and factual context: the shadow of multimodalism 
 
At the point that the Rotterdam Rules were first drafted, the matrix of society different 
substantially to when previous papers had been drafted; most of the problems encountered in 
the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules had been solved. During the time of the 
Rotterdam Rules, however, new issues needed to be addressed by the international maritime 
community.386 The issue most relevant to this research is the fact that, as a result of the 
container revolution and the new factual context of the shipping industry (as explained in 
Chapter 2), there are currently parties involved in the carriage that were not involved 
                                                        
385 With the respect to the receipt, loading, handling, stowage, carriage, care, unloading or delivery of goods. 
386 In United States, a draft text for an amended COGSA had already been made. In this context in fact, the 
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develop an international, and uniform, solution under the aegis of UNCITRAL and since then, the US has been 
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Shipping: “THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE OF GOODS 
WHOLLY OR PARTLY BY SEA (THE “ROTTERDAM RULES”)”  
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previously. These parties are not secondary to the carrier and the shipper but are nevertheless 
primary actors.  
Furthermore, there is no longer only one category of third parties performing carriage 
but rather a variety of categories. Hence, the creation of a general definition (i.e. ‘performing 
parties’) in the Rotterdam Rules. This actually acknowledges and enforces through an 
international regulation one of the arguments of this research: that carriage is ‘performed’ by 
many parties and not only by the carrier. 
The Rotterdam Rules travaux preparatoire involved not only carrier, shipper and 
insurances of both parties but, for the first time, representatives of third parties as well.387  
Compared to previous conventions, a greater number of states and institutions were 
interested in the drafting of the Rotterdam Rules.388 Other associations such as the International 
Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations (FIATA), the International Shipowners’ 
Association (ISA) and the IGP&I bear significant influence over international maritime circles. 
These organizations can affect maritime legislation on both a national and international level 
where the parties that they seek to protect are concerned.  
The need for a new convention was felt as early as 1996. At its twenty-ninth session, 
the UNCITRAL considered a proposal for its work program to include a review of current 
practices and laws in the area of the international carriage of goods by sea, with a view to 
establishing the need for uniform rules where no such rules existed, and with a view to 
achieving greater uniformity of laws.389 
In the same session, the Commission decided on the involvement of the international 
organizations representing the commercial sectors involved in the carriage of goods by sea; 
including the Comité Maritime International (CMI), the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC), the International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI), the aforementioned FIATA, the 
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the International Association of Ports and 
Harbours.390 
                                                        
387 Amongst the others, FIATA (n 41) and CLECAT. CLECAT represents European freight forwarders, logistics 
service providers and customs agents. CLECAT, position paper ‘RE: 2008 - United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea - the “Rotterdam Rules”’ Brussels, 11 
May 2009. 
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389 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Report of the Working Group on Transport Law, 9th 
session’ (New York, 15–26 April 2002) A/CN.9/510. 
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In the thirty-second session of the Commission, 1999, it was stated that the aim of the 
convention was uniformity and harmonization.391 The commission resolved that: 
 
The purpose of its work was to end any multiplicity of the regimes of liability applying 
to the carriage of goods by sea and to adjust maritime transport law in order to better 
meet the needs and realities of international maritime transport practices.392 
 
As the title of this section suggests, the Rotterdam Rules emerged from the ashes of 
failed multimodal conventions. In doing so, it represented an acceptance of sorts that a real 
solution to multimodalism had not been found. In this way, the Rotterdam Rules are a 
compromise between the need of a pure multimodal convention, the failure of the precedents, 
and the intention of parties and delegations to have their scope of application and limitation 
limited to the sea.  
The expansion of door-to-door operations has not gone uncontested. The CMI argued 
that an earlier efforts at a multimodal legislative convention – namely the United Nations 
Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods (1980) – were not successful; 
their concern was that including multimodal transport in the draft instrument might 
compromise the acceptability of the new instrument.393 
In the same period, a study of the feasibility of the multimodal carriage was prepared 
by the United States.394 As a result it was noted that the legislative regime applicable to 
maritime export-import operations should not treat the maritime leg in isolation and disregard 
the broader door-to-door transport operation. Moreover, the report stated that a new convention 
should respond to the reality of containerisation and multimodalism, technological instruments, 
and improvement of logistics.395 
Echoing this support for a new convention, organizations such as BIMCO and IGP&I 
argued that there would be little value added by developing another unimodal regime; it would, 
they argued, be remiss to ignore door-to-door transport. Providing that carriage by sea is 
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contemplated at some stage, the provisions of the instrument should apply to the full scope of 
the carriage.396 
The representatives of P&I therefore declared that adoption of “a network system 
approach in the context of door-to-door carriage [is] an approach that respects the unimodal 
regimes and with which we agree”.397 
The result is a highly compromised wet multimodal regime. The Rotterdam Rules 
govern door-to-door transport and what is already called ‘wet multimodal transport’, i.e., any 
multimodal transport that includes a maritime leg. 
As previously stated, the convention acknowledges that the simple bilateral concept of 
carriage had expanded. The expression “under a contract of carriage” should be replaced with 
“in the context of transport operations” or “in performing the transport operations”, in order to 
more clearly indicate the relation of different performing parties to the “contract of carriage”. It 
was specified, however, that the performing party was not a party to the contract of carriage 
between the shipper and the contracting carrier.398 
The CMI discussion also highlights the need for a regime that includes a carriage of 
goods by sea stage, regardless the other modes of transport: 
 
Since much sea transportation in the containerised field involves movement by more 
than one mode of transport, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to see whether the 
movement on land is subsidiary to that by sea. It is therefore considered by many that 
any future instrument should contain provisions applicable to the full scope of 
carriage irrespective of whether or not the movement on land may be deemed 
subsidiary to that by sea, providing carriage by sea is contemplated at some stage.399 
 
The Rotterdam Rules involve compromise, the extent and significance of which has 
been cited as a concern during the preparatory work. The travaux preparatoire from 
Germany’s delegates on 29 July 2008 states that: 
 
                                                        
396 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the 
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Baltic and International Maritime Council on the scope of the draft instrument’ (Thirty-sixth session Vienna, 30 
June–11 July 2003 A/CN.9/525) Annex 1, 36.  
397 Ibid. Comments from the representative of the International Group of Protection & Indemnity Clubs’ Annex 2, 
37. 
398 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ‘Report of the Working Group on Transport Law’ (n 
388). 
399 Comité Maritime International (CMI) Yearbook 2000 <http://comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Yearbooks/Yearboo 
k+2000.pdf> Accessed 24 January 2014, 113. 
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[The delegation has] serious concerns about the broad scope of the draft convention 
and, in particular, the establishment of special rules applying to multimodal transport 
contracts that provided for carriage by sea, which would lead to a fragmentation of 
the laws on multimodal transport contracts. To avoid that outcome, her delegation 
wished to see the draft convention applied solely to maritime transport contracts.400 
 
From a different view, the delegation of the United States argued that the ‘maritime 
plus’ approach was best suited to the manner in which the business community operated.401 As 
explained by representatives of UNECE: “The extension of the liability coverage from the 
tackle-to-tackle carriage under the Hague-Visby Rules or port-to-port carriage under the 
Hamburg Rules to door-to-door carriage is said to respond to the reality of containerised 
transport of goods”.402 
However, the merits of an approach such as this are debatable because the instrument 
does not take into account the views of the parties involved in modes of transport other than 
sea, nor those of the shippers, who create the initial demand for the transport. Instead, it only 
reflects the view of the maritime transport related interests.403 
To date, 25 nations404 have signed the rules, and there have only been three 
ratifications.405  
 
3.8 Third party protection under the Rotterdam Rules 
 
The Rotterdam Rules have a more expanded scope of work and the contract of 
carriage is considered as a contract in which a carrier, against the payment of freight, 
undertakes to carry goods from one place to another.406 
                                                        
400 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Summary Record of the 865th Meeting’ (Forty-first 
session 2008A/CN.9/SR.865). 
401 Ibid. Only transport by sea. 
402 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Inland Transport Committee, ‘Possibilities for 
Reconciliation and Harmonisation of Civil Liability Regimes Governing Combined Transport’ (Thirty-seventh 
session, 18 and 19 April 2002 TRANS/WP.24/2002/5). 
403 Ibid. 
404 Armenia, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Senegal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, United States of America.  
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/rotterdam_status.html  
Updated as of August 17, 2016. 
405 Spain in 2011, Togo in 2012 and Congo in 2014. Ibid 
406 The Art 1 definition also specifies that it is compulsory for the contract to provide for a sea leg and that it may 
have a leg by another mode of carriage. 
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The multilateral aspect of the convention and the involvement of third parties is 
shown immediately; as Article 12407 states, the period of responsibility of the carrier for the 
goods under this convention begins when the carrier or a performing party receives the goods 
for carriage and ends when the goods are delivered.  
Moreover, having affirmed that the carrier is liable for the breach of its obligation 
under this convention, Article 18 of the Rules408 specify that this breach can be caused by an 
act or an omission by three different categories of party: first, any performing party (thus 
delineating the concept of network of people working together);409 second, the master and the 
crew of the ship;410 third, employees of the carrier or a performing party.411 Lastly, it addresses 
any other person that performs or undertakes to perform any of the carrier’s obligations under 
the contract of carriage.412 This provision is residual, as it does not place any party performing 
the job beyond the carrier’s responsibility. However, this provision states that the central party 
of the convention is the carrier. As the last sentence of the article states: “to the extent that the 
person acts, either directly or indirectly, at the carrier’s request or under the carrier’s 
supervision or control”. Therefore, it recognises an enterprise of parties but nevertheless 
operating under the carrier’s direction.  
Like the Hamburg Rules, the Rotterdam Rules also regulate (together with loss or 
damage) liability for delay.413 Regarding the limitation of liability, the Rotterdam Rules 
increase it to 875 SDR per package or unit and 3 SDR per kilogram. The time bar is two 
years.414  
In terms of third parties, the Rotterdam Rules expand the concept of actual carrier 
with performing parties. A performing party is a person, other than the carrier, who performs or 
undertakes to perform any of the carrier’s obligations under a contract of carriage. The 
obligations are in respect to specific actions that have been listed as follows: receipt, loading, 
handling, stowage, carriage, keeping, care, unloading and/or delivery of the goods. 
                                                        
407 Period of responsibility of the carrier. 
408 Liability of the carrier for other persons. 
409  Art 18(a). 
410 Art 18(b) in line with The Hague and Hamburg Rules where the carrier is responsible for his immediate 
employees. 
411 Art 18(c), extending vicarious liability to all the employees of the performing parties and eliminating the 
difference between the party itself and its employees.  
412 Art 18(d). 
413 Art 17. While Art 60 specifies that, “Subject to article 61, paragraph 2, compensation for loss of or damage to 
the goods due to delay shall be calculated in accordance with article 22 and liability for economic loss due to 
delay is limited to an amount equivalent to two and one-half times the freight payable on the goods delayed. The 
total amount payable pursuant to this article and article 59, paragraph 1, may not exceed the limit that would be 
established pursuant to article 59, paragraph 1, in respect of the total loss of the goods concerned”. 
414 Art 62. 
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In order to be qualified as a performing party such a person has to act either directly or 
indirectly at the carrier’s request or under the carrier’s supervision or control.415 The Working 
Group noted that the purpose of the definition of ‘performing party’ was to regulate three 
different issues: 
 
1) Governing parties that performed the carrier’s activities under a contract of carriage, 
usually sub-contractors, and their joint and several liability with the contracting carrier. 
2) Regulating the vicarious liability of the performing party for its employees or others 
working in its service. 
3) In conjunction with drafted Articles 4 and 19, protecting the so-called ‘Himalaya 
clause’ for such employees, agents or sub-contractors.416 
 
The transformation from actual carrier to performing party417 has been a work in 
progress, beginning with the CMI’s preparatory work and continuing with the UNCITRAL 
work. During the first draft prepared by the CMI, the definition was of a performing carrier and 
not a performing party, defined as:  
 
A person who performs, undertakes to perform, or procures to be performed any of a 
contracting carrier’s responsibilities under a contract of carriage, to the extent that 
the person acts, either directly or indirectly, at the request of, or under the supervision 
or control of, the contracting carrier, regardless of whether that person is a party to, 
identified in, or has legal responsibility under the contract of carriage.418 
 
 The Comité states that the term ‘performing carrier’ does not include any person 
(other than the contracting carrier) who is retained by a shipper or consignee, or is an 
employee, servant, agent, contractor, or sub-contractor of a person (other than the contracting 
                                                        
415 Art 6 (b) ‘Performing party’ does not include any person that is retained, directly or indirectly, by a shipper, by 
a documentary shipper, by the controlling party or by the consignee instead of by the carrier. 
416 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the 
work of its nineteenth session’ (Fortieth session Vienna, 25 June–12 July 2007) A/CN.9/621. 
417 For the definition of ‘performing party’ it is useful to follow some of the reasoning from the CMI (CMI 
Yearbook 2001 <http://www.comitemaritime.org/uploads/yearbooks/ybk_2001.pdf> Accessed 4 January 2014, 
539) as follows, The ‘performing party’ definition is limited to those who are involved in the carrier’s core 
responsibilities of carriage, handling, custody, or storage of the goods. Thus, ocean carriers, inland carriers, 
stevedores and terminal operators, for example, would be included under either ‘performing party’ definition. In 
contrast, a security company that guards a container yard, an intermediary responsible only for preparing 
documents on the carrier’s behalf and a ship yard that repairs a vessel (thus ensuring seaworthiness) on the 
carrier’s behalf would not be included. 
418 CMI Yearbook 2000 (n 399) 117. 
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carrier) who is retained by a shipper or consignee.419 
In comparison to the Hamburg Rules, the class of ‘performing carriers’ not only 
includes the contracting carrier’s sub-contractors but also the entire line of subsidiary persons; 
parties who perform the contract (i.e., the sub-contractor’s sub-contractors, that party’s sub-
contractors and so on, indefinitely).420 
The definition immediately provides an important clarification; that ‘performing 
carriers’ are only those who work, directly or indirectly, for the contracting carrier. If the 
cargo’s interests have a servant or agent performing a task that would otherwise be the 
contracting carrier’s responsibility under the contract of carriage, that servant or agent does not 
thereby become a performing carrier.421 
After having established the general concept of performing party, it should be noted 
that only a specific category of a performing party is liable under the convention, namely, a 
‘maritime performing party’.422  
Article 19 of the Rules explains that the maritime performing party – in essence, a 
performing party423 that operates exclusively between port of loading and port of discharging – 
is liable while in custody of the goods and at any time to the extent that it was participating in 
the performance of any of the activities contemplated by the contract of carriage.424 This article 
specifically excludes from the provision master, crew of the ship and employees of the carrier 
or of maritime performing parties.425  
Traditional transport conventions have focused on the liability of the carrier.426 On the 
contrary, according to the Rotterdam Rules (pursuant to Article 19)427 a maritime performing 
party is subject to the obligations and liabilities imposed on the carrier’s defences and limits of 
liability as provided for in this Convention. However, the Rotterdam Rules limit this liability to 
the port of loading and the port of discharge.428 It was noted that the definition of ‘maritime 
performing party’ referred back to the definition of ‘performing party’ and thus also includes 
employees, agents and sub-contractors. It was suggested that, as formulated, the definition 
could have the unintended effect of allowing any possible contractual liability of a maritime 
                                                        
419 Ibid.  
420 Ibid. 118. Probably one of the first definitions of performing party. 
421 Ibid. 119.  
422 Which is essentially a concept similar to the actual carrier of the Hamburg Rules. 
423 ‘Maritime performing party’ means a performing party to the extent that it performs or undertakes to perform 
any of the carrier’s obligations during the period between the arrival of the goods at the port of loading of a ship 
and their departure from the port of discharge of a ship. 
424 Art 19(h)(iii). 
425 Art 19(4). 
426 Fujita (n 10). 
427 Liability of a maritime performing party. 
428 Art 19(b).  
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performing party under the contract of carriage to be imposed directly on an employee, agent 
or sub-contractor. Similarly, it was held that the definition of ‘performing party’ should be 
reconsidered in order to avoid such an unintended consequence. 
In response, it was explained that the reason that the definition had been framed so 
broadly was in order to avoid the privity of contract problem that had arisen in the 
jurisprudence with respect to Himalaya clauses. This allowed for such protection under the 
clause only for sub-contractors, but not for those further down the chain of contracts.429  
In exchange for their liability under the convention and pursuant to Article 4, the 
maritime performing party receives the same defence and limitation of liability of the carrier 
(whether in contract, tort or otherwise). 
During the draft, the committee supported the provision establishing that the general 
policy behind Paragraph 4 was to afford employees, agents and sub-contractors of the carrier 
and maritime performing parties the full protection of the rights, defences and limits of liability 
available to the carrier under the drafted convention for any breach of contractual obligations 
or duties. In the event that an action under the draft convention was made directly against it, a 
protection, which was often sought through the insertion of ‘Himalaya’ clauses in transport 
documents, would be offered.430 
It is evident that the Rules wish to draw a clear geographic distinction between 
someone who works at the port and someone who does not. In one of the first drafts of the 
conventions, the notion of ‘non-maritime performing party’ was also drafted in order to make 
the difference even clearer: “Non-maritime performing party’ means a performing party who 
performs any of the carrier’s responsibilities prior to the arrival of the goods at the port of 
loading or after the departure of the goods from the port of discharge”.431  
In contrast to previous conventions where the rationale for the protection of third 
parties was the carrier’s vicarious liability and the carrier’s benefit, the rationale for third party 
protection under the Rotterdam Rules has changed from benefiting the carrier to benefiting 
third parties. The reason is that specific categories of performing parties (maritime) have the 
same liability of the carrier. In this case, the rationale for the protection of the maritime 
performing party is that they have the same liability as the carrier and they therefore must have 
the same limitation. The second category defined by the Rotterdam Rules includes employees 
of the carrier and maritime performing parties, together with master, crew and people working 
                                                        
429 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ‘Report of Working Group III’ (n 389). 
430 Ibid. 
431 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group III (Transport Law)’ (13th session 
New York, 3–14 May 2004 A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.36). 
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onboard. As Fujita states, they need a different justification because they are not liable under 
the convention. In this case the justification is purely economic; they depend on the carrier or 
maritime performing party and therefore it would mean that the cargo owner could still null the 
provision, suing the employee of the carrier instead of the carrier.432 This feature supports an 
important argument made in Chapter 2; specific categories of third parties are freed from 
carrier dependency and become part of the business. 
Berlingieri explains that, when considering whether and to what extent the sub-
contractors of the carrier (called ‘performing parties’) should be subject to the Rotterdam Rules 
and liable to be sued by the shipper or consignee, it was decided that it would be convenient to 
do so only in respect of services rendered at sea or in the ports. Therefore, the notion of a 
‘maritime performing party’ was created, thereby incorporating in the Rotterdam Rules the 
principles on which the Himalaya clause is based.433 It is important to note that the parties 
under the convention, pursuant to Article 20 are jointly and severally liable.434 
In the Rotterdam Rules different categories of third parties (grouped into the general 
category of maritime performing party) are, for the first time, protected. This confirms not only 
the Rotterdam Rules’ acceptance of the concept of multilateralism, but also how integrated and 
sophisticated the world of trade has become. Strictly speaking, the role of the shipper lies 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but it should be acknowledged that also the role and 
responsibility of a shipper are completely different from that stated in the Harter Act or Hague 
Rules, wherein it was limited only to someone who entered into a contract with the carrier. The 
role of shipper is now much more involved, in accordance with the fact that carriage is now a 
network of interests.435 
Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Rotterdam Rules (applicability of defences and limits of 
liability) states that: 
                                                        
432 See generally Fujita (n 10). 
433 Berlingieri (n 20). 
434 Art 20 states that, “1. If the carrier and one or more maritime performing parties are liable for the loss of, 
damage to, or delay in delivery of the goods, their liability is joint and several but only up to the limits provided 
for under this Convention. 2. Without prejudice to article 61, the aggregate liability of all such persons shall not 
exceed the overall limits of liability under this Convention”. 
435 Art 34 also regulates liability of the shipper for its third parties as follows, “The shipper is liable for the breach 
of its obligations under this Convention caused by the acts or omissions of any person, including employees, 
agents and sub-contractors, to which it has entrusted the performance of any of its obligations, but the shipper is 
not liable for acts or omissions of the carrier or a performing party acting on behalf of the carrier, to which the 
shipper has entrusted the performance of its obligations”. Chuah (n 29) further enhances the role of the shipper in 
the Rotterdam Rules and its involvement in the carriage operations: “In a tackle-to-tackle type of arrangement, it 
is probable that the port terminal operator actually is the shipper’s independent contractor. Under the Rotterdam 
Rules, the shipper is indebted to the carrier a number of significant duties including the duty to deliver cargo 
packed in an appropriate manner, the duty to cooperate with the Carrier and the duty to provide relevant handling 
instructions. The shipper will be liable for breaches caused by the acts or omissions of any person, including 
employees, agents and sub-contractors, to which it has entrusted the performance of any of its obligations”. 
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Any provision of this Convention that may provide a defence for the shipper or the 
documentary shipper applies in any judicial or arbitral proceeding, whether founded 
in contract, in tort, or otherwise, that is instituted against the shipper, the 
documentary shipper, or their sub-contractors, agents or employees.436 
 
In this context, Smeele explains that the independent contractor is not a maritime 
performing party, even though the Rotterdam Rules enable parties to the contract of carriage to 
agree that cargo loading, discharging, handling and stowing is to be performed by the parties 
interested in the cargo – and therefore that the cargo owners may delegate the performance of 
these duties to an independent contractor.437 
 
3.9 Problems regarding third party protection 
 
As Fujita clearly explains in the colloquium on the Rotterdam Rules: “There are many 
people other than the carrier who are involved in transport of goods”.438 This is acknowledged 
by the Rotterdam Rules but, as previously stated, the Rules have given rise to two categories, 
distinguished according to where they perform their services. If services are performed in the 
port area and/or during the voyage between the ports of loading and discharge, protection is 
granted by the Rotterdam Rules. If services are performed outside of the port area or sea 
voyage, no protection is granted by the Rules, but provisions of other international unimodal 
conventions or national law will still apply.439 
As Baldwin notes, through Article 4 (1), the Rotterdam Rules extend the scope of the 
carrier’s protection to maritime performing parties, the master, crew, and other categories 
performing services on board the ship. These however may not be servants or agents of the 
carrier, for instance when the carrier is a time charterer and to employees of the carrier or of a 
maritime performing party.440 
                                                        
436 Article 4 para 2. 
437 Smeele (n 143). Chuah (n 29) specifies that “In the circumstances, the Rotterdam Rules leave it to the shipper 
and his employee agent or independent contractor to make provisions for a Himalaya clause”. 
438 Fujita (n 10). 
439 See David Moran Bovio, ‘Ocean Carriers’ Duty of Care to Cargo in Port: The Rotterdam Rules of 2009’ 
(2008) 32 Fordham International Law Journal 4, 1160. Many legal systems have differentiated further within the 
group of independent contractors of the carrier and have created separate categories and protective rules for sub-
carriers, stevedores, pilots and other independent contractors. 
440 Kevin Baldwin, ‘COGSA Carriers’ (2010–2011) 35 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 391. 
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Article 1(7)(d) and Article 19(1)(b) state that the definition and liability of an MPP 
apply only “during the period between the arrival of the goods at the port of loading […] and 
their departure from the port of discharge”.  
Therefore it is clear that the definition of port, its boundaries and delimitation become 
crucial in the Rotterdam Rules. Atamer suggests that cargo owners will now focus on 
investigating where the landside limits of the port are to be drawn.441 
The concept of a ‘port’ has changed since the Harter Act. As explained in Chapter 2, 
logistics have connected ports with inland infrastructure. Numerous ports are nowadays in the 
process of being privatised. Two considerations arise considering these changes: first, owing to 
the port’s logistics, a geographical dimension of the port can be expanded in the future; second, 
the privatization of ports is likely to give rise to the adoption of a commercial view, rather than 
a geographical one based on state or territory.  
Today, the private sector plays an important role in port management. As explained in 
Chapter 2, the concept of a port is evolving from what was once a specific area under state 
control into something more akin to a managed company.442 Private investments play an 
increasingly important role in helping ports operate at maximum efficiency.443 The Rotterdam 
Rules leave boundary regulation up to the relevant national law. So, as far as the Rotterdam 
Rules are concerned, the ‘port phase’ of the goods is one of many identifiable during the 
transport process. Determination of the limits of each transport section is possible only on a 
case-by-case basis. The geography of the port in question, the modality of the goods, other 
details of the contract, and, most importantly, the law regulating the port will all affect any 
arbitration.444 Chuah is concerned that:  
 
The word ‘port’ is not explicitly defined. This lack of a definition would seem to be 
intentional but problematic. A question is whether cargo consolidation areas would 
also count as the port area. In the light of the increasing need for cargo consolidation 
near a port, it seems unrealistic to make an artificial distinction between inland and 
port without looking at the logistic chain.445 
 
                                                        
441 Kerim Atamer, ‘Construction Problems in the Rotterdam Rules Regarding the Performing and Maritime 
Performing Parties, (2010) 41 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 4. 
442 Holman Fenwick Willan, ‘Global Investment in Ports and Terminals’ (June 2011).  
443 Ibid. 
444 Bovio (n 439).  
445 Chuah (n 29). 
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The difficulty in defining the port area emerged also during the working group that in 
fact shows: 
 
Concerns were raised, however, that in the case of very large or geographically 
proximate ports, or different ports that were administered under a single authority, it 
would be very difficult to determine whether a performing party were performing its 
services ‘exclusively within a port area’, and thus very difficult to determine who 
qualified as ‘maritime performing parties.’ Support was expressed for those concerns, 
including some support for the suggestion that the Working Group might wish to 
consider excluding altogether inland carriers from operation of the draft convention. 
In response, it was noted that the Working Group had previously agreed to leave the 
determination of what constituted a ‘port’ to local authorities and the judiciary, since 
views on that topic differed widely according to geographic conditions.446 
 
In their final version, the Rotterdam Rules therefore incorrectly rely on the geographic 
approach. Analysis of the Working Group clearly shows, however, that another “functional” 
approach was considered in creating the definitions of maritime performing party.447 There are 
no specific references to this functional approach but, going back to the first draft of the CMI, a 
more conceptual approach to deal with the issue can be identified. At that time, the CMI 
expressed the concept that a performing carrier (original definition for performing party) 
should be generally entitled (without differentiating the categories according to the geographic 
aspect of their job) to the same rights as the contracting carrier. The CMI continues, stating that 
this gives performing carriers the benefits of a broad Himalaya clause without the need to 
include a Himalaya clause in the contract of carriage or the transport document.448 It is clear 
that, in this sense, the geographic line was not supposed to be included in the Rules at that 
time. 
                                                        
446 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ‘Report of Working Group III’ (n 389). 
447 According to the Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its twelfth session (Vienna, 6–
17 October 2003) A/CN.9/544 in fact at para 30 states “By way of presentation, the Working Group heard that 
two approaches had been envisaged in creating the definitions, namely, a functional approach and a geographical 
approach. The geographical approach had been chosen as the simpler of the two. It was proposed that the 
geographical area for the definition could be the “port”, although it was conceded that a definition of “port” could 
pose considerable difficulties, and would likely be defined with reference to national law”. And at para 31 states 
“There was general agreement in the Working Group that these definitions were a good basis for continuing the 
discussion on how to define maritime and non maritime performing parties. There was general agreement that a 
geographical approach to the definition was appropriate, and there was support for the suggestion that inland 
movements within a port should be included in the definition of a maritime performing party, as, for example, in 
the case of a movement by truck from one dock to the next”. 
448 CMI Yearbook 2000 (n 399) 135. 
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Another solution proposed during the preparatory work (and one that could be 
commercially viable) was channeling the liability to only the main party of the convention. 
Here, it is relevant to report the position of the International Chamber of Shipping. In the CMI 
travaux preparatoire: 
 
The ICS proposes that the convention should only deal with the liability of the 
contracting carrier. Whether or not the carrier in some cases sub-contracts part of the 
transportation to another carrier and in another cases performs the whole carriage 
should not change the legal position of the shipper. The ICS argues that channeling 
the liability only to one party will avoid multiparty suits that are usually very 
protracted and difficult to settle. The ICS then suggests that the contracting carrier 
will then decide whether exercise his right of recourse against its contractors. Finally 
ICS reports that also the shippers representatives expressed the preference for the 
convention to deal only with the liability of the contracting party.449 
 
In this respect, the proposal had the support of the IGP&I that reinstated the concept: 
 
The IG reiterates its belief that liability under the DOI should be ‘channelled’ to the 
contracting carrier alone and that the liability and protection of performing parties 
should be addressed through contractual indemnities. The concept of providing for the 
liability of performing parties as defined, seems to be an unnecessary complication of 
a regime the objective of which should be to simplify in so far as possible the carriage 
of goods involving a sea leg.450 
 
The International group also reported the example of the International Conventions on 
Civil liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) where the concept of channeling liability to a 
single party in international convention has proved to be successful.451 The NitLeague and the 
World Shipping Council follow the same rationale: 
 
The Instrument should not provide a right to sue a party performing the obligations of 
                                                        
449 CMI Yearbook 2001 http://www.comitemaritime.org/uploads/yearbooks/ybk_2001.pdf  Accessed 8 January 
2014 139). The International Chamber of Shipping aims to have only the contracting carrier in the instrument and 
not the performing carriers. 
450 Ibid. 459. 
451 Ibid. 459. 
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the carrier (see CMI Draft Articles 6.3.2(a)(i) and (ii). The right of suit for cargo 
claims should be solely against the carrier issuing the contract of carriage. 
Agreement to a higher liability limit or greater responsibilities by the contracting 
carrier should not be binding on a performing party, unless the performing party 
agrees to such higher limit or responsibility. Supplemental Submission Performing 
Parties. – The parties agreed that the Instrument should not provide a right to bring 
an action for cargo loss or damage against a party that performs the obligations of 
the contracting carrier. Rather, all such actions must be commenced against the 
contracting carrier. The contracting carrier is responsible for the acts and omissions 
of any party that performs the duties of the carrier (including sub-contractors and 
agents of performing parties.452 
 
Though the channeling of responsibility represents an interesting alternative, its lack 
of implementation renders it only theoretical. Instead, the less desirable geographic approach 
has been adopted. Chuah contends that favouring a geographic test of what constitutes the 
maritime side of its coverage is contrary to how the shipping industry views cargo logistics.453 
Furthermore, also the definitions of performing parties and maritime performing 
parties hide technical problems raised by Atamer regarding wording: 
 
 The first is hidden in Article 1(6)(a)(i) for performing parties and 1(7)(a)(i) for maritime 
performing parties as they refer to them as any person other than the carrier. This leaves 
doubt as whether this includes also legal entity apart from humans.454 
 The second is the fact that if a person as described in Article 12(2) does not act under the 
“carrier’s request, supervision or control”. Therefore, such a person is excluded from the 
carrier’s vicarious liability, and could not be held liable under Art. 19 as a Maritime 
Performing Party.455  
 The third one is the omission to keep (custody). In fact, on a literal construction a person 
that is involved exclusively in ‘keeping’ the goods can neither be qualified as a Performing 
Party nor as a Maritime Performing Party.456 
 
                                                        
452 Same for NITL and WSC. CMI Yearbook 2001 Ibid. 139. 
453 Chuah (n 29). 
454 Atamer (n 441). 
455 Ibid. 
456 Ibid. 
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Smeele is concerned about the exclusion of an independent contractor who merely 
assists in the performance of carriage or cargo-related obligations by others, without 
performing any of these carrier’s obligations themselves. Likewise, independent contractors 
undertake other duties of the carrier under the contract of carriage. These include exercising 
due diligence to make and maintain the ship in a seaworthy state, as well as crewing, equipping 
and supplying the ship, or arranging and issuing transport documentation. Such obligations are 
related to cargo-handling or carriage only indirectly.457 
Smeele also highlights the ambiguous position of other parties within the Rules. These 
parties might include: a ship repair yard; a container supplier; a repairer who performs the 
carrier’s duty to exercise due diligence to make and maintain the cargo holds in which the 
cargo is to be carried.458 
The confusion regarding the definitions of port and the different positions of maritime 
or non-maritime performing party has also influenced the approval of various categories of 
third parties. Without aiming to provide an exhaustive list, it is helpful here to provide 
examples in the form of inland carriers, port terminals and freight forwarders. 
 
3.9.1 The position of inland carriers 
 
The position of the inland carrier459 is one of the most controversial. The proposal of 
the United States regarding the definition of ‘maritime performing party’ during the Working 
Group helps to better understand the position. The proposal states that: 
 
It has been suggested that the definition of ‘maritime performing party’ (draft article 
1 (7) of the draft convention) should be edited to clarify that a rail carrier, even if it 
performs services that might be considered the carrier’s responsibilities after the 
arrival of the goods at the port of loading or prior to the departure of the goods from 
the port of discharge, should be considered a non-maritime performing party.460 
 
                                                        
457 Smeele (n 143). 
458 Ibid. 
459 During the preparatory work the term ‘inland performing party’ was also proposed as alternative for the word 
inland carrier. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Thirty-seventh session (New York, 14 
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From this suggestion some understanding can be drawn. Countries with a strong 
tradition of carriage of goods by rail – the United States, for instance – do not want a rail 
carrier to fall into the category of maritime performing party even if performing carrier’s 
responsibilities.461 In the final version, this suggestion is slightly different: “An inland carrier is 
a maritime performing party only if it performs or undertakes to perform its services 
exclusively within a port area”.462 Conceptually, it is very difficult not to include an inland 
carrier in the definition of “performs or undertakes to perform any of the carrier’s obligations 
during the period between the arrival of the goods at the port of loading of a ship and their 
departure from the port of discharge of a ship”. In a door-to-door contract, an inland carrier can 
go beyond the line of a port and, if goods are damaged, the fact that they have exceeded a line 
makes the difference in terms of protection that they can rely on. This test is purely 
geographical and not commercial.  
 As previously stated, it is currently a very complicated matter to establish what does 
and what does not constitute a port area. Thanks to multimodal carriage, logistics, and new 
needs within the industry, the meaning of the term ‘port’ is in flux. In a few years, today’s 
inland carrier could be a maritime performing party as a result of the geographic expansion of 
ports.463 
Moreover, amid such confusion, the inland carrier might prefer to keep its position as 
a non-maritime performing party and keep the protection that the CMR allows. 
As Clarke has stated, “CMR, it has been said, works well enough … There is little 
evidence that road carriers, their customers or trade organizations that represent them today 
want change”.464 
Conversly – and without engaging in debates about a single category of third party 
protection that lie beyond the scope of this research – many inland carriers, if sued directly in 
tort, are likely to benefit from an international convention governing transport, such as the 
CMR. There are countries, however, to which no international convention applies, and in 
which national law may not provide protection against a claim in tort to an inland carrier. 
Therefore, third parties might need contractual protection – i.e. the Himalaya clause – that 
                                                        
461 It is also interesting to know that the United States signed the Rotterdam Rules on the first day, indicating their 
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462 Art 1(7) Rotterdam Rules. 
463 See Holman Fenwick Willan, ‘What Impact Will the Rotterdam Rules Have on Shipowners?’ July 2010. This 
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avoids significant liability for a rail carrier, as in Kirby.465 Thus, in this instance, any attempts 
to replace the Himalaya clause with what has been called ‘Himalaya Protection’ under the 
Rotterdam Rules will surely fail.  
The decision to exclude the inland carrier from the Rotterdam Rules appears to have 
emerged from the Working Group. According to their report, it was proposed that rail carriers 
should be excluded from the definition of ‘maritime performing party’ even when performing 
services within a port. In support of this, certain quarters suggested that such an exemption was 
warranted given the practical reality; though rail carriers might appear similar to other inland 
carriers – in that they collect cargo or deliver it for carriage within a port area – rail carriers 
differ dramatically from other inland carriers. Ultimately, their services exist almost solely for 
the purpose of moving goods great distances into or out of a port, not simply moving goods 
from one place to another within a port.466 
This explains the intention of excluding only the rail carrier and it is seen as 
fundamentally wrong because it excludes a category of third party solely because they overrun 
the port boundaries. 
 
3.9.2  The position of terminal operators 
 
 Another controversial category is that of the terminal operator. A terminal operator 
falls within the definition of a ‘maritime performing party’ and is thus jointly and severally 
liable with the carrier under the Rules for loss or damage insofar as the occurrence causing 
such loss or damage meets the requirements of Article 19(1)(b). Terminal operators have no 
liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules (a terminal operator is not an 
‘actual carrier’) and they have expressed concern at being brought within the scope of a 
mandatory regime.467  
The Rotterdam Rules have substantial impact on terminal operators; their risk profile 
will change as a result of them being liable under the new convention. Port terminal operators 
are likely to be approached more frequently with insurance claims from shippers and cargo 
interests under the yet-to-be-ratified Rotterdam Rules cargo liability convention. 
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It has been reported that, for global terminal operators who do not have a contractual 
relationship with cargo interests, the implementation of the Rules would result in a 
substantially different claim scenario: “That funnel will disappear. Instead of the carriers being 
the front line of claims, it will be the terminal operators themselves”.468 
Holman Fenwick and Willan reports that, a legal counsel for Hutchison Ports UK, 
characterised the current legal position – in which cargo interests have no direct contract with 
port operators – as “a situation we very much like”, adding that there were very few claims 
coming directly from cargo interests.469 Following the Rotterdam Rules, terminal operators 
nevertheless become a ‘maritime performing party’, having joint and several liability.470 “It 
means that the cargo interests can cherry-pick who they want to bring their claim against,” 
states the legal counsel: “Our view is that they will like to bring their claim against Hutchison, 
a major terminal operator. Our ability to limit our liability is fettered”.471 
Equally concerning is the fact that cargo interests bringing a claim have no contractual 
relationship with the port terminal operator. As a result, they have little or no interest in settling 
the cases quickly for the sake of preserving a commercial relationship.472 Should the Rotterdam 
Rules be enforced, the terminal operators will be for the first time subject to a mandatory 
convention.473 
Finally, as Chuah reports, in contrast to the Himalaya clause, Articles 4 and 19 do not 
provide for an indemnity but merely the extension of the carrier’s defences and limitations of 
liability rights to the maritime performing party. Therefore, port terminal operators (as well as 
all the other third parties) may therefore still ask for an indemnity through a protection clause 
in the contract.474 Given all of the above, it is easy enough to see why terminal operators have 
shown little support for the Rules. 
 
3.9.3  The position of freight forwarders 
 
                                                        
468 The National Association of Marine Surveyors, Inc. ‘President’s Message’ (NAMSGlobal, 2010) 
<http://www.namsglobal.org/assets/92/20100127webnews.htm> Accessed 15 December 2014. 
469 Holman Fenwick Willan, ‘Terminal Operators Face Claims ‘Front Line’ in Rotterdam Rules’ February 2010. 
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permission <www.lloydslist.com>. 
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As stated in Chapter 2, freight forwarders are frequently engaged in various capacities 
in seaports. They will rely, therefore, according to their specific activity, on the protection 
afforded to them as a maritime performing party. 
In answer to this question (i.e. whether freight forwarders fall within the definition of 
‘maritime performing party’) the CMI stated that the Rotterdam Rules apply to some of these 
and not to others: 
 
 If, for instance, freight forwarder undertakes to carry the goods to its customer, it is a 
carrier under the Rotterdam Rules. 
 If a freight forwarder enters into a contract with a sub-carrier in its own name, it is a 
shipper under the Rotterdam Rules. 
 If a freight forwarder enters into a contract with a carrier on behalf of a customer (as an 
agent), it is not the carrier or the shipper under the Rotterdam Rules and is not liable as 
such. 
 When freight forwarder provides services as a stevedore, for instance. As regards the 
contractual relationship between the freight forwarders (acting as stevedores) and the 
carrier, the contractual relationship is not affected by the Rotterdam Rules because they do 
not apply to the contract between the carrier and the maritime performing party, unless 
that contract satisfies the definition of ‘contract of carriage’ (article 1(1)) (this is 
apparently not the case here). 
 As regards the forwarder’s relationship with the shipper or consignee, the Rotterdam Rules 
make the carrier and the maritime performing party jointly liable towards the shipper and 
consignee.475 
 
The CMI continues saying that the fact that the freight forwarder, acting as a maritime 
performing party, is subject to the Rotterdam Rules would probably constitute an advantage 
rather than a disadvantage, because it guarantees that the freight forwarders enjoy defences 
including the short time-bar and the right of limitation of its liability. At present, in cases 
where it may be sued in tort, it would be liable without limitation irrespective of the contractual 
terms.476 
The view from FIATA is somewhat different. FIATA has stated that freight 
forwarders “are adversely affected by the liability regime applicable to maritime performing 
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parties”. More precisely, three specific complaints are made: a) those freight forwarders acting 
as warehousemen and stevedores – and who are entitled to freedom of contract while under the 
Rotterdam Rules – will then be considered performing parties and thus be subject to the 
liability regime of carriers; b) in those countries where warehouse and stevedore interests are 
state-owned or state-controlled, steps towards ratification are likely to be met with resistance; 
and c) multipurpose cargo terminals engaged as distribution centres in logistics operations 
would strongly oppose a sort of maritime law injection. FIATA concludes its report by stating 
that any entering into force of the Rotterdam Rules would greatly increase the administrative 
burden of freight forwarders.477 
In support of this, the Freight Forwarders association CLECAT has provided a strong 
view on the Rotterdam Rules, as explained in the following report: 
 
While neutral towards all transport modes, our Members are amongst the main users 
of maritime transport (or shipping) services, they would thus be directly affected by 
the possible entry into force of the above mentioned international conventions, which 
we will refer to as ‘Rotterdam Rules’ (RR) hereinafter. 478 
 
CLECAT states that the Rotterdam Rules will not provide any benefit for their 
members, arguing that the situation would be too complex and that the insurance and 
protection under this regime would become more expensive. They therefore suggest that 
nations and EU institutions – especially those where stevedores and warehousing enterprises 
are owned by the governments – do not ratify the Rotterdam Rules.479 They will be exposed in 
their place in respect of tort claims, and consideration should be given to this fact. In nature 
these claims are unlimited and they are likely to be devoid of the background that the 
Convention offers in relation to the contractual carrier and potentially other maritime entities 
party to the occurrence and ensuing claims. 
The limitations of the Rotterdam Rules are relatively low. However, due to the 
package limitation – which is usually relevant for multimodal carriage of containers – the 
limitation figures for the Rules are often higher. The Rotterdam Rules, by contrast with the 
CMR, are more convenient for the cargo claimant, but only if the package weighs less than 109 
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kilograms. Furthermore, any shipper may be able to multiply the ‘per package’ factor simply 
by adding the content of the container into the transport document.480 
Until category associations such as CLECAT and FIATA are persuaded of their 
advantages, the Rotterdam Rules will face a strong opposition in terms of approval from freight 
forwarders. 
 
Summary of Part B 
 
In the Rotterdam Rules, the carrier is responsible for different third parties. However, 
while the carrier is responsible for a substantial chain of third parties, not all of them receive 
the same protection. 
The Rotterdam Rules have provisions similar to those of the Hague-Visby Rules and 
the Hamburg Rules in respect of the servants and agents of the carrier. However, with the 
adoption of the notion of maritime performing party they have widened the category of persons 
to whom they apply and clearly provide that all such persons are also subject to the obligations 
and liabilities of the carrier. The action against them is, therefore, clearly in contract. This 
provision shows one of the most controversial aspects of the Rotterdam Rules; the fact that 
only the maritime performing parties have the same obligation as the carrier. Therefore, some 
categories of party involved in the carriage of goods by sea might hope that the Rotterdam 
Rules will not be ratified, because they wish to avoid this liability. This supports a crucial 
premise of this chapter; the Rotterdam Rules, in one way or another do not approach third party 
protection in an adequate way.481 
 
Chapter conclusion 
 
The international conventions on the carriage of goods by sea regulate the particular 
contract that incorporates them. They are themselves a contract, in essence, with the difference 
that while in a contract, autonomy lies between the parties, in this case the freedom to negotiate 
has moved to a macro level, i.e., the international community, with all the restriction that the 
international community has and with all the parties that have an interest in it. It was therefore 
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essential for this research, which demonstrates that carriage has moved to a multilateral system 
and as a result the rationale to protect third parties has to change, to show also that this change 
has been appreciated by the international community. 
From the perspective of international conventions, the support for the new role of third 
parties in the supply chain in not adequate. The Hague Rules and Hamburg Rules – both 
currently in force – are conventions highly focused on shipping and, as such, do not offer broad 
protection. Furthermore, the geographic approach proposed by the Rotterdam Rules does not 
do justice to the concept of the multilateral common enterprise. Thus, the current situation, 
with all its different regimes and analyses, is riddled with confusion. 
This chapter started with the assumption that, at beginning of the nineteenth century – 
when for the first time the transport industry felt the need to allocate loss and protect parties 
involved in the carriage of goods by sea – there were only two parties involved and all the 
efforts were focused on them. 
This is the rationale behind the Harter Act and the Hague Rules, and the reason why 
little reference is made in either to third parties. When the Harter Act and Hague Rules were 
written there was no representative of third parties at the table of the negotiations. In the 
intervening years, the industry and the world more broadly, have changed dramatically.  
Third parties who, at the beginning of the period considered, were carrier or shipper’s 
protected, are becoming bigger and more powerful; their role is no longer marginal. During the 
travaux préparatoires of the Rotterdam Rules, the participants included different third party 
associations on the one side but also international intergovernmental organizations on the 
other.  
For some, the Hamburg Rules function satisfactorily. According to Tetley Article 4 
solves the problem of the Himalaya clause by extending the responsibility of the carrier from 
port-to-port, while Article 10 holds the carrier responsible for the acts of the actual carrier, 
who, by the definition in Article 1(2), would include the stevedore and the terminal agent.482  
The Rotterdam Rules do not assess the trade in a proper way because they still look at 
it only from the maritime/geographic perspective and not from the maritime/commercial 
perspective.  
Some corners of the academic community believe that the Rotterdam Rules do not 
represent a retrograde move, primarily because they were never intended to replace the United 
Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, nor the UNCTAD/ICC 
Rules for Multimodal Transport Documents. Instead, they were created to replace the Hague 
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and Hague-Visby or the Hamburg Rules. Thus, they feel it is inappropriate to view the 
Rotterdam Rules as an ‘imperfect’ multimodal transport law convention.483 
Although international conventions can make new provisions on third parties, nothing 
prevents the industry from adding provision contractually. As it has been shown already, in 
some cases, parties (under the Rotterdam Rules) can agree on a Himalaya clause for the benefit 
of non-maritime performing parties or other persons who are not covered by article 4(1).484 
Adding a contractual provision is also significant because the Rotterdam Rules 
imposes responsibility and protection only to the narrow category of maritime performing 
parties and not all the performing parties. The reasoning behind this is that the convention does 
not seek to interfere with the other conventions in case of multimodal transport.485 Although 
this approach is highly respectable, it seems to exclude certain categories of third parties (for 
example the inland carrier) who can be sued in tort by the shipper, and thus it can create 
confusion. 
The difference between the bilateral approach of the Hague, Hague-Visby, Hamburg 
Rules and Rotterdam Rules lies in the rationale for extending carrier protection to third parties. 
In the bilateral approach, the rationale was to avoid cargo owners circumventing the bill of 
lading and to protect the carrier because the third parties were related to him. In the Rotterdam 
Rules, the primary motivation is protection of the performing parties. Thus, the idea of 
protection is changing. The Rotterdam Rules reflect the fact that shipping has become a 
network and many parties are now involved.  
As a solution, however, the Rotterdam Rules pose too much of a compromise, and 
room for improvement certainly exists.486 In this respect, the exchange between CLECAT and 
CMI is particularly pertinent. CLECAT argues that the Rotterdam Rules are not appropriate for 
the evolution of modern logistics. In fact, CLECAT states that the evolution of modern 
logistics “would have been better served by a convention that focused on the intermodal nature 
of containerisation”.487 The CMI answered by saying that this has been precisely what the 
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Rotterdam Rules have done, by providing door-to-door application if the parties choose so to 
do.488 This thesis argues and has demonstrated that this is not the case in terms of third party 
protection; the Rules do not do justice to modern logistics nor therefore to the multilateral 
common enterprise. 
The International Multimodal Transport Association (IMMTA) holds a similar view. 
The IMMTA believes that existing transport liability regimes are not adequate, fragmented, 
and expensive, and also that a more efficient system is needed. The IMMTA calls for a new, 
comprehensive approach to cover all modes of transport in a uniform manner.489 
The same association recognises, however, that this proposal could be too forward-
thinking for the transportation industry. They propose, therefore, as an alternative, working 
towards achieving coherence at least in the movement of goods from door-to-door, regardless 
of the individual modes being used. This should not, however, simply be a maritime 
convention extended beyond the port, but rather a truly multimodal instrument.490 
The IMMTA also offers guidance on how to go about developing a globally 
satisfactory regime. It believes that such a regime cannot be achieved without involvement 
from representatives from all interested modes and users participating in the work.491 
The UNECE Secretariat believes that, if and when a clear mandate is acquired on the 
elaboration of a multimodal convention, it is right – given the process towards a global logistic 
chain – that the new regime should apply to all possible combinations of transport; it must not 
be restricted to the presence of a maritime leg. It is also crucial that representatives from all 
modes involved in multimodal transport – as well as from shippers and from other interested 
parties – be consulted and participate in the drafting process.492 
As far as the analysis of the difference between maritime and non-maritime 
performing parties is concerned, Berlingieri believes there is a marginal doubt as to whether 
the maritime performing party is an innovation with respect to the Hamburg Rules.493 This 
thesis argues that this could be considered more an extension than a proper conceptual 
improvement.  
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Debattista has said that the Rotterdam Rules are not perfect, but nevertheless better 
than the alternatives against which they are updated.494 Although this might be correct, it is not 
sufficient argument for the international maritime community to rest on its laurels in the future. 
The Rotterdam Rules are surely the best effort that can be made in a ‘maritime plus’ scenario. 
However, trade requires a more modern and pragmatic solution and in this sense – as will be 
explained in the next chapter – the commercial approach proposed by Kirby is superior. 
The Shippers Association has also argued that the Rotterdam Rules is not the only 
option for the future.495 The author agrees and believes that either a ‘single convention’ 
including the multilateral common enterprise concept will be created, or continuing to favor the 
contract, in order to best protect third parties, will come to be the most pragmatic solution. 
As Sturley states, the Rotterdam Rules are deliberately evolutionary and not 
revolutionary.496 It is not unreasonable to argue, however, that the shipping industry in recent 
times has undergone a revolution; therefore a revolutionary convention would be more 
appropriate than an evolutionary convention. 
This chapter provides evidence to support the central argument of this thesis; that the 
concept of multilateral common enterprise is a key consideration in developing an approach to 
deal with third party protection in the carriage of goods by sea. It demonstrates that the current 
international regulatory framework provides inadequate protection for third parties in the 
carriage of goods by sea. Although the Rotterdam Rules acknowledge this and consider the 
integrated role of third parties in the industry, it cannot be denied that the geographic approach 
of the Rotterdam Rules does not allow the problem to be tackled from the correct perspective. 
By way of evidence in support of this argument, some categories of third parties do not even 
seek the protection from the rules. This research aims to set a default position for the carriage 
of goods by sea and does not consider all the variables provided by other forms of protection 
that third parties can implement for themselves.  
The chapter shows that, as a result of an increase in the scope of work and the 
responsibilities of the carrier, parties other than the carrier (especially auxiliaries who are not 
employed by the carrier) now have a major role to play. Furthermore, the shape of the carrier’s 
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area of operation, in contrast with the areas of other third parties, have become blurred, proving 
that carriage is now a multilateral common enterprise. 
As a consequence, carriers now need to protect external third parties. Evidence of 
evolution in international regulation lies in the fact that the seminal Harter Act does not address 
any third parties, but the subsequent Rotterdam Rules acknowledge that the project is now 
performed by a conglomerate of parties. This shows a steady movement in international 
conventions from the bilateral structure of carrier and shipper to a multilateral network of 
parties. Despite these advances, the Rotterdam Rules inappropriately define limitations along 
geographical lines. 
The main concern is that international conventions recognise the evolution and the 
integration of shipping with the chain but focus only on a partial aspect, i.e., the multimodalism 
of transport and the geographical aspect instead than commercial. 
The Rotterdam Rules are essentially a door-to-door regime (if there is a sea leg) and, 
as such, they are found lacking. This thesis does not say that this is because of third party 
protection but it does maintain that in regards of third party protection they fail. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Third party protection in the carriage of goods by sea 
under the legal traditions of England and the United States 
 
  
The difficulties created in international trade by the doctrines of privity  
of contract and consideration had to be overcome. Those doctrines obstructed  
the process of giving effect to the reasonable expectations of parties.497 
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4.1 Chapter Background 
 
A primary argument of this thesis is that the carriage of goods by sea has recently 
become an unequivocally multilateral common enterprise. However, only the main party (the 
carrier) has a contract with the cargo owners.498 All the other third parties participating in the 
project are exposed to full liability in tort. This is especially because the cargo owner has an 
interest in suing the third party instead of the carrier, knowing that he can rely on limitation 
under international conventions. Should this occur, the third parties would seek to show that 
they are privy to the contract of carriage and can rely on the carrier’s limitation. This chapter 
demonstrates the evolution of the protection under domestic systems – in particular those of the 
England and United States – and how the carriage of goods by sea has influenced such 
evolution. The aim is to demonstrate that, considering the multilateral and common nature of 
the enterprise, the major legal regimes regulating the shipping sector do not deal with 
protection of third parties in a suitable manner. 
This study focuses on countries that have a specific impact on international carriage of 
goods by sea law. As it happens, the practice of international contract on the carriage of goods 
by sea mainly follows English and United States law. A majority of contracts of the carriage of 
goods by sea have jurisdiction clauses under English law and United States law. BIMCO, a 
major international association in shipping, draws up its contracts with arbitration clauses from 
English and United States law.499 Therefore, an analysis of how these two countries deal with 
the topic is vital to this research.  
A third party is generally outside the contract and thus any issues that arise are often 
addressed by local jurisdictions (usually the jurisdiction of the port where the damage took 
place). In turn, this requires consideration of the acceptance of protection clauses and their 
evolution. Consequently, this chapter will discuss exculpatory clauses under English and 
United States laws and how these countries’ courts have changed their views whilst 
considering national law and statutory law. 
England attempted to address the issue with the Contract (Right of Third Parties) Act 
1999. This chapter analyses the process that led to the enactment of this legislation.  
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499 Singapore has also been introduced as arbitration center. Singapore has a legal system substantially similar to 
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132 
 
Regarding case law, this thesis provides a statistic table that shows cases concerning 
third party protection in United States law. In particular, the table shows the case, the year, the 
decision, the protection been asked, the legal devise that has been used (e.g. Himalaya clause 
or Bailment law) and if any reference has been made or not to the multilateral common 
enterprise.  
This chapter is therefore divided in two parts. The first is dedicated to English Law 
and the second to United States Law.  
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CHAPTER 4 PART A 
Third party protection under English law 
 
As one of the leading English cases has expressed and many others commentators 
already corroborated: “Denying validity to the clause would be to encourage action against 
servants, agents, and independent contractors in order to get round exemptions”.500 As cargo 
owners can also sue parties other than contracting parties in tort.501 Third party protection has, 
however, been a contentious issue in English law in general as well as in maritime law.  
The majority of shipping contracts are governed by English Law. Under this, a person 
that has not entered into a contract cannot benefit from it.502 As reported by Spurin (referring to 
White v Jones503
 
and Henderson v Merrett Syndicates504): “The mere fact that a contractual 
relationship exists does not prevent a litigant suing in either contract or in tort and selecting the 
course of action which provides the best procedural advantages or the most appropriate 
remedies”. At the same time, however, Spurin suggests that “the terms of a contract can 
exclude a tortious duty of care, preventing such an action. This is most likely to happen where 
a contract contains exclusion clauses and limitation clauses”.505 
English law has for a long time been reluctant to accept that parties outside the 
contract (i.e., third parties) can receive protection from it.506 However, in the shipping world 
there is the need to extend this protection. Therefore, for many years the industry has used 
different ‘tools’507 to allow this protection.508  
This part of the chapter frames the problem of privity and consideration in relation to 
the difficulties of accepting third party protection, and explores how English law has addressed 
the situation to date.  
                                                        
500 The Eurymedon (n 338); Jill Poole, Contract Law (12th ed Oxford University Press 2014); Merkin (n 30). 
501 Tort is not based on the existence of contractual rights and relationships; rather it is based on the existence of a 
duty owed by one party to another.  
502 This is related to the concepts of privity and consideration. 
503 White v Jones (1995) UKHL 5. 
504 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates (1994) 3 All ER 506. 
505 Corbett Spurin, ‘The Liability of Carriers to Cargo Owners’ (Ch 5, The Nationwide Academy 
for Dispute Resolution (UK) Ltd. 2004) <http://www.nadr.co.uk/articles/published/shipping/005CHAPTERFIVE 
TRADE4.pdf>) Accessed 27 March 2014. 
506 English Courts have been less inclined than the United States Court to extend protection to parties outside the 
contract. As it will be further detailed, however, not always. 
507 Such as protection clauses. 
508 The mechanism is explained in the foundation of the thesis. However for easy reference it is here reported, as 
detailed by Macmillan, “A and B contract and A excludes or limits the liability that would otherwise arise on the 
part of B. A extends the benefit of this exclusion or limitation term to C, who is usually the agent, employee or 
sub-contractor of B. Should A sue C, C can avail himself of the exclusion or limitation of liability clause found in 
the A-B contract where this clause covers the liability in question”, Catharine MacMillan, ‘A Birthday Present for 
Lord Denning: The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999’ (2000) 63 The Modern Law Review 5, 721–738, 
726. 
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4.2 Third party protection and the obstacle of privity and consideration 
 
The extension of protection from the two parties of a contract to a third party has been 
an endless and evolutionary work in progress, especially in the carriage of goods by sea. 
The main conceptual problem is finding the justification for the protection.509 The 
problem is – especially for common law and even more so English Law – dealing with the old 
principles of privity and consideration. As a matter of reference, privity is an obstacle because 
according to privity, “an agreement is only enforceable as between the parties to the agreement. 
Third parties to an agreement cannot legally enforce benefits accruing to them from the 
agreement, nor can they have burdens thrust upon them by others”.510 More specifically, “an 
agreement must be supported by consideration, so that both parties provide or promise to 
provide something valuable in money or services, benefit or detriment in exchange for the like 
consideration of the other party”.511 
What has been defined as the ‘third party rule’ in the English system was established 
in 1861 in the case of Tweddle v Atkinson.512 In Drive Yourself Hire Co. (London) Ltd v 
Strutt,513 Lord Denning commented: 
 
It is often said to be a fundamental principle of our law that only a person who is a 
party to a contract can sue on it. I wish to assert, as distinctly as I can, that the 
common law in its original setting knew no such principle. Indeed, it said quite the 
contrary. For the 200 years before 1861 it was settled law that, if a promise in a 
simple contract was made expressly for the benefit of a third person in such 
circumstances that it was intended to be enforceable by him, then the common law 
would enforce the promise at his instance, although he was not a party to the 
contract.514 
 
                                                        
509 It is argued that the lack of rationale, although being a conceptual problem, has also affected the shipping 
industry in practice. 
510 On the topic of privity the leading case is Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd (n 136).  
511 On the topic of consideration leading cases are Thomas v Thomas [1842] 2 QB 851, and Tweddle v Atkinson 
[1861] EWHC QB J57. 
512 Tweddle v Atkinson (n 511). 
513 Drive Yourself Hire Co. (London) Ltd. V Strutt (1954) 1 QB 250. 
514 Ibid. 272. 
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The thrust of Lord Denning’s comment is that third parties to a contract do not derive 
any right from that agreement. Dunlop Pneumatic515 is a leading case in determining the 
contemporary meaning of the concepts of privity and consideration. In it, Lord Haldane states:  
 
My Lords, in the law of England certain principles are fundamental. One is that only 
a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it. Our law knows nothing of a jus 
quaesitum tertio arising by way of contract. Such a right may be conferred by way of 
property, as, for example, under a trust, but it cannot be conferred on a stranger to a 
contract as a right to enforce the contract in personam. A second principle is that if a 
person with whom a contract not under seal has been made is to be able to enforce it 
consideration must have been given by him to the promisor or to some other person at 
the promisor’s request. These two principles are not recognised in the same fashion 
by the jurisprudence of certain Continental countries or of Scotland, but here they are 
well established.516 
  
Consideration is an old and well-established concept in English Law.517 Lord Denning 
famously described the doctrine of consideration as “too firmly fixed to be overthrown by a 
side-wind”.518 The following statement is also of relevance here: 
 
A person wishing to enforce an agreement must show that they have brought 
something to the bargain which has ‘something of value in the eyes of the law’, either 
by conferring a benefit on another person or incurring a detriment at their request.519  
 
Lord Somervell, in the case Chappel & Co, stated that:  
 
 Even though the bargain is selling a house for as little as a peppercorn and the seller 
‘does not like pepper and will throw away the corn’.520 
 
                                                        
515 Dunlop (n 136) 853. 
516 Ibid. 
517 In Dunlop Pneumatic Lord Dunedin questioning consideration said that is: “possible for a person to snap his 
fingers at a bargain deliberately made...not in itself unfair and which the person seeking to enforce it has a 
legitimate interest to enforce”, Dunlop (n 136) 853. 
518 Central London Property Trust Ltd. v High Trees House Ltd. (1947) KB 130. 
519 See Thomas v Thomas (n 511) and Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153 (Lush LJ) 162: “A valuable 
consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the 
one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other”. 
520 Chappell & Co. Ltd v Nestle Co. Ltd (1960) AC 87 (Lord Somervell). 
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What is brought to the bargain can be anything of value, that the parties of the 
agreement consider adequate for the contract to be valid. If only one party offers consideration, 
the agreement is not legally a binding contract. Consideration in its fundamental form, 
expresses the concept of quid pro quo. Only one who gives something to the contract can 
enforce a promise and therefore only a person who has provided consideration can enforce a 
contract. It is said that, in order to be enforceable, a contract must be ‘met with’ or ‘supported 
by’ consideration.  
Although undeniably important, Hallebeek reports that “the rule of consideration has 
not been a significant restriction given the willingness of courts to recognise nominal 
consideration as sufficient and to infer the existence of consideration on relatively flimsy 
evidence”.521 Hallebeek goes on to say that the real problem stems from the ‘parties only’ rule, 
where only parties to a contract have rights in it. As he explains, and as this thesis contends, the 
rule does not adequately sustain the realities of complex commercial transactions. Looking at 
the contract as a “single transaction between two individuals” does not work in an industry 
such as shipping, interaction are seldom binary, and usually involve a network of actors.522 In 
bringing the two concepts of privity and consideration, the former restricts who can enforce an 
agreement to those have brought the latter to the bargain. 
Consideration for a promise can be the performance of a contractual duty owed to 
someone other than the promisor.523 Contextualising it in the carriage of goods by sea, it can be 
argued that it has to be a duty of the carrier performed by the third party who would like to rely 
on the exclusion clause. 
The relationship between employer and employee is an important aspect of the 
relation between privity and consideration. In most cases, even if the employer is the 
contractual party, the employee is usually the one performing most of the obligations arising 
under the contract.524 This was the case in the now famous example of the employees and the 
crew of the carrier in Adler v Dixon: The S.S. Himalaya.525 This type of situation has often 
involved indicating in the contract which categories of people could be accepted, a task usually 
achieved using a protection clause. According to Tetley, a protection clause can only affect the 
rights and responsibilities of the parties if its underlying contract is operative. In the case of 
                                                        
521 Hallebeek and Dondorp (n 91) 116. 
522 Ibid. 
523 See Shadwell v Shadwell (1860) EWHC CP J88, confirmed by The Eurymedon (n 338). 
524 Robert E Forbes, ‘Practical Approaches to Privity of Contract Problems’ (2002) 37 Canada Business Law 
Journal 357.  
525 The Himalaya (n 4). It should be noted that under UCTA 1977 and the Athens Convention 1974 it is not 
possible to exclude liability for death or personal injury under English Law. 
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Himalaya clause, the underlying contract only becomes active to protect the stevedore and 
terminal operator when the latter begins to perform obligations as referred in the contract of 
carriage.526 
Since third parties in the carriage of goods by sea are not privy to the contract of 
carriage, they have typically encountered difficulties in benefiting from such exclusion clauses. 
This was the case in Scruttons v Midland Silicones.527
 
 
Privity and consideration have never sat comfortably in the commercial world. In 
Smith and Snipes Hall Farm Ltd v River Douglas Catchment Board, Lord Denning stated that a 
third party can enforce a promise made for his benefit “provided that he has a sufficient interest 
to enforce it”.528 The need for a promise to provide consideration in order to enforce a promise 
was firmly established by the beginning of the eighteenth century. Lord Mansfield, as outlined 
by Merkin, severely criticised it, arguing that the role of law should be that of facilitator rather 
than inhibitor of commercial practice.529 
The history of the doctrine of privity of contract in twentieth-century English Law has 
been defined as “one of fluctuation between the doctrine and pragmatism”530 and has always 
been fought on different grounds. Under English law, and with the exception of clauses in 
contract as a device and international conventions, privity and consideration in the carriage of 
goods by sea has often been circumvented using the concept of bailment and the concept of 
agency – as a tool for accepting the protection clause – and also more recently the Contract 
(Right of Third Parties) Act 1999.  
 
4.3 Bailment 
 
Apart from the mechanism of protection clauses in contract, an alternative manner in 
which to afford protection to third parties is bailment law. Bailment occurs when there is a 
delivery or transfer of a chattel (or item of personal property) by one person (the bailor) to 
another (the bailee) with a specific mandate which requires the identical item to be delivered 
up to the bailor or to be dealt in a particular way by the bailee.531 The concept of agency is 
                                                        
526 Tetley (n 85). 
527 Midland Silicones (n 5). 
528 (1949) 2 KB 500. 
529 Merkin (n 30) at 9. 
530 Merkin (n 30) at 10 The ruling of Devlin J in Pyrene v Scindia Navigation Co. Ltd (1954) 2 QB 402 also 
provides support for the condemnation of privity. 
531 L S Sealy and R J A Hooley, Commercial Law: Text Cases and Materials (4th ed. Butterworths 1999). 
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expressed in the next paragraph but for an immediate distinction, bailment is different from 
agency as: 
 
1) The bailee merely exercises, with leave of the bailor, certain powers over the bailed 
property but, unlike the agent, the bailee does not represent the bailor; and 
2) the bailee cannot enter into contracts on the bailor’s behalf, although he may have the 
power to do things which are reasonably incidental to his use of the goods which he 
holds (e.g. to have the property repaired) and thereby make the bailor liable to a third 
party.532 
 
With this immediate difference appropriately framed, the focus can shift to the 
concepts of bailment, bailment on terms and sub-bailment relevant to third party protection in 
the carriage of goods by sea. In particular, attention is given to the relationship between the 
cargo owner (bailor) the carrier of the vessel (the bailee) and the shipowner of the vessel under 
a charterparty (the sub-bailee), in receiving the goods under the terms of the bill of lading or 
any other third parties in the position of sub-bailee. 
It is argued here that an analysis of bailment and bailment on terms are topics of 
paramount importance for the protection of third parties in the carriage of goods by sea under 
statutory law systems. This is due to the fact that, with protection clauses, the relationship that 
bailment creates has been applied to protect third parties (including but not limited to 
shipowners).533 Moreover, bailment has two things in common with the protection clauses: 
first, the same difficulty in dealing with the concepts of privity and consideration; second, the 
same commercial approach towards the law, i.e. meeting the expectation of the parties. 
Sub-bailment on terms is explained by Lord Denning in Morris v C. W. Martin & 
Sons Ltd.534 However, it must be noted that this case does not relate to shipping. As Lord 
Denning explains, the principle of sub-bailment of terms is when A, the owner of the goods 
bails his goods to B, the bailee, who then sub-bails the goods to C, the sub-bailee, under a 
contract containing exemption clauses limiting or excluding C’s liability. Thus in an action by 
A against C for the loss or damage to the goods, A will be bound by the exemption clauses 
contained in the contract between B and C even though A was not a party to that contract. 
Regarding Morris v Martin, Lord Denning said: 
                                                        
532 Ibid. 
533 A famous and current example is The Mahkutai (1996) AC 650, where the shipowners sought to rely on both 
the Himalaya clause and the principle of bailment on terms. 
534 (1966) 1 QB 716. 
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If the owner of the ship accepts goods for carriage on a bill of lading contained 
exemption condition...the owner of the goods is bound by those conditions if he 
impliedly consented to them as being in the known and contemplated form.535 
 
Although Morris was an ‘inland’ case of fur, Lord Denning creates through this 
example an important authority for the carriage of goods by sea. The doctrine of sub-bailment 
on terms as stated by Denning in Morris v C. W. Martin & Sons Ltd. has later been recognised 
by various subsequent authorities536 and academics.537 
 
4.4 The Elder Dempster case 
 
The case of Elder Dempster is the precursor to all contemporary cases revolving 
around the aforementioned issue. Before the advent of the Himalaya clause, the only remedy 
available for a third party – in the case of Elder Dempster, shipowners – was appealing on 
bailment on terms. An examination on bailment and the carriage of goods by sea cannot be 
completed without considering Elder Dempster. In this case, the shipowners tried to rely on a 
clause in a bill of lading to which they were not privy. Both the Court of Appeal and the House 
of Lords allowed the shipowner to rely on carrier limitation of liability. However, the reasons 
provided differed. In the Court of Appeal, Scrutton L.J. qualified the shipowner as agent of the 
charterer and therefore entitled to the same protection of the charterer against the cargo 
owner.538 
The main issue reading the judgment in this case was whether the fault was due to 
unseaworthiness or bad stowage. Given the vast amount of literature regarding the concept of 
unseaworthiness, it is perhaps unsurprising that the decision became long and somewhat 
                                                        
535 Ibid. 
536 China Pacific S.A. v Food Corporation of India (1982) AC 939, 957–958; Compania Portorafti Commerciale 
S.A. v Ultramar Panama Inc. (No. 2) (1990) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 395; Dresser U.K. Ltd. v Falcongate Freight 
Management Ltd. (1992) QB 502; Hispanica de Petroleos S.A. v Vencedora Oceanica Navegacion S.A. (No. 2) 
(Note) (1987) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 321; JohnsonMatthey & Co. Ltd. v Constantine Terminals Ltd. (1976) 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep.215; Singer Co. (U.K.) Ltd. v Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority (1988) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 164; and by the 
Privy Council in Gilchrist Watt and Sanderson Pty. Ltd. v York Products Pty. Ltd. (1970) 1 WLR 1262 and Port 
Swettenham Authorityv T W Wu and Co. (M) Sdn. Bhd. (1979) AC 580.  
537 Joseph Chitty, Chitty on Contracts (26th ed. vol 2 Sweet and Maxwell 1989) 115, para. 2653; Sir 
Guenter Treitel QC, Trietel on Contract (8th ed. Sweet and Maxwell 1991) 558–560; N Palmer, ‘Sub-Bailment on 
Terms’ (1989) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 466; A P Bell, Modern Law of Personal 
Property in England and Ireland (Butterworths 1988) and A P Bell, ‘Sub-Bailment on Terms’ in N E Palmer and 
E McKendrick (eds), Interests in Goods (Ch 6, LLP 1993) 178–180. 
538 Elder Dempster (n 3). 
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controversial. Of particular interest for this research, however, is the issue which the Lords 
addressed last; “a further question” as defined by Viscount Cave539 or even more explicitly by 
Lord Sumner,540 “a final argument”. 
Lord Sumner led the speech, agreeing that the shipowners had received the goods as 
bailees on the terms of the bill of lading.541 Both judges of the Court of Appeal and the House 
of Lords shared the view that the reason for protecting the shipowner is to give justice to the 
commercial expectation of the bill of lading: 
 
Were it otherwise there would be an easy way round the bill of lading in the case of 
every chartered ship; the owner of the goods would simply sue the owner of the ship 
and ignore the bill of lading expectations, though he had contracted with the charterer 
for carriage on those terms and the owner had only received the goods as agent for 
the charterer.542 
 
In the opinion of Viscount Finlay, “it would be absurd that the owner of the goods 
could get rid of the protective clauses of the bill of lading...by suing the owner of the ship in 
tort”.543 
In Elder Dempster, the House of Lords held that the damage was to be attributed to 
bad stowage and as a result, the time charterers were protected by the bill of lading 
exception.544 However, the cargo owners had also sued the shipowners in tort. Consequently, 
the question arose as to whether the shipowners were also protected by the exception contained 
in the bill of lading, to which they were not parties. Essentially, the case illustrates the 
following concept: 
If a cargo owner (bailor) places the goods on a chartered vessel under a bill of lading 
issued by a carrier (bailee), the shipowner of the vessel receives the goods under the terms of 
the bill of lading (sub-bailee). If the cargo owner sues the shipowner for a breach of duty in tort 
or bailment, the shipowner can rely on the exemptions set out in the bill of lading. Therefore, 
                                                        
539 Ibid. 533. 
540 Ibid. 564. 
541 Ibid. As stated by Lord Sumner, “(i)t may be, that in the circumstances of this case the obligations to be 
inferred from the reception of the cargo for carriage to the United Kingdom amount to a bailment upon terms, 
which include the expectations and limitations of liability stipulated in the known and contemplated for of bill of 
lading” 564–565. 
542 Ibid 441, 442 (Scrutton L.J.). 
543 Ibid. 548. 
544 On this point differing from a majority of the Court of Appeal. 
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as stated in Elder Dempster, the reception of goods by the shipowner under the terms of the 
contract between the cargo owner and the carrier maybe referred to as “bailment on terms”.545 
Although the decision in Elder Dempster seems to be commercially friendly and 
therefore attractive for the development of the concept, as anticipated it had to deal with strict 
concepts of common law such as privity and consideration.  
The authority of Elder Dempster has rarely been followed and received much 
criticism. Fullagar J. for instance explains, in the Australian case of Wilson v Darling Island 
Stevedoring & Lighterage Co.: 
 
In my opinion, what the Elder Dempster case decided, and all that it decided, is that 
in such a case, the master having signed the bill of lading, the proper inference is that 
the shipowner, when he receives the goods into his possession, receives them on the 
terms of the bill of lading. The same inference might perhaps be drawn in some cases 
even if the charterer himself signed the bill of lading, but it is necessary to consider 
any such question.546 
 
Fullagar J. seems to disagree entirely with the rationale in Elder Dempster, placing 
more importance upon the simple fact that he who damages pays, “a curious, and seemingly 
irresistible, anxiety to save grossly negligent people from the normal consequences of their 
negligence”.547 
This concept was fully appreciated by Viscount Simonds in the concluding sentence 
of his speech in the Midland Silicones case548 and further detailed by Tetley more recently in 
his article, ‘The Himalaya clause revisited’.549 Conversely, however, the decision in Elder 
Dempster was appreciated by Bingham L.J., in Dresser U.K. Ltd. v Falcongate Freight 
Management Ltd. as "a pragmatic legal recognition of commercial reality”.550 
The reason that the shipowner in Elder Dempster could be considered a sub-bailee lies 
in the concept of vicarious immunity. As also analysed in the previous chapter, the rationale 
behind Elder Dempster and, in particular, Scrutton L.J.’s doctrine of vicarious immunity, can 
                                                        
545 Elder Dempster (n 3). 
546 (1956) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 346, 365 (Aust HCt). 
547 Ibid. Elder, Dempster (n 3) has been also critised by Carver, Carriage by Sea (13th ed Stevens & Sons Ltd 
2005) paras 717–19; Thomas Edward Scrutton, Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (19th ed Sweet & 
Maxwell 1984) 251, n 36, 458, n 47 and Paul Todd, Modern Bills of Lading (2nd ed Blackwell Law 1990) 99. 
548 Midland Silicones (n 5); also in The Mahkutai (n 533). 
549 Tetley (n 27). 
550 (1992) QB 502, 511.  
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be found in the expression of the conventions on the carriage of goods by sea regarding the 
relationship between carrier and his servant, agents and sub-contractors.551  
In the Court of Appeal,552 Scrutton L.J.553 rejected the claim against the shipowners on 
a suggested principle of vicarious immunity. This principle was relied on by the shipowners in 
argument before the House of Lords554 and was accepted555 by Viscount Cave,556 Viscount 
Finlay,557 and Lord Sumner.558 
 
4.5 Agency Law 
 
As previously discussed, in order to circumvent the problem of privity and 
consideration and in order to provide full justice to contractual clauses,559 parties in the 
carriage of goods by sea require tools such as agency. The concept of agency has been defined 
as an exception to the doctrine of privity, where an agent may contract on behalf of his 
principal with a third party and form a binding contract between the principal and third 
party.560 Agency allows one to move consideration from a third party (sub-contractor of one of 
the two parties of the contract) to a contractual party. 
In law there are many definitions of agency. What is of immediate importance for this 
research is the concept of ‘representation’. As Fridman states:  
 
Agency is the relationship between two persons when one, called the agent, is 
considered in law to represent the other, called the principal, is such a way as to be 
able to affect the principal’s legal position in respect of strangers to the relationship 
by the making of contracts or the disposition of property.561 
 
                                                        
551 For instance, Art 4bis of the Hague-Visby Rules scheduled to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971. 
552 (1923) 1 KB 420, 441–442. 
553 Who alone considered the damage was to be attributed to bad stowage rather than unseaworthiness. 
554 (1924) AC 522. 
555 Ibid. 534. 
556 With whom Lord Dunedin ibid 548, Lord Carson ibid. 565 agreed. 
557 Ibid. 548. 
558 Ibid. 564. “in the circumstances of this case the obligations to be inferred from the reception of the cargo for 
carriage to the United Kingdom amount to a bailment upon terms, which include the exceptions and limitations of 
liability stipulated in the known and contemplated form of bill of lading”. (Lord Dunedin, 548 and Lord Carson, 
565 agreed). 
559 The fact is that contracts often provide for a benefit to be conferred upon a third party as a primary or 
secondary intention of the agreement. Such benefits can be financial or other, or an exclusion of liability and/or an 
indemnity in favour of a third party, such as a director, officer or employee of a contracting party. 
560 Midland Silicones (n 5). 
561 Gerald Henry Louis Fridman, The Law of Agency (7th ed Butterworths 1996) 11. 
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It is pertinent to mention that, as reported by Bowstead and Reynolds, such assent can 
be expressly stated or implied: 
 
Agency is the fiduciary relationship which exists between two persons, one of whom 
expressly or impliedly manifests assent that the other should act on his behalf so as to 
affect his relations with third parties, and the other of whom similarly manifests 
assent so to act or so acts pursuant to the manifestation.562  
 
Summarising, agency is the relationship that exists between two persons, one of whom 
consents that the other should act on his behalf. In other words, agency enables one person to 
enter a contract on behalf of another. 563 
Fundamentals of agency law demonstrate lack of consistency with any doctrine of 
privity. The idea of a principal enforcing a contract between the agent and a third party made 
for the principal’s benefit does not sit comfortably with the assertion that a contract between 
two parties cannot confer rights or liabilities on a third party, even if the third party is the 
intended beneficiary. It is particularly at odds with the rule that the agents may themselves 
incur liabilities and obtain rights under the contract with the third party if the agent has signed 
the contract in a manner that indicates personal liability.564 
Agency is essential for modern trade. Contracts are often drawn up by intermediaries; 
a practice that is even more common in shipping.565 Agency is an important exception to the 
doctrine of the privity of contract. It is argued that the agency rule in English law was also 
expressed in the leading case of Dunlop Pneumatic: “English law knows nothing of a jus 
quaesitum tertio”. Lord Haldane refers to agency in the last part of his summary of the concept 
of privity and consideration.566 Agency is Haldane’ third fundamental principle (privity and 
consideration being the first and second, respectively): 
 
                                                        
562 Francis Martin Baillie Reynolds and William Bowstead, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (18th ed Sweet & 
Maxwell 2006) Art 1(1). 
563 See Municipal Council v Prabhu Narain, AIR 1968 Raj 297; P. Ramanatha Aiyar, The Major Law Lexicon 
(Wadhwa and Company 2010); Cane Conaghan, The New Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford University Press 
2008); Roger Billins, Agency Law (Longman 1993); A C Pritchard, ‘United States v O’Hagan: Agency Law and 
Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading’ (1998) 78 Boston University Law Review 13; Randy E 
Barnett, ‘Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory’ (1987) 75 California Law Review 1969. 
564 Merkin (n 30) at 32. 
565 There are a wide variety of circumstances in international trade where agents are involved. In particular, import 
and export agents make contracts of carriage, stevedoring and storage on behalf of clients and carriers may act as 
agents for stevedores, as in The Eurymedon case (n 338).  
566 Reported in paragraph 4.2 related to third party protection and the obstacle of privity and consideration.  
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A third proposition is that a principal not named in the contract may sue upon it if the 
promisee really contracted as his agent. But again, in order to entitle him so to sue, he must 
have given consideration either personally or through the promise, acting as his agent in 
giving it.567  
 
However, Haldane refers only to third parties who wish to sue and not third parties 
who seek protection. 
The reason for the development of the concept of agency lies in commercial 
convenience and therefore the thesis refers to it as a tool to allow third party protection.  
An agent may be either a servant or an independent contractor.568 As reported by 
Forbes, a general principle of the law of agency is that an agent may contract with another 
party on behalf of his or her principal. As a result the principal, not the agent, is liable to 
perform the contract and is entitled to the benefit of the contract. This is also the case where the 
other party does not know that the agent is representing the undisclosed principal.569 
According to Forbes, agency seems to function best when a set of relationships 
already extant precipitate a need for the creation of third party rights. This scenario might take 
place as a result of previous agreements between the contracting party and the third party, or 
where contracting parties aim for rights under the contract to be transferred on to the third party 
and the contracting parties make precise provision for how to achieve it.570 
Before continuing, it is important to understand how agency works and who is an 
agent in the carriage of goods by sea. In order to fully perceive the appliance of agency on third 
party protection in the carriage of goods by sea, therefore, the mechanism of the agency theory 
as formulated by the combined authorities of Scrutton and The Eurymedon should be 
addressed. 
 
4.6 The cases of Scrutton and The Eurymedon 
 
                                                        
567 Dunlop (n 136) 753. 
568 As it has been discussed, essentially, a servant is one who gives his service to another and there is a contract of 
employment between the two parties (e.g., in the maritime context a master is a servant). An independent 
contractor provides services for another. In this respect it is reported that a very recent decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom expanded the definition of charterer’s agent. NYK Bulkship (Atlantic) NV 
(Respondent) v Cargill International SA (Appellant) [2016] UKSC 20. In this case the word agent has been 
extended to persons or subcontractors to whom the charterers’ rights are made available downstream in the 
carriage chain or to whom perform the charterers’ obligations. To the extent that they are “availing themselves of 
the facility contractually derived either directly or indirectly from the charterers” such subcontractors are the 
“agents”. https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2014-0143-press-summary.pdf  
569 Forbes (n 524). 
570 Ibid. 
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Agency in the carriage of goods by sea has been stated and substantially elaborated by 
two cases: Midland Silicones Ltd v Scruttons Ltd and The Eurymedon. In both cases, the 
principle now known as ‘agency theory’ was enunciated. 
In 1961, in Midland Silicones v Scruttons Ltd., the English House of Lords turned 
away from the facts of the Elder Dempster case and reestablished the classic view on privity. 
The Lords argued that to do away with a fundamental and elemental principle of law such as 
privity requires an Act of Parliament following due consideration of its merits and demerits. 
Almost 40 years later, their argument will soon be accepted by the English parliament as it will 
be shown later in this thesis.571 
A question raised by the case of Scrutton was, according to Viscount Simonds, 
whether the Appellants – stevedores who admitted their negligence caused damage to certain 
cargo (consigned to the Respondents under a bill of lading, 26th March, 1957) – could take 
advantage of a provision for limitation of liability contained in that document.572 
In the Scrutton case, the answer was positive providing that four conditions, as set by 
Lord Reid, were met: 
 
I can see a possibility of success of the agency argument if (first) the bill of lading 
makes it clear that the stevedore is intended to be protected by the provisions in it 
which limit liability, (secondly) the bill of lading makes it clear that the carrier in 
addition to contracting for these provisions on his own behalf, is also contracting as 
agent for the stevedore that these provisions should apply to the stevedore, (thirdly) 
the carrier has authority from the stevedore to do that, or perhaps later ratification by 
the stevedore would suffice, and (fourthly) that any difficulties about consideration 
moving from the stevedore were overcome. And then to affect the consignee it would 
be necessary to show that the provisions of the Bills of lading Act, 1855, apply.573 
 
Lord Reid’s speech, although refusing the allowance of protection to third parties in 
that specific instance, allowed the Himalaya clause to extend the defences of the carrier to 
servants, agents and independent contractors engaged in the loading and unloading process.574 
In particular, and referring to Elder Dempster, Lord Reid stated:  
 
                                                        
571 Midland Silicones (n 5). 
572 Ibid. 
573 Ibid. The Bill of Lading Act 1855 is an Act regulating the bill of lading. 
574 Midland Silicones (n 5) 376. 
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It can be hardly be denied that the ratio decidendi of the Elder Dempster decision is 
very obscure. A number of eminent judges have tried to discover it, hardly any two have 
reached the same result, and none of the explanation hitherto given seems to me very 
convincing […] I must treat the decision as an anomalous and unexplained exception to the 
general principal that a stranger cannot rely for his protection on provisions in a contract to 
which is not a party.575 
 
The main problem of Lord Reid’s agency theory is to find “consideration” passing 
from the stevedore to the shipper. The answer was given a few years later in The Eurymedon 
case.576 The Privy Council held that the consideration was the discharge of the goods by the 
stevedore for the benefit of the shipper: “The performance of these services for the benefit of 
the shipper was the consideration for the agreement by the shipper that the appellant 
(stevedore) should have the benefit of the exemptions and limitations contained in the bill of 
lading”.577 
Though similiar to Scrutton, The Eurymedon case was not the same. The facts of the 
case are briefly summarised here: 
 
 There was a contract of carriage incorporating HVR. 
 There was a Himalaya clause drafted, essentially with the intent to avoid the outcome of 
Scrutton. 
 The clause claimed to afford protection for the carrier and agents and independent 
contractors of the carrier and those who engaged by him. 
 The stevedores were expressly included. 
 The cargo was damaged during unloading. 
 Consignee sued the stevedores. 
 The stevedores won because the court held that the stevedores were entitled to the benefit 
of limitation clauses.  
 
The distinction between Scrutton and The Eurymedon lies in the fact that the 
stevedores in Scrutton were not clearly included in the contract of carriage and the bill of 
lading as they were in The Eurymedon case. In Scrutton, there was no agency relationship 
                                                        
575 Ibid. 377.  
576 The Eurymedon (n 338). 
577 Ibid. 154–155. 
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because the carriers did not known at time of contract who the stevedores were to be. The 
shipowners in The Eurymedon made two separate contracts with the shipper and the stevedore 
company, which entitles the latter to rely on protection by the exclusion clause in respect of 
damage to cargo. Since the shipowners were agents of the stevedores, the stevedores were 
principal parties to the stevedore part of the contract with the shipper. Furthermore, the Court 
held in The Eurymedon that there was valid consideration.  
On one hand, The Eurymedon reinforced the dicta of Lord Reid in Scrutton, 
establishing four requirements that must be met in order for a stevedore to benefit from the 
clauses of limitation that apply to the carrier against the shipper: 
 
1) The bill of lading must make clear the carrier’s intention to protect the stevedore. 
2) The carrier makes clear that he is contracting for the stevedores protection as well as 
for its own. 
3) The authority of the carrier to act for the stevedore, whether antecedent or by 
ratification, must be declared. 
4) There should be consideration from the stevedore.  
 
On the other hand, in doing it, it completed the contractual procedure to give full 
protection to third parties.  
The performance of these services for the benefit of the shipper was the consideration 
for the agreement by the shipper that the appellant (stevedore) should have the benefit of the 
exemptions and limitations contained in the bill of lading. The Privy Council concluded that 
the stevedores provided consideration for the benefit conveyed by the clause simply by 
discharging the cargo from the vessel. 
According to Tetley, Lord Reid did not solve the problem; there was no consideration 
passing from the stevedore to the shipper: 
 
In my view, the consideration found by Lord Wilberforce for Lord Reid’s agency 
theory and the presumed benefit to society and commerce are doubtful. It is my view 
that, only if the carrier himself also undertakes to discharge the goods and care for 
them after discharge, may he be able to benefit his servants or independent 
contractors by his contract with the shipper. Nor can anyone entitled to benefit under 
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a Himalaya clause receive greater exemptions than those to which an original party 
to the contract is entitled.578 
 
In The Eurymedon, the court “upheld the efficacy of a Himalaya clause to confer upon 
the stevedores the benefit of defences and immunities contained in the bill of lading”.579 By 
wrestling with established contract law – namely the doctrines of consideration and privity – 
the case established The Eurymedon principle: “the carrier acts as agent for independent 
contractors in contracting liability exemptions”. The necessary bilateral contract between the 
stevedore and the cargo-owner is created by the stevedore performing the stevedoring services. 
The court in The Eurymedon held that the discharging of cargo by the stevedore could 
be deemed consideration for the artificial contract between the consignor and the stevedore. 
However, the discharging was requested for the execution of a separate contract; the 
stevedoring contract between the carrier and the stevedore.580 
It is argued that the commercial reasons to back up the justification of the Himalaya 
clause in this case581 was similar to that of Lord Wilberforce in Elder Dempster, almost 50 
years earlier:  
 
In the opinion of their Lordships, to give the appellant the benefit of the exemptions 
and limitations contained in the bill of lading is to give effect to the clear intentions of 
a commercial document, and can be given within existing principles. They see no 
reason to strain the law or the facts in order to defeat these intentions. It should not be 
overlooked that the effect of denying validity to the clause would be to encourage 
actions against servants, agents and independent contractors in order to get around 
exemptions (which are almost invariable and often compulsory) accepted by shippers 
against carriers, the existence, and presumed efficacy, of which is reflected in the 
rates of freight. They see no attraction in this consequence.582 
 
                                                        
578 Tetley (n 26). 
579 This would be subsequently reaffirmed by the Privy Council in the case called Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty. 
Ltd. v Salmond and Spraggon (Australia) Pty. Ltd. (The New York Star) (1981) 1 WLR 138. In The New York Star 
the Court had to deal with an Australian decision where the court did not allow the stevedoring contractor of the 
protection because the act took place after discharge. The Privy Council reversed with a very functional approach 
towards the contract of carriage and held that the contract ends not when the carrier ends his responsibility but 
where the goods are delivered to the consignee and therefore allowed the protection to the stevedore.  
580 See Liang (n 17) for an example of an implied contract. 
581 Criticised by Tetley (n 26) 11. 
582 The Eurymedon (n 338).  
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The Eurymedon makes clear that, in many cases, the bill of lading issued by the carrier 
includes a Himalaya clause conferring to the carrier’s sub-contractors the benefit of all terms 
benefiting the carrier by providing that in accord to such terms, the carrier enters into the bill of 
lading contract not only on his own behalf but also as agent for the sub-contractors. Such a 
clause protects a sub-contractor in certain circumstances by giving rise to a contract between 
the owner of the goods and the sub-contractor whereby the sub-contractor receives the benefit 
of clauses contained in the carrier’s bill of lading.583  
From Elder Dempster to The Eurymedon, it became clear that there was a need to 
extend protection to third parties, and the principles of bailment (Elder Dempster) and agency 
(Scrutton and The Eurymedon) were used in order to achieve it. However, the concept of 
protection clauses through agency from the carrier and bailment were further enhanced in the 
1990s when two famous cases regarding the carriage of goods by sea addressed the concept of 
bailment and protection clauses of third parties (in these cases, shipowners).584 The Mahkutai 
and the The Pioneer Container585 cases asked again whether a third party is entitled to receive 
protection from a contract that he is not part of. Once more the courts took completely different 
routes.  
 
4.7 The cases of The Mahkutai and The Pioneer Container  
 
The Mahkutai and The Pioneer Container have several features in common.  
 
1) In both cases the defendant was a shipowner of a cargo vessel. The Mahkutai 
in the homonym case and the KH Enterprise in The Pioneer Container (which 
was the sister vessel of the KH Enterprise); 
2) both of these cases deal with concepts of bailment and protection clauses as 
raised by the respective shipowners; 
3) in both cases the type of protection was an exclusive jurisdiction clause set out 
in the bill of lading;  
4) lastly, both cases were appealed to the Privy Council with Lord Goff of 
Chieveley delivering the judgment.  
 
                                                        
583 Ibid. 
584 In a different way. 
585 Interestingly, Lord Chievely was present in both. 
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What is substantially different, is the outcome that sees the shipowners of KH 
Enterprise, in The Pioneer Container, being held entitled to rely on the exclusive jurisdiction 
clause. The opposite outcome was reached in The Mahkutai with the Privy Council dismissing 
the shipowner’s appeal.  
Without delving too much into the facts of the two cases, it is worth mentioning that 
in The Pioneer Container case, the cargo owners had engaged carriers to ship goods by sea 
under bills of lading that gave the carriers authority to sub-contract the whole or part of the 
carriage of the goods on ‘any terms’. The carrier sub-bailed the goods to the shipowners for 
carriage on board their vessel for part of the voyage.586 
The Mahkutai587 was a case in which the shipowners carrying cargo shipped under 
charterers’ bills of lading sought to claim the benefit of a Himalaya clause in the time 
charterers’ bills of lading or to invoke the principle of bailment on terms.588 The question was 
whether a shipowner on a chartered vessel could share the same rights and liabilities of the 
carrier.589 Cargo owners instituted proceedings in the High Court of Hong Kong against the 
shipowners, who were claiming damages for breach of contract, breach of duty, or negligence. 
On application by the shipowners, the judges declared that the shipowners – although not 
parties to the bill of lading – were entitled to invoke the exclusive jurisdiction clause either as a 
contractual term or as one of the terms on which the goods had been bailed to them. 
At the Court of Appeal, the cargo owner argued that the shipowners were not party to 
the bill of lading and therefore could not rely on the exclusive jurisdiction clause contained in 
the bill of lading. The only parties privy to the bill of lading were the cargo owner and the 
carriers (i.e. charterers). The cargo owner specified that they brought an action against the 
respondents in bailment and negligence and therefore the jurisdiction clause under the bill of 
lading did not apply.590 The Court of Appeal of Hong Kong reversed the decision of the High 
Court by a majority.591  
The judges of the Court of Appeal based their decision on the assumption that the 
goods had been shipped on board the shipowner’s vessel pursuant to a bill of lading containing 
a Himalaya clause whereby the shipowners, if sub-contractors, were expressly to be entitled to 
                                                        
586 KH Enterprise v Pioneer Container (The Pioneer Container) (1994) 2 AC 324. 
587 The Mahkutai (533). 
588 However, by these means they were seeking to invoke not an exception or limitation in the ordinary sense of 
those words, but the benefit of an exclusive jurisdiction clause. 
589 In this respect, this thesis will advance a critical proposition in paragraph 4.9.1. 
590 See also on the same point, Gadsen v VCSC (1977) 1 NSWLR 575 and Air New Zealand Ltd v The Ship 
Contship Americana (1992) 1 NZLR 425. In both cases the Court of New South Wales and New Zealand declared 
the shipowners liable in negligence. 
591 The Mahkutai (n 533). 
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the benefit of some of the terms in the bill of lading but not of the exclusive jurisdiction clause. 
Therefore, that clause was not an implied term on which they had taken the goods into their 
custody because a bailment on terms, which included such point, would be contrary to the 
express provisions of the bill of lading.592 
The rationale of the shipowner’s argument is illuminated by their legal representatives 
Peter Gross Q.C. and Duncan Matthews: 
 
Given the adherence of English law to the doctrine of considerations and privity of 
contracts, the problem is: whether A contracts with B on terms which purports to 
protect C, and in circumstances where C voluntarily takes into his custody A’s goods, 
C can take the benefit of those terms when sued in tort by A. The shipowners are 
entitled to rely on the terms of the bill of lading, including the exclusive jurisdiction 
clause, because they received the cargo as bailees (sub-bailees) on those terms.593 
 
According to the shipowners’ representatives, the shipowners’ rights and liabilities 
against the shippers and their assigns are those to which the shippers have consented in the bill 
of lading contract with the carrier. That contract includes the exclusive jurisdiction clause.594 
Moreover, according to their representatives’, the shipowners are entitled to rely on the terms 
of the bill of lading by operation of the Himalaya clause, because the four requirements 
presented by Lord Reid in the Scrutton case had been met.595 
Moving to The Pioneer Container appeal, Sydney Kentridge QC and George Legatt 
argued on behalf of the cargo owner that the doctrine of bailment and sub-bailment are 
contrary to the principle of law that a person cannot be bound by the terms of a contract to 
which they are not party596 thus raising the same debate of privity and consideration against 
commercial expectation.597 
Therefore they concluded: “There is no need to stretch principles of law to give 
protection to a sub-bailee when he can protect himself, if not by insurance then by contracting 
an indemnity with the intermediate bailee”.598 
Conversely, as expressed by Michael Thomas Q.C. and Anthony Dicks on behalf of 
                                                        
592 Ibid. 
593 Ibid 730. 
594 Ibid. 652. 
595 Ibid. 653. 
596 Such as the case of Midland Silicones (n 5). 
597 The Pioneer Container (n 586). 
598 Ibid. 329. See also Gillespie Bros. & Co. Ltd. v Roy Bowles Transport Ltd. (1973) Q.B. 400. 
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the shipowners: 
 
Two relationships are governed by the terms of the bill of lading, namely, the agreed 
contractual provisions as between the defendants and the shipowners and the terms of 
the sub-bailment of the plaintiffs goods. A contract is formed by agreement. A 
bailment is formed by a transfer of possession independently of contract. Upon 
accepting possession of another’s goods, a bailee may stipulate the terms affecting his 
liabilities, those terms will bind not only the immediate bailor, but also those who are 
privy to the bailment, including those with superior rights to possession who have 
consented to the bailment. 599 
 
In both case, the two principles invoked by the shipowners – bailment on terms and 
third parties benefiting by a term in a contract – are products of developments in English law 
during the present century.600 According to The Mahkutai judgment, the two principles seem to 
have a common aim: 
 
Recognising some form of modification of, or exception to, the strict doctrine of 
privity of contract to accommodate situations which arise in the context of carriage of 
goods by sea, in which it appears to be in accordance with commercial expectations 
that the benefit of certain terms of the contract of carriage should be made available 
to parties involved in the adventure who are not parties of the contract.601 
 
In The Mahkutai case, the cargo owners argued that shipowners were not entitled to 
the benefit of the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the bill of lading through the agency of the 
carrier, nor could they rely on the Himalaya clause because they were not servants, agents or 
sub-contractors of the carrier.602 
Regarding bailment, they considered consent an essential element of bailment on 
terms. An owner of goods is bound by the conditions of a sub-bailment only if he or she has 
expressly or impliedly consented to the bailee making a sub-bailment on those terms. The 
                                                        
599 Ibid. See also Morris (n 534) 729 and Norman Palmer, ‘Ambulatory Bailments’ (1983) 36 Current Legal 
Problems 1, 91. 
600 Ibid. 
601 Midland Silicones (n 5); The Eurymedon (n 338) and The New York Star (n 579). 
602 The Mahkutai (n 533) Richard Aikens QC and Alan Roxburgh. 
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cargo owners in The Makhutai case did not consent to the bailment to the shipowners due to 
the terms of the bill of lading.603 
In The Pioneer Container case, Lord Goff of Chieveley followed the doctrine of sub-
bailment on terms as stated by Denning in Morris. He affirmed that, as far as English law and 
the law of Hong Kong are concerned, a technical problem arises for shipowners who carry 
goods in situations where there is no contractual relationship between the shipowners and 
certain cargo owners. This is because English law still adheres strictly to the principles of 
privity of contract and consideration. Lord Goff asks whether this adherence should continue 
with the same strictness, highlighting the opinions of judges of great authority and distinction 
who were in no doubt that it should be so maintained. Goff concludes, however, by pointing 
out that, in the present case, the question is whether the law of bailment can be invoked by the 
shipowners to circumvent this difficulty.604 
This begs a question raised in The Pioneer Container case: should it be a prerequisite 
of a bailment that the bailor should have consented to the bailee’s possession of the goods? 
Bell, cited in The Pioneer Container judgment, argues that it should:  
 
If the owner seeks to hold a sub-bailee responsible to him as bailee, he has to accept 
all the terms of the sub-bailment, warts and all; for either he will have consented to 
the sub-bailment on those terms or, if not, he will (by holding the sub-bailee liable to 
him as bailee) be held to have ratified all the terms of the sub-bailment.605 
 
Palmer606 and Tay607 disagree, arguing that a person who voluntarily takes another 
person’s goods into his custody holds them as bailee of that person (the owner), and that they 
can only invoke, for example, terms of a sub-bailment under which the goods were received 
from an intermediate bailee as qualifying or otherwise affecting responsibility to the owner if 
the owner consented. As explained by their Lordships, it is the latter approach that has been 
adopted by English law and, in turn, the law of Hong Kong.608 
 
                                                        
603 Ibid.  
604 Ibid. 335. 
605 A P Bell, Modern Law of Personal Property in England and Ireland (n 537) 88–89. 
606 N Palmer, ‘Sub-Bailment on Terms’ (n 537) 31 et seq. 
607 Alice Erh-Soon Tay, ‘The Essence of Bailment: Contract, Agreement or Possession?’ (1966) Sydney Law 
Review 239. 
608 The Pioneer Container (n 586) 341, 342. 
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The Mahkutai decision has received criticism from scholars. Commenting on the 
judgment, Nossal felt that: 
 
The majority of the Court of Appeal (Litton J.A. and Mayo J., Bokhary J.A. dissenting) 
squandered an opportunity to harmonise the correlation between the legitimate 
commercial expectations of the parties and the law relating to carriage of goods by 
sea.609 
 
The rationale of The Mahkutai610 decision and the interpretation that the judges gave 
to the bailment on terms are neatly summarised by the words of Lord Goff of Chieveley: 
 
In the light of the principle stated by Lord Sumner in the Elder Dempster case as 
interpreted by Fullagar J. of Darling Island, the next question for consideration is 
whether the shipowners can establish that they received the goods into their 
possession on the terms of the bill of lading, including the exclusive jurisdiction clause 
(clause 19), i.e., whether the shipowners’ obligations as bailees were effectively 
subjected to the clause as a term upon which the shipowners implicitly received the 
goods into their possession. This was the ground upon which Bokhary J.A. expressed 
the opinion, in his dissenting judgment that the shipowners were entitled to succeed.611 
 
The Court in The Mahkutai found what they called “an insuperable objection” to the 
argument of the shipowners. The bill of lading under which the goods were shipped on board 
contained a Himalaya clause under which the shipowners, as sub-contractors, were to be 
entitled to the benefit of certain terms in the bill of lading. However, as their Lordships held, 
those terms did not include the exclusive jurisdiction clause.612 The Court held that by 
receiving the goods pursuant to the bill of lading, the shipowners’ obligations as bailees were 
effectively subjected to the exclusive jurisdiction clause as a term upon which they implicitly 
received the goods into their possession.613 
As anticipated, another question in The Pioneer Container was whether the sub-
                                                        
609 S Nossal, Bailments on Terms and the carriage of Goods by Sea: The Mahkutai, Hong Kong Law Journal, 
1994, v24 n. 1, p. 19-28. 
610  Referring to The Pioneer Container (n 586) case.  
611 The Mahkutai (n 533). 
612 As this thesis explains in Chapter 1, there are certain carrier exceptions that a third party can rely on and others 
cannot.  
613 The Mahkutai (n 533). 
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bailees could invoke any of the terms on which the goods were sub-bailed to them, and in 
particular the exclusive jurisdiction clause. Lord Denning contended that "the answer to the 
problem lies, I think, in this: the owner is bound by the conditions if he has expressly or 
impliedly consented to the bailee making a sub-bailment containing those conditions, but not 
otherwise”. 614 
The cargo owners also argued that the shipowners’ bill of lading contained a 
Himalaya clause which, following The Eurymedon case, would allow a third party the same 
protection of the carrier under the bill of lading, if the four rules laid out by Lord Reid are 
respected.615 As reported in The Pioneer Container case, the Himalaya clause alone is not 
sufficient to exclude a sub-bailee from relying on the terms of his own contract with the bailee. 
Contrary to the statements of the cargo representatives, this is necessary in cases where 
Himalaya clauses are not mentioned in the contract, for instance, where a third party in need 
can rely on the terms of bailment and sub-bailment. In the judges’ words: 
 
If it should transpire that there are consequently two alternative regimes which the 
sub-bailee may invoke, it does not necessarily follow that they will be inconsistent; 
nor does it follow, if they are inconsistent, that the sub-bailee should not be entitled to 
choose to rely upon one or other of them as against the owner of the goods.616 
 
The judges went on to say that, even if a Himalaya clause is applicable and is 
satisfied, it does not defeat the shipowners’ reliance on bailment.617 
In case of The Mahkutai, the shipowner argument was unsuccessful both in bailment 
and in tort. Since the Himalaya clause does not include a jurisdiction clause in the bill of 
lading, the Court decided that bailment should not succeed on the bill of lading terms. In this 
case, the application of judgments from the Elder Dempster case were precluded by special 
circumstances.618 As in Scrutton, The Mahkutai – although failing the request of third parties to 
be protected – improved the mechanism of the protection in reality:  
  
So long as the principle continues to be understood to rest upon an enforceable 
contract as between cargo owners and the stevedores entered into through the agency 
                                                        
614 In Morris (n 534) 729. 
615 The Eurymedon (n 338). 
616 See Bell, ‘Sub-Bailment on Terms’ (n 537).  
617 The Pioneer Container (n 586) 344. 
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of the shipowners, it is inevitable that technical points of contract and agency law will 
continue to be invoked by cargo owners seeking to enforce tortious remedies against 
the stevedores and others uninhibited by the exceptions and limitations in the relevant 
bill of lading contract.619 
 
Lord Goff’s criticisms of The Eurymedon do not run counter to the principle of 
protection of a third party. Nonetheless, he expresses concern that the mechanism used to 
extend such protection is wrong. For Goff, the importance lies in discovering the factual basis 
from which the rendering of the bailment subject to such provision can be properly 
influenced.620 
The Mahkutai re-established the orthodox view on third party protection in English 
law. In contrast to the court in The Mahkutai, the court in The Pioneer Container emphasise 
the importance of commerce in deciding whether to rule in favour of the third party asking for 
legal protection.621 The same commercial sense and commercial unreasonableness of the 
contrary seems to be also the foundation behind the Contract (Right of Third Parties) Act 1999. 
 
4.8 The Contract (Right of Third Parties) Act 1999: protection clauses on a statutory 
footing 
 
The shipping industry has tried to circumvent privity and consideration and allow 
protection to those who are not part of the contract. Because English law has always had 
theoretical difficulties with this, the industry has not hesitated in its attempts to circumvent it. 
Reading between the lines, however, it is evident that privity and consideration have been an 
uncomfortable obstacle for the pragmatism of English Law. This is also apparent in a debate 
that forms part of the preparatory work to the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, regarding the 
insertion of Article 4 bis. The discussion focused on whether or not carrier protection should be 
extended to third parties and whether there had to be a difference between servant and agent on 
one hand and independent contractors on the other. The delegation from the Netherlands 
criticised the United Kingdom delegation, who were on that occasion happy to allow a broader 
protection to third parties (but only servant and agents and not independent contractors). The 
delegation from Netherland stated: “We should be very glad if you make that amendment in 
                                                        
619 Tetley (n 26). 
620 The Mahkutai (n 533). 
621 Ibid. (Lord Goff). The submission of the plaintiffs in the present case was that the "Himalaya" clause gives 
sufficient effect to the commercial expectations of the parties. 
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your own domestic law, but we pray you humbly leave the Hague Rules alone”.622 The United 
Kingdom delegation answered that, as a matter of fact: 
 
A problem arises because of the fundamental problem of the English law of contract 
which is that a person who is not a party to a contract can derive no benefit from it.  
 
The delegation continues saying that: 
 
 it would be impossible to put the matter right by proposing this to the Parliament 
because an amendment of this general principle of law of contract would require an 
Act of Parliament asking them to provide by statute that a person who is not a party to 
a contract can derive benefit from it because the answer would be that the only people 
hampered by that principle would only be a very small section, though a very 
important class of people, an important class of traders, those who carry goods by 
sea.623 
 
At the time, the English delegation rationalized that a state should not alter a 
fundamental principle of its own law just because a somewhat narrow domestic difficulty 
arises. Instead, they argued, it is better to alter the international law of convention. At this 
point, it is worth noting the following: 
 
1) Although English law had a problem ‘at home’ they were willing to open the door to a 
broader protection in an international environment. 
2) At that time, the reluctance to propose an action of that nature to the British Parliament 
was based on the assessment that it would represent a major upheaval and 
administrative undertaking that was not proportionate to the very small number of 
people who demanded it or who would benefit from it. 
3) It was considered an unalterable fundamental principle of English Law. 
 
Despite all of this, in 1999 the United Kingdom adopted the Contract (Right of third 
parties) Act 1999.624 The judgment in Dunlop Pneumatic has now been reversed: 
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623 Ibid. 
624 Law Commission, ‘Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties: The Legal Systems of Most 
Member States of the European Union Allow Third Parties to Enforce Contracts’ (1996) Law Com 242 para 8. A 
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My Lords, in the law of England certain principles are fundamental. One is that only 
a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it. Our law knows nothing of a jus 
quaesitum tertio arising by way of contract.625 
 
As previously stated, there has always been a battle against the privity and 
consideration rule. They were seen as barrier and in response, as reported by the Law 
Commission in 1996, the Contract (Right of Third Parties) Act 1999 was enacted.626  
The Act essentially allows a third party to benefit from the Contract. Section 1 (1) 
grants a third party the right to enforce a term of the agreement if either the contract expressly 
provides he may or, under Section 1(1) (b) “the term purports to confer a benefit upon him”. In 
relation to a clause excluding or limiting liability, Section 1(6) provides: “Where a term of a 
contract excludes or limits liability in relation to any matter references in this Act to the third 
party enforcing the term shall be construed as references to availing himself of the exclusion or 
limitation”. 
Section 6 of the statute addresses exceptions to the right of a third party under Section 
1 to enforce a benefiting contractual term. In particular, under Section 6(5)(a), a third party has 
no right to enforce such a term for his benefit, in the case of a contract for the carriage of goods 
by sea. A contract for the carriage of goods by sea is defined as a contract either: i) “contained 
in or evidenced by a bill of lading, sea waybill or a corresponding electronic transaction” 
according to Section 6(6)(a)i) or ii) “under or for the purposes of which there is given an 
undertaking which is contained in a ship’s delivery order or a corresponding electronic 
transaction”, according to Section 6(6)(b). 
However, there is one fundamental exception, permitting the third party beneficiary, 
in reliance on Section 1, to “avail himself of an exclusion or limitation of liability in such a 
contract” (Section 6(5)(a)). It is this exception to an exception in the Contracts (Rights of Third 
                                                                                                                                                                               
further factor in support of reforming the third party rule in English law is the fact that the legal systems of most 
of the member states of the European Union recognise and enforce the rights of third party beneficiaries under 
contracts.  
625 Dunlop (n 136). 
626 Its full title which states, “An Act to make provision for the enforcement of contractual terms by third parties”. 
Interestingly, this reform started long before 1999, in 1937. In the Recommendation (The Editorial Committee of 
the Modern Law Review, ‘The Law Revision Committee’s Sixth Interim Report’ (1937) 1 The Modern Law 
Review 2) it says: “The rule that a stranger to a contract cannot maintain an action upon it has been one of the 
most unsatisfactory features of the law relating to consideration. It has been tenaciously adhered to in all but a few 
cases, which were of minor importance. The rule is completely out of harmony with the conditions of modern 
commerce and industry”. 
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Parties) Act 1999 that places the Himalaya clause on a statutory footing in the U.K. As the 
Explanatory Note to Section 6(5) states: 
 
Subsection (5), which excludes certain contracts relating to the carriage of goods, 
nevertheless does not prevent a third party from taking advantage of a term excluding 
or limiting liability. In particular, this enables clauses which seek to extend an 
exclusion or limitation of liability of a carrier of goods by the sea to servants, agents 
and independent contractors engaged in the loading and unloading process to be 
enforced by those servants, agents or independent contractors (so called ‘Himalaya’ 
clauses). 
 
Analysing the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, it appears first that the 
Act expressly provides that the contract has to explicitly confer a benefit to a third party. As 
Stevens states, it seems that the third party must be expressly identified in the contract by 
name, as a member of a class or as answering a particular description but need not be in 
existence when the contract is entered. This is substantially the equivalent of the Himalaya 
clause but in a statutory guise. Rather than abolishing the need to satisfy privity and 
consideration, the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 has created another exception 
to each of them.627 Had it been utilised in Scrutton, the Act would have had limited application. 
In his article, ‘A Birthday Present for Lord Denning’, Macmillan explains the following: 
 
Here, the relevant contract was the bill of lading which contained a limitation of 
liability clause. The contract was initially between the shipper and the carrier; after 
the sale of the goods it was between the shipper and the consignee. In order for the 
new Act to have allowed the stevedores to avail themselves of the limitation clause in 
this contract, the contract would have needed to contain a term which purported to 
benefit them (s 1(1)(b), (2) & (6)). It is by no means clear that it did. The Law Lords, 
including Lord Denning, did not believe that the bill of lading was intended to protect 
the stevedores. However, the Law Lords were considering a different issue: whether 
the carriers had acted as agents of the stevedores and not whether the contract 
extended an enforceable benefit to the stevedores. The bill of lading did seek to allow 
a bailee of the goods to avail himself of the limitation of liability and on this basis it is 
at least arguable that the new Act would have allowed the stevedores to raise the 
                                                        
627 R Stevens, ‘The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999’ (2004) Law Quarterly Review 120. 
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limitation of liability in their defence. This last example serves to illustrate that 
difficult cases are bound to arise even after the new Act. 628 
 
Smith outlines the rationale behind the Act: “If the contracting parties intend to 
benefit a third party then the law should support this intention by allowing the third party to 
enforce the contract”.629 However, although the Act confers rights to third parties and a 
Himalaya clause has a statutory footing, it still needs a juridical justification. It requires 
consideration for an implied contract. This consideration – as in The Eurymedon, for example – 
could be performing one of the carrier activities. However, it is difficult to define accurately 
the activities of modern carriers. In the past such definitions were easier; the activities were 
related only to the sea-side of operations (see Hague-Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules). But, 
with the Rotterdam Rules, and with the carrier taking responsibilities for the whole carriage, it 
is very difficult to differentiate categories of third parties. 630 
An article by Clifford Chance’s International Maritime Trade & Insurance Group 
states: 
 
One of the clear benefits of the Act is to render virtually obsolete Himalaya-type 
provisions. The new Act effectively dispenses with all but one of the four conditions 
that were set out in Scruttons Ltd v Midlands Silicones Ltd The remaining condition is 
the two-fold test in Section 1(1) of the Act. For this reason, while the new Act greatly 
alleviates the previous problem and largely replaces the need for Himalaya clauses, it 
does not automatically follow that Himalaya provisions are completely obsolete or no 
longer necessary.631 
 
Lord noted that Section 7 (1) of the Contract (Right of Third Parties) Act 1999 
maintains any right or remedy of a third party that exists outside the Act. Article IV bis (2) of 
the Hague-Visby Rules allows servants and agents of the carriers to rely on the protection to 
which the carrier is entitled under the rules. This is unaffected by the Contract (Right of Third 
Parties) Act 1999. The protection granted by the rules does not extend to independent 
                                                        
628 Macmillan (n 508).  
629 Stephen A Smith, ‘Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties: In Defence of the Third-Party Rule’ (1997) 17 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 643. 
630 Ibid. 
631 Tony Vlasto and Julian Clark, ‘The Effect of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 on Voyage and 
Time Charter Parties’ (2000–2001) 25 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 519.  
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contractors, whose position is therefore greatly improved by the Contract (Right of Third 
Parties) Act 1999.632 
In general terms and as far as this thesis concerns, under the Contract (Right of Third 
Parties) Act 1999 tools such as protection clauses and agency might no longer needed633 as the 
consent of the parties could be adequate to extend the protection.  
 Tetley contends that the 1999 statute provides a less complex foundation for applying 
a standard limitation of liability clause. The statute requires merely that the third party 
beneficiaries be identified with sufficient clarity; expressly (Section 1(1)(a)), or by class, name 
or description (Section 1(1)(b) and 1(3)). The carrier’s permission from the third party to 
stipulate the clause, the third party’s ratification of the benefit conferred by the clause, and the 
passing of consideration are no longer a concern.634 
This undeniably confirms that third parties in the carriage of goods by sea cannot be 
left stranded without proper protection. However, introducing a Himalaya clause on a statutory 
footing does not equate to provision of the clause with full effect. It simply states that in some 
circumstances, under the Act, a third party can rely on an exclusion clause of a contract of 
which they are not part. If the bilateral perspective is still adopted to judge the carriage of 
goods by sea, the Contract (Right of Third Parties) Act 1999 surely is a step forward. If the 
multilateral perspective is adopted is not that sufficient. 
 From the explanatory notes it is clear that the activities of the third parties are related 
to the loading and unloading process. Since the Act was drafted in 1999, commerce has 
changed a great deal. Convincing arguments have been made that, as a result of these changes, 
the Act has been rendered almost obsolete. Restricting reliance on this clause to only third 
parties involved in the loading and unloading processes means leaving outside the law all the 
others involved in the multilateral common enterprise. 
 
Summary of Part A 
 
In summary, English law and third party protection are not comfortable with each 
other. Consideration may indeed be “too firmly fixed to be overthrown by a side-wind”, but, it 
has nonetheless been circumvented.  
                                                        
632 David Lord, ‘Insurable Interest: Is There a Rule?’ (3 Stone Buildings, 2005), 159 <http://clients.squareeye.net/ 
uploads/3sb/events/121005_lord.pdf > Accessed 5 May 2013. 
633 In case the carriage of goods by sea contract in question is under English law.  
634 Tetley (n 26). 
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Bailment, agency, protection clauses, and the Contract (Right of Third Parties) Act 
1999 have all been geared towards attaining the same objective, but none of them provide third 
parties with adequate, up-to-date, and juridically justified protection.  
These concepts have created various difficulties in the aforementioned cases: from 
Elder Dempster to Scrutton and The Eurymedon, and more recently The Pioneer Container and 
The Mahkutai.635  
The Eurymedon case warrants particular mention here. In it, the House of Lords 
accepted that a promise by A could enforce separate contracts with B and with C.636 The Privy 
Council’s view on The Eurymedon demonstrated that the unnecessary complexities which 
emerge in the event of a digression from the doctrine and giving effect to the parties’ intention. 
Since the The Eurymedon decision of the Privy Council, the extension of rights to third parties 
by virtue of the Himalaya clause has been acknowledged in the United Kingdom. The Pioneer 
Container case developed this further: 
 
1) The Privy Council was attracted to a solution which accorded with commercial 
convenience and practical good sense. 
2) The Himalaya clause route and the doctrine of bailment on terms are cumulative rather 
than alternative solutions.637 
 
The difference between the cases of The Pioneer Container and The Mahkutai is that 
the former has been decided in a very commercial way, whilst the latter took a very 
conservative approach to third party protection. 
Finally, although the Contract (Right of Third Parties) Act 1999 improves the 
situation of third party protection, it still relies on the presence of an implied contract to 
function. Moreover, the Act substantially only moves the third party protection on a statutory 
level. As the full title of the Act implies, it is concerned with the rights of third parties. 
However, as demonstrated by arguments contained in this thesis, the situation of third party 
protection in the carriage of goods by sea differs from the one envisaged by the Act. Not only 
that, but it is seventeen years since the Act was passed, and its drafting began many years 
earlier. The Act seems to have placed the Himalaya clause on a statutory footing but the four 
criteria outlined Lord Reid must still be satisfied. It is argued that, in the carriage of goods by 
                                                        
635 Merkin (n 30) 18. 
636 Merkin (n 30) 18. 
637 The Pioneer Container (n 586). 
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sea, these criteria are now not adequate; third parties should, as an integral part of the 
enterprise, receive their own protection. 
Taking into account Nossal’s criticisms of the The Mahkutai case – and considering 
that carriage has evolved into a multilateral sector – it is believed that the strict application of 
concepts of law such as privity and consideration fail to do justice to a fundamental 
commercial principle: namely, that if a party performing the carriage enterprise is sued by the 
cargo owner (who aims to circumvent the limitation of liability in the contract) the party sued 
in tort has to rely on that clause.638 Denying it is fundamentally wrong because it fails to 
respect not only the parties’ wishes, but also the reliance that the third party has on that 
principle. Once established, bailment, agency and protection clauses become mere instruments 
in applying that principle. 
 
4.9 Critical propositions 
 
Once the English position has been stated the thesis advances two critical propositions 
for a default position under English law. The first takes into account the evolution of the 
theoretical thread that culminated in the involuntary bailment in The Pioneer Container case, 
using this concept to extend the protection under bailment to anyone in the position of the 
shipowner of the vessel. The second considers the importance of adopting a reliance-focused 
perspective of contract theory – rather than a classical one.639 
 
4.9.1 The application of involuntary bailment in the carriage of goods by sea  
 
The Pioneer Container case highlighted the concept of voluntary bailment. Taking 
that into account, it has been observed that, in the carriage of goods by sea, third parties in 
certain circumstances – such as the owner of the vessel in a demise charter – the vessel itself 
(when considered a third party defendant) or any other third party in that situation can rely on 
                                                        
638 S. Nossal (n 609). 
639 This proposition is inspired by the observations of Lord Steyn in the Darlington case Darlington Borough 
Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd (1994) EWCA Civ 6. In this case Lord Steyn said: “The case for recognising a 
contract for the benefit of a third party is simple and straightforward. The autonomy of the will of the parties 
should be respected. The law of contract should give effect to the reasonable expectations of contracting parties. 
Principle certainly requires that a burden should not be imposed on a third party without his consent. But there is 
no doctrinal, logical, or policy reason why the law should deny effectiveness to a contract for the benefit of a third 
party where that is the expressed intention of the parties”. Moreover, often the parties, and particularly third 
parties, organise their affairs on the faith of the contract. They rely on the contract. It is therefore unjust to deny 
effectiveness to such a contract”.  
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bailment on terms. As already mentioned in paragraph 4.3, in Morris v Martin, Lord Denning 
stated: 
 
If the owner of the ship accepts goods for carriage on a bill of lading contained 
exemption condition...the owner of the goods is bound by those conditions if he 
impliedly consented to them as being in the known and contemplated form.640 
 
Quoting again Wilson v Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co., Fullagar J. in 
the last part of his statement on Elder Dempster said that “the same inference might perhaps be 
drawn in some cases even if the charterer himself signed the bill of lading, but it is necessary to 
consider any such question”.641  
Through his comment, Fullagar raised the possibility of the shipowner enjoying 
entitlement under bailment on terms even if the master were not to sign the bill of lading but 
instead the charterer or carrier did. Fullagar draws his conclusion from the modern version of 
bailment, which provides that the possession of goods is sufficient to consider a person bailee 
or sub-bailee. Acknowledging this, one could extend the concept to a shipowner, who under 
bareboat charter, would be equally entitled along with the vessel or any other third party in 
such position. 
In order to forward this proposition, one must first define the term bailee. According 
to Pollock and Wright, a bailee is: 
 
...any person [who] is to be considered as a bailee who otherwise than as servant 
either receives possession of a thing from another or consents to receive or hold 
possession of a thing for another upon an undertaking with the other person either to 
keep and return or deliver to him the specific thing or to (convey and) apply the 
specific thing accordingly to the directions antecedent or future of the other person.642 
 
A common perception of bailment, as specified by Sealy and Hooley, holds that 
possession alone is not enough to create bailment.643 Two other conditions must also be 
fulfilled. Firstly, the bailor must retain a superior interest in the chattel, which is subordinate to 
                                                        
640 Morris (n 534) 730. 
641 Wilson (n 546). 
642 Sir Frederick Pollock and Robert Samuel Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (Clarendon 
Press 1888) 163. 
643 Sealy and Hooley (n 531). 
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the bailor’s interest. This is reflected in the fact that at the end of the bailment, the bailee must 
redeliver the chattel to the bailor or deal with it according to the bailor’s instructions.644 
Secondly, the bailee must consent to take possession of the chattel for there to be a bailment. 
On the other hand, involuntary bailments arise where a person is in control of a chattel 
belonging to another person, without consenting to act as a bailee, (e.g., when goods are sent to 
the bailee’s premises by mistake).  
Traditionally, bailment has been explained on the basis of mutual consent.645 
However, in recent years the consensual theory of bailment has been challenged. It has been 
argued that it is the bailee’s, not the bailor’s, consent which matters. As Palmer argued, 
furthermore, it is believed that any person who voluntarily assumes possession of goods 
belonging to another will be held to owe at least the principal duties of the bailee at English 
law.646 This new theory has now been endorsed by the Privy Council, with The Pioneer 
Container case. 
A progressive definition of bailment has been given by Mance L.J., in the case of East 
West Corporation v Dksb 1912: “what is fundamental is not contract, but bailee’s consent...the 
essence of bailment is the bailee’s voluntary possession of another goods”.647  
Bell648 compliments this by stating, “In rejecting consensus as the basis of bailments, 
The Pioneer Container clearly moves the law of bailment away from the law of contract and 
towards the law of tort”. 649 
The main issue of bailment in the carriage of goods by sea is whether a shipowner on 
a chartered vessel can share the same rights and liabilities as the carrier.650 Should the answer 
be affirmative,651 then one must ask whether it is applicable to all the charterparties, or is there 
a difference between time and voyage on the one hand, and bareboat charter on the other.652 
Likewise, would it be applicable should vessel or another third party be in the same situation? 
In The Pioneer Container case, for instance: 
 
                                                        
644 The Mahkutai (n 533). 
645 Palmer, ‘Sub-Bailment on Terms’ (n 537). 
646 Ibid. 
647 (2003) EWCA Civ 83; (2003) QB 1509, paras 24 and 26. 
648 A P Bell, ‘The Place of Bailment in the Modern Law of Obligations’ in N Palmer and E McKendrick (eds) 
Interest in Goods (Ch 19, 2nd edn 1998) 471. 
649 Claims in Bailment are considered as tortious and not contractual for the purposes of founding jurisdiction 
under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 6.20.  
650 As a protection for third parties, in this case the shipowner. 
651 In Elder, Dempster (n 3) and The Pioneer Container (n 586) but not The Mahkutai (n 533). 
652 In a bareboat charter, the shipowner leases the vessel to the charterer and usually provides no other services. 
The charterer becomes in effect the owner of the vessel and the master and crew become his servants (Scrutton, 
Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (n 575) 47; Todd (n 575) 10.  
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Where goods had been sub-bailed with the authority of the owner, the obligation of 
the sub-bailee towards the owner was that of a bailee for reward and the owner could 
proceed directly against the sub-bailee under the law of bailment without having to 
rely on the contract of sub-bailment between the bailee and the sub-bailee; that a sub-
bailee who voluntary took the goods into his custody could invoke terms of the sub-
bailments qualifying or otherwise affecting his responsibility to the owner if the owner 
had expressly or impliedly consented to those terms or had ostensibly authorised 
them.653 
 
Bareboat agreements can also affect the parties’ in personam and in rem liabilities. In 
any other charter agreement where possession and control are not transferred, the charterer is 
neither liable in rem nor in personam for injuries resulting from unseaworthiness, for example. 
Though bareboat charter agreements generally allow owners to shield themselves from in 
personam liability, the vessel and therefore the owner can still be liable in rem for damages not 
exceeding the vessel’s value.654 This in turn leads them to be liable for the cargo. 
For a bareboat charter position, the test carried out in The Pioneer Container case 
appears successful because a shipowner in the bareboat charter, although not involved in the 
commercial life of the ship, “involuntarily” takes the goods on his ship and therefore into 
possession. This may not be so in the terms of the bill of lading but is under the terms of 
bailment.  
Once confirmed that the shipowner can be considered as a sub-bailee under bareboat 
charterparty, it is worth exploring the possibility of having the vessel itself as responsible and 
therefore being able to seek protection in rem.655 In this respect if the vessel is found in the 
same causal position as a defendant because she had been sued in rem also the vessel can rely 
on the same protection. Setting this default position also other categories of third parties in the 
same position could rely on it.  
 
4.9.2 The reliance perspective 
 
                                                        
653 The Pioneer Container (n 586) 325. 
654 John W Chitty, ‘Bareboat Charters: Can a Shipowner Limit Liability to Third Parties? Answers for Owners 
Attempting to Navigate the Unsettled Waters in the Eleventh Circuit’ (2008) 25 Georgia State University Law 
Review, 2, Art 2, 477. 
655 In the recent American case of Mazda Motors (n 6) this was tested with regard to the Himalaya clause for the 
first time. 
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With the exception of bailment, agency and the Contract (Right of Third Parties) Act 
1999, if a multilateral perspective on the carriage of goods by sea is accepted, then privity and 
consideration can be severed from their theoretical roots and beaten on a theoretical ground 
using a reliance (rather than classical) approach to contract theory. 
Over the last century or so, privity and consideration have represented a serious and 
extensive issue for the shipping community, precisely because they have prevented a total 
justification for third party protection. While this has not remained unsolved in practice – the 
industry has elaborated many tools to get around it – it remains conceptually problematic. The 
bulk of this obstacle is derived from a classical approach to contract theory, which views the 
contract as a bilateral promise between its parties. Against the backdrop of the modern factual 
context of the shipping industry – where third parties are the pivots of the business – it is more 
fruitful to consider adopting the reliance-based approach to contract theory. 
Neither classical contract theory nor reliance contract theory are modern theories, but 
the application of reliance contract theory to support justification for the protection of third 
parties undoubtedly shows elements of originality. This thesis advances the possibility that the 
reliance perspective could supplement the multilateral common enterprise and the third party 
protection in a theoretical perspective.656 
As previously stated, under common law, the difficulty has always lain in finding a 
conceptual solution for privity and consideration in the context of third party protection. This is 
largely because, according to contract theory, the contract is a promise only between its parties. 
This thesis shapes a new justification for the protection of third parties in the carriage of goods 
by sea. Consequently, in relation to the contract theory, the thesis suggests a different 
theoretical perspective. The thesis does not aim to compare the two theories but instead 
approach third party protection via these theories. Consequently, the thesis argues that overall 
the reliance theory perspective provides a more adequate theoretical solution.  
As being argued, from a factual perspective, third parties are part of the enterprise. 
Yet, in the perspective of contract law, third parties are still protected by the main parties to the 
contract.657  
The protection afforded to third parties, however is undergoing a transformation, the 
trend of which is to move away from a pure, bilateral freedom of contract (where only the 
                                                        
656 Which could better match the factual current shipping scenario. 
657 Peter Jaffey, ‘A New Version of the Reliance Theory’ (1998) 49 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 107. As a 
premise, the classical theory leans towards freedom of contract and the reliance theory towards limited autonomy 
of contract. 
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parties to the contract are considered) toward a multilateral freedom of contract.658 In the sense 
that the position and needs of who may be formally considered a third party has to be taken 
into consideration. Although efforts of national and international communities regarding 
international trade have allowed the protection of third parties, classical contract theory has 
always been an obstacle.659 Classical contract theory is based on promise and when put simply, 
states: “I promise to do this if you promise to do that”.660 As previously discussed, if only one 
party offers consideration, the agreement is not legally a binding contract. Reliance contract 
theory, by contrast, is based on an assumption of responsibilities: 
 
We will proceed on the assumption that I am to do this and you are to do that, and 
although I do not promise that I will do this, I accept responsibility for your reliance 
on the assumption that I will, and you will accept responsibility for my reliance in the 
same way. 661 
 
For example, A makes a contract with B where they agree a benefit for C. A makes an 
agreement with C to assume responsibility for C’s reliance on the performance that B has 
contracted. In terms of shipping, the carrier contracts with the shipper and it is agreed that a 
third party would benefit. The carrier then makes an agreement with the third party to assume 
responsibility for the third party’s reliance on the performance for which the shipper has been 
contracted. 
 Taking the above analysis into account, this research advances the reliance contract 
theory as approach for third party protection in the carriage of goods by sea supporting the 
concept of multilateral common enterprise. In The Himalaya case over 60 years ago, Lord 
Denning, referring to Smith & Snipes, stated: 
                                                        
658 Here the meaning assigned to freedom of contract is different from the meaning usually found in the literature; 
especially on the carriage of goods by sea (i.e. choice of law doctrine that permits parties to choose the law of a 
particular country or sovereignty to govern their contract where it involves two or more jurisdictions). The 
meaning conferred to freedom of contract is that a person entering into contract can do it on terms of his or her 
choice. In this regards according to Oxford legal dictionary, freedom of contract means: “A person’s freedom to 
enter a binding agreement on terms of his or her choice”. 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095833975 Accessed 21 April 2014. 
659 Both the classical and reliance theory derive from the contract theory, the study of how individuals and 
businesses construct and develop legal agreements. It draws upon principles of financial and economic behaviour. 
See generally, Schwartz, Alan and Scott, Robert E., "Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law" (2003). 
John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Papers. Paper 275. 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/lepp_papers/275 Accessed 24 February 2014; Eigen, Zev J., "Empirical 
Studies of Contract" (2012). Faculty Working Papers. Paper 204. 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers/204 Accessed 5 March 2014. 
660 Joseph Raz, ‘Promises and Obligations’ in P M S Hacker and J Raz (eds) Law Morality, and Society (OUP 
1977); United States Restatement (Second) of Contracts, para 2(l) (1981). 
661 Patrick S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press 1979). 
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The truth is that there was only one contract, namely, the contract evidenced by the 
bill of lading; and the reason why the stevedores and others are protected because, 
although they were not parties to the contract, nevertheless they participated in the 
performance of it, and the exception clause was made for their benefit whilst they 
were performing it. The clause was not made expressly for their benefit, it is true, but 
nevertheless it was by necessary implication, which is just as good: and they have a 
sufficient interest to entitle them to enforce it. Their interest lies in this: they 
participated in so far as it affected them and can take those benefits of it, which 
appertain to their interest therein. It is one of those cases – by no means rare – where 
a third person is entitled to enforce a contract made for his benefit.662  
 
Lord Denning explained, in dicta that all defences in the contract of carriage would 
extend to all participants in its performance.663 Hooper adds that: 
 
… The master, the stevedores and any other persons who may be engaged in carrying 
out the services provided for by the contract.’ Relying on the case law of England, 
Australia, and the United States. Lord Denning stressed that the participants are 
protected by the contract even though they are not parties to it; they could rely on the 
contract even though they might be guilty of negligence and are sued in tort.664 
 
Smith, then, says that anyone who relies on a promise has a potential claim in 
contract, subject only to the usual tort limitations of proximity, foreseeability, and so on.665 
This thesis extends this concept stating that, if contract law is seen from the reliance 
perspective, who relies on a contract has a potential right to benefit from that contract.  
Once more it is fundamental to recall that this research grounds the limitation of the 
appliance of its propositions on a causal level. Therefore the criterion is that in the multilateral 
enterprise whoever party is involved in a claim can be entitled to receive that protection. 
 
 
  
                                                        
662 The Himalaya (n 4). 
663 Hooper (n 149). See also The Himalaya, Ibid. 183 (Lord Denning). 
664 Hooper, ibid. 
665 Smith (n 629). 
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CHAPTER 4 PART B 
Third party protection under United States law 
 
Courtesy of its deep involvement with multimodalism, the political role of 
transportation in the United States has been identified as differing substantially from its 
political role in England.666 What is called the United States intermodal system is a system of 
transport that links the transfer of cargo from one side of the United States to the other.667 
Currently, the United States intermodal system has the shortest ocean navigation time; 
18.5 days from Asia to the east coast of the United States.668 As explained by the United States 
ministry of agriculture, this is an ideal scenario. However, labour problems at ports can slow 
down the system. Improvement and new investments in ports and links between sea and land 
legs are therefore sought. Another main problem of the United States intermodal system – 
compared to a unimodal system, such as the Panama Canal – is that although the intermodal 
system is in principle faster, the unimodal system is cheaper. The aim of the intermodal system 
is therefore to reduce costs as much as possible. To do this, the intermodal system requires 
economies of scale (for terminal operators) and economies of scope (for carriers and port 
workers).669 This places the United States in a different footing in terms of context.  
United States law approaches third parties in a manner rather different to English law, 
and shows a correspondingly different willingness to grant them protection.670 The United 
States has a completely different historical background to England in the carriage of goods by 
sea. Curiously, as Sturley states, “England is a leading carrier nation, but the House of Lords’ 
initial response to the ‘Himalaya clause’ problem was strongly pro-cargo. The United States is 
                                                        
666 The geographical extension of the United States and its geographical position as a link between east and west is 
another main difference between the two countries and is one of the main reasons why the multimodality has been 
developed in this country. 
667 The terms multimodal and intermodal are variously defined. They are sometimes considered different from 
each other and some other time considered as a synonym. It is safe to say that both are linked with the 
involvement of different modes of transport. Martin Stopford for instance, in the book Maritime Economics refer 
to intermodalism and define it as: “system concerned with the transfer of cargo from one mode to another”. Bes 
chartering definition is that:"intermodalism (or multimodalism) which is carriage of goods by a mixture of modes 
of transport”. This thesis recognises that they can be essentially used interchangeably but prefer to use the term 
multimodalism. However, in United States literature is frequent to find the term intermodalism and the system that 
this chapter refer to is formally called “United States Intermodal System”. 
668 12.3 days from Asia to the United States West Coast and 6 days from the United States West to East Coast, via 
land routes. For means of comparison, the same route from the Panama Canal takes 3 days more. 
669 Delmy L. Salin, IMPACT OF PANAMA CANAL EXPANSION ON THE U.S. INTERMODAL SYSTEM 
United States, United States Department of Agriculture Marketing and Regulatory Programs Agricultural 
Marketing Service Transportation and Marketing Programs January 2010. 
670 Michael F Sturley, ‘International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic Law in 
Conflicts of Interpretation’ (1986–1987) 27 Virginia Journal of International Law 729. 
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a cargo nation, but its Himalaya clause jurisprudence favours the carrier”.671 Apart from 
Himalaya clauses, in general Courts in the United States are also usually more open to third 
party protection.672 
United States law has two unique features that impact on the carriage of goods by sea: 
 
1) The conflicts between COGSA and state law, and the enactment of the Harter Act. 
2) United States law is federal in nature; third party protection varies from state to state. 
According to Zawitosky, the laws of some states provide that an agent of the carrier 
acting within the scope of its authority is entitled to the benefit of any contractual limit 
upon the liability of its principal, including any limitation under COGSA or the bill of 
lading.673 
 
Zawitosky also reports that two other sources of authority under state law for the 
extension to stevedores and terminal operators of limitation provisions in the carrier’s bill of 
lading exist: sections 7-20429 and 7-3093 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which 
together allow contractual limitation of liability under specific conditions for warehousemen 
and carriers.674  
Under Section 7- 204(2) of the UCC, a warehouseman may validly contract to limit 
their liability to a specific amount per package. This section states:  
 
Damages may be limited by a term in the warehouse receipt or storage agreement 
limiting the amount of liability in case of loss or damage, and setting forth a specific 
liability per article or item, or value per unit of weight beyond which the 
warehouseman shall not be liable; provided, however, that such liability may on 
written request of the bailor at the time of signing such storage agreement or within a 
reasonable time after receipt of the warehouse receipt be increased on part or all of 
the goods thereunder, in which event increased rates may be charged based on such 
increased valuation, but that no such increase shall be permitted contrary to the 
lawful limitation of liability contained in the warehouseman’s tariff, if any. No such 
                                                        
671 Ibid., 742. 
672 The modern third party beneficiary rule in the United States has started with the case of Lawrence v Fox (1859) 
20 NY 268 (NYCA).  
673 Joanne Zawitoski, ‘Limitation of Liability for Stevedores and Terminal Operators Under the Carrier’s Bill of 
Lading and COGSA’ (1985) 16 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 3, 337. 
674 Ibid. 
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limitation is effective with respect to the warehouseman’s liability for conversion to 
his own use.675 
 
In general terms, it is clear that multilateral transport in the United States faces a 
problem of jurisdiction (i.e., Admiralty and federal regulation of railroads).676  
Having framed the factual and general legal context of transportation in the United 
States, this part of the chapter deals with third parties under United States law. The concept of 
bailment and agency under United States law will be analysed, and a review of the most 
relevant authorities on the topic will be provided. 
 
4.10 Agency and bailment in United States law  
 
Agency and bailment held great importance under United States law up to a certain 
point. After the case of Herd, however, the Courts’ approach changed.677 
According to American Restatement,678 an agency is the fiduciary relationship that 
arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the 
agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent 
manifests or otherwise consents so to act.679 
Also under United States law, agency is strictly connected with bailment. A treatise 
from over a hundred years ago on the law of bailment and carrier reports that most contracts 
could be entered into by an agent of the contractor;680 the principles of agency apply to 
bailment. In the same treatise, Elliot refers to his statement as especially true in reference to the 
law of carriers, since today most carriers are great corporations, which can contract only by and 
via their agent.681 This statement is extremely contemporary and relevant for the proposition of 
the multilateral common enterprise. 
                                                        
675 Denniston, Gunn and Yudes (n 87).  
676 The issue of the conflict between Admiralty law and federal law in the United States is outside the scope of this 
thesis. However, it is worth to specify that, as reported by Sweeney (n 17), the approach of admiralty jurisdiction 
has most probably been adapted after Kirby decision. In Kirby, Justice O’Connor defined the case as a “maritime 
case about a train wreck” therefore under Admiralty jurisdiction. Sweeney aptly point it out that this definition is 
shocking “only” for those who are not familiar with modern transport. For who is part of modern transport instead 
it should be a natural consequence of the current factual context. 
677 Herd (n 155). 
678 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Agency (3rd ed American Law Institute 2006) para 1.01.  
679 Ibid. Agency under US law also affects the relationship between employer and employee under United States 
law is dealt with the concept of the respondeat that states that an employer is subject to liability for torts 
committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment. 
680 William F Elliot, A treatise on the law of bailment and carriers (Bobbs-Merrill Company 1914) 266. 
681 Ibid. 
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 Bailment in the United States is dealt with by the UCC,682 which defines a bailee as 
“a person that by a warehouse receipt, bill of lading, or other document of title acknowledges 
possession of goods and contracts to deliver them”.683 As explained by the Uniform Law 
Commission: 
 
The storage and shipment of tangible goods for commercial purposes has been going 
on for centuries. The physical side of the business is carried on by entities that provide 
warehouses (warehousemen) and entities that carry the goods from place of origin to 
destination (common carriers). These are tangible, visible businesses. What is not 
tangible and visible is the transfer of rights in the goods while they are stored and/or 
shipped. The common law provided the rules of bailment.684 
 
In order to underline the originality of this analysis it should be observed, and 
acknowledged here that, as Helmholz said in 1992 but valid more than two decades later, in 
more than sixty years, there has been no systematic treatise devoted to the United States law of 
bailment in the United States law.685  
Street stresses that possession is severed from ownership.686 Decisions under United 
States regarding bailment have tended to swing, pendulum-like, between possess and contract. 
In his article “The definition of a bailment”, Cullen actually specifies that although it is usually 
created by a contract, this is not always so.687 
Laidlaw explained in 1932 that the courts of the nineteenth century gave a great deal 
of attention to contract, and frequently stipulating its requirement where in Laidlaw’s opinion 
none should have been needed.688 In a variety of American cases, bailment was not found 
because no contract existed.689 Other courts have nonetheless contradicted this approach; for 
                                                        
682 The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or ‘the Code’), first published in 1952, is one of a number of Uniform 
Acts that have been promulgated in conjunction with efforts to harmonise the Law of Sales and other commercial 
transactions in all 50 American states. The goal of harmonising State Law is important because of the prevalence 
of commercial transactions that extend beyond one state. 
683 Section 7–102(1). Therefore, it is acknowledged that according to the UCC it has to be under a document and 
not just possession. 
684 Uniform Law Commission, ‘UCC Article 7, Documents of Title (2003) Summary’ (Uniform Law Commission, 
2015) <http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=UCC%20Article%207,%20Documents%20of%20Ti 
tle%20(2003)> Accessed 9 February 2014. 
685 Richard H Helmholz, ‘Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The Elusive Uniform Standard of 
Reasonable Care’ (1992) 41 University of Kansas Law Review 97. 
686 Thomas Atkin Street, 2 Foundations of Legal Liability (1906) New York at 232 
687 (1926) 11 St. Louis Law Review 257, 264. 
688 William King Laidlaw, ‘Principles of Bailment’ (1932) 37 Commercial Law Journal 134. 
689 Berting v Norman 101 Ark 75, 141 SW 201 (1911); Bohannon v Springfield Ala 789 (1846); Cowen v 
Pressprich 202 App Div 796, 196 NY Supp 921. 
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example, that bailment does not always depend upon a contractual relation. It is an element of 
lawful possession no matter how it is created and duty to account for it as the property of 
another that creates bailment, regardless of whether such possession is based upon contract in 
the ordinary sense.690 According to Laidlaw,691 if there is a bailment whenever there is 
possession of the chattel every possessor who is not an owner is a bailee. 
As in England, also in the United States, third parties have historically sought legal 
protection under agency and bailment law.  
 
4.11 Third parties in United States case law prior to Herd & Co. 
 
The United States’s willingness to allow protection to third parties seems to have 
varied throughout different periods of history. As Zawitosky points out, in the middle of last 
century, a United States Court would have held a third party employed by the carrier to receive 
a benefit from the contract, by virtue of that employment relationship alone, under the 
principles of agency law.692 In contrast to the English law, the United States has not had 
problems with the English concept of privity and consideration.693 
Early judgments in the United States extended bill of lading exceptions even where 
the bill of lading clauses in question were far from specific. It is safe to say that, until middle of 
the twentieth century, a terminal operator or a stevedore could rely on the protection from the 
bill of lading even without specific clauses in the bill of lading.694  
Citing Reid v Fargo, Healy argues that the extraordinary lack of litigation on this 
question in the years between 1913 and 1952 is responsible for the denial of extension of 
liability limitation to the stevedore; a time when the case of Collins & Co. v Panama Railway 
Co. was appealed to the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit.695 
The concepts of bailment and agency have been cornerstones of the protection 
afforded during this period, giving the effect of limitation clauses (such as the Himalaya 
clause) and the concept of vicarious liability. On the issue of whether or not a stevedore might 
                                                        
690 Foulke v New York Consolidated R.R. 228 NY 269, 127 NE 237 (1920). 
691 Laidlaw (n 688). 
692 Zawitoski (n 673). 
693 The Restatement (Second) Contracts 1981, Section 304, which provides, “A promise in a contract creates a 
duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and the intended beneficiary may enforce 
the duty”. Comment (b) to Section 304 states, “This Section reflects the basic principle that the parties to a 
contract have the power, if they so intend, to create a right in a third person”. 
694 National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia v Isbrandtsen Co. (1957) AMC 1571 (Sup Ct NY). United 
States v The South Star 210 F 2d 44 (2d Cir 1954). 
695 Marie Healy, ’Carriage of Goods by Sea: Application of the Himalaya clause to Sub-delegees of the Carrier’ 
(1977) 2 The Maritime Lawyer 91. 
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vicariously have the benefit of a contractual limitation of liability as an agent of the named 
carrier in the bill of lading, a leading authority in this period emerged with the case of 
Collins.696 In it, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had held that where the provisions of 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act was expressly incorporated into the bill of lading, the 
stevedore had equal benefit with the carrier of Section 4(5) of the Act which states that: 
 
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or 
damage to or in connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceeding 
$500 per package lawful money of the United States, or in case of goods not shipped 
in packages, per customary freight unit, or the equivalent of that sum in other 
currency, unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the 
shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading. This declaration, if 
embodied in the bill of lading, shall be prima facie evidence, but shall not be 
conclusive on the carrier.697 
 
The court provided a staunchly commercial rationale, summarised below: 
 
 Ships are usually unloaded by stevedores. 
 Carriage of goods by sea covers the period from the time of loading to discharging. 
 The stevedore was contracted by the carrier to carry out the carrier’s obligations to 
discharge cargo. 
 The goods went damage during this period. 
 
Therefore the stevedores were entitled to the same limitation of liability of the carrier. 
The court in Collins applied the principle of the Restatement of agency (Paragraph 347), which 
states that “an agent who is acting in pursuance of his authority has such immunities of the 
principal as are not personal to the principal”.698 
Almost a decade later, this scenario in the United States has been changed by the 
Supreme Court in Herd. This case disregarded the nature of the relationship between the third 
party and the main party of the contract and therefore the concepts of bailment and agency. On 
the contrary, the discussions in Herd focused on how Courts would have construed the clauses. 
                                                        
696 A.M. Collins & Co v Panama R. Co (1952) 197 F 2d.  
697 Ibid. 
698 Ibid. 
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The Court passed over bailment and agency, taking the protection of third parties to a purely 
contractual level and thus highlighting the autonomy of the parties of a contract. Analysis of 
the Herd case is important because it defines the modern way in which clauses have to be 
construed in order to do justice to the intention of the parties. The rest of this chapter, therefore, 
addresses first the Herd case, followed by its influence over cases in the carriage of goods by 
sea, and then how this has been changed by Kirby, in which it is stated that the intent of a 
maritime contract goes beyond any barrier. Herd has been the watershed of the United States’ 
approach to the law governing third party protection. 
 
4.12 The case of Herd & Co. 
 
Herd case involved stevedores, contracted verbally by the carrier, who, while loading 
the cargo, dropped it into the water. The stevedore attempted to rely on the bill of lading and to 
take advantage of the $500 per package limitation. The district court refused to extend the 
package limitation to the stevedores holding that: 
  
Contracts purporting to grant immunity from, or limitation of, liability must be strictly 
construed and limited to intended beneficiaries, for they "are not to be applied to alter 
familiar rules visiting liability upon a tortfeasor for the consequences of his 
negligence, unless the clarity of the language used expresses such to be the 
understanding of the contracting parties.699 
 
The case reached the Supreme Court of the United States which also refused to extend 
the $500 per package limitation to stevedores who had been contracted orally by the carrier. In 
the Herd case, the Court changed its approach towards third party protection stating that:  
 
1) The language of the Himalaya clause must be very specific as to who it protects. 
2) Courts will not interpret bills of lading to benefit third parties not mentioned in any way 
whatsoever. 
 
In 1959, the United States Supreme Court, in deciding Herd made it difficult for third 
parties to benefit from exculpatory clauses in bills of lading to which they were not a party. 
The result was that, in order to be viewed as protected by an exculpatory clause in a contract 
                                                        
699 Herd (n 155) 
177 
 
for carriage, a third-party contractor would have to be named with some degree of specificity. 
However, in the case, the court did not establish a rule regarding how specific the identification 
of a party must be.  
It became perceptible in the United States that, after Herd, a simple agency 
relationship between stevedore and carrier would be insufficient to extend the carrier’s bill of 
lading protections to the stevedore. By contrast, to facilitate the application of the protection, 
the clause must reflect the intention of the parties to protect the third party. In the period 
following Herd, American Courts further specified the Supreme Court’s request for precision 
in the wording of clauses to be extended to third parties.700 
In the Herd case, the Court commented in detail on the text of the Hague Rules and 
their adoption by the United States Congress: 
 
The debates and Committee Reports in the Senate and the House upon the bill that 
became the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act likewise do not mention stevedores or 
agents. There is, thus, nothing in the language, the legislative history or environment 
of the Act that expressly or impliedly indicates any intention of Congress to regulate 
stevedores or other agents of a carrier, or to limit the amount of their liability for 
damages caused by their negligence.701 
 
In the Herd case, the Supreme Court stated that “no statute has limited its liability, and 
it was not a party to nor a beneficiary of the contract of carriage between the shipper and the 
carrier, and hence its liability was not limited by that contract”.702 
After Herd, the shipping industry started to comply with its requirement in order to 
allow protection to parties outside the contract. As a matter of fact, the Himalaya clause 
benefiting the stevedore and the terminal operator is valid in the United States in virtue of 
Herd, but certain conditions must be complied:  
 
There must be a contractual relationship between the contracting party and anyone 
who purports to claim the benefit of any clause in that contract. Furthermore, the 
party claiming the benefits bestowed by a Himalaya clause must be performing part of 
the contract that actually contains the clause. As said before, in case of independent 
                                                        
700 Zawitoski (n 673). 
701 Herd (n 155) 358. 
702 Ibid., 359. 
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contractors, some courts have required that the operation being performed be of a 
“maritime nature”.703 
 
As Tetley points out, the Herd case also impacted upon the relationship between 
independent contractor and employer. Generally speaking, the employer of an independent 
contractor is not held liable vicariously for any tortious acts and omissions of the contractor; 
the control and supervision existing in an employer-employee or principal-agent relationship is 
absent. However, vicarious liability will be imposed only if the clause is sufficiently clear and 
drafted narrowly enough to cover only the intended beneficiaries.704 
 It has been observed that, what Scrutton achieved in England, Herd achieved in the 
United States. These two cases, in denying third parties the ability to benefit from a limitation 
of liability, in reality opened the door for third party protection. 
 
4.13 From Herd & Co. to Kirby 
 
In the period between Herd and Kirby, United States case law established various 
limits for third party protection, such as the maritime nature of the service, the clarity of the 
language of the protection clause and the relationship that the third party has to have with the 
main party.  
There are several cases demonstrating this, but one in particular summarises the 
criteria quite well; the 1998 case known as Akyiama Corporation of America. The court, in 
allowing the stevedores and terminal operators to receive protection under the bill of lading, 
formally summarised that there are three factors to consider in determining the intent of the 
contracting parties: 
 
1) Nature of the service performed. 
2) Clarity of language to extend to third party. 
3) Contractual relation between third party and main party.705 
 
The amount of cases in that period is substantial and the analysis below does not 
attempt to cover all of them – data analysis will be expanded in the table attached – but instead 
refer to the most relevant cases to support the argument of this thesis. 
                                                        
703 Taisho Marine & Fire Insurance Co. v The Vessel Gladiolus 762 F 2d 1364 (2d Cir 1985).  
704 Tetley (n 26). 
705 Akiyama Corporation Of America v M.V Hanjin Marseilles (1998) 162 F.3d 571. 
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An example of limiting the nature of the service to geographical boundary is the case 
of Virgin Island Corp. v Merwin Lighterage Co., Inc.. As Healey reports, this was the first case 
to rely on the Herd mandate. The court stated that the carrier’s $500 per package limitation of 
liability was not intended to be extended to the carrier’s negligent lighterman, where the bill of 
lading expressly included protection for the carrier or bailee only before the goods left the 
ship’s tackle, and where it expressly provided that lighterage was at the “risk of the goods”.706 
In a case known as The Vessel Gladiolus, a trucking company was not allowed to 
benefit from a Himalaya clause because it was not performing a “maritime function”.707 
In 1991, the case of Caterpillar Overseas reinstated the concept that the operation 
being performed be of a maritime nature. In the words of the Court: 
 
In determining the meaning of the term independent contractor in the application of 
the Himalaya clause the court is to take into consideration the nature of the services 
performed compared to the carrier’s responsibilities under the carriage contract and 
that if the independent contractor is performing a non-maritime service, that is 
another factor to be given weight in ascertaining whether the third party qualifies for 
the Himalaya limitation.708 
 
In the same period, the Court of Maryland in the case Herr-Voss Corporation case 
allowed the Himalaya clause to a cover a trucking services company because it was judged that 
“while in truth non-maritime, the trucking company was performing a service crucial for the 
maritime services”.709 
Another case on the same line is Acciai Speciali where the Court stated that the 
Himalaya clause could be extended to third parties only “while acting in the course of or in 
connection with their employment”.710 Such clauses, following Herd, must be strictly 
construed and limited to intended beneficiaries. 
As explained in Chapter 3, maritime boundaries also seem to have been adopted a few 
years later, in the preparation of the Rotterdam Rules where the United States delegation 
                                                        
706 Healy (n 695). 
707 The Vessels Gladiolus (n 703). 
708 Caterpillar Overseas, S.A. v Marine Transports, Inc. 900 F 2d 714, 724, 1991 AMC 75, 92–93 (4 Cir 1990); 
Herr-Voss Corporation v Columbus Line (Herr-Voss) 1994 AMC 77, 81 (D Md 1992).  
709 Herr-Voss, ibid. 
710 Acciai Speciali Terni v M/V Berance, et al., Defendants (181 F.Supp.2d 458).  
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insisted on putting forward a geographic approach.711 
However, an opposing and more conceptual view (even though strictly related to the 
specificity of the clause) is the interpretation of Carle & Montanari, where the court stated:  
 
It is understood and agreed that, other than said shipowner or demise charterer, no 
person, firm or corporation or other legal entity whatsoever (including the Master, 
officers and crew of the vessel, all agents and all stevedores and other independent 
contractors whatsoever) is, or shall be deemed to be liable with respect to the goods 
as carrier, bailee or otherwise howsoever, in contract or in tort. If, however, it shall 
be adjudged that any other than said shipowner or demise charterer is carrier or 
bailee of the goods or under any responsibility with respect thereto, all limitations of 
and exonerations from liability provided by law or by the terms hereof shall be 
available to such other.712 
 
In Carle Montanari therefore the Court acknowledged the authority of Herd and the 
fact that a bill of lading can extend the legal protection to a third party but only if there is a 
clear and expressed intention to do so. In this case the court considered that was such intention 
and extended the $500 liability to the stevedores. The Court in Middle East Export Co. v 
Concordia Line – where the $500 per package limitation was extended by the bill of lading to 
“any other legal entity whatsoever”, including “all agents and independent contractors” – were 
of the same opinion.713 
                                                        
711 As set out in footnote 9 of the ‘Transport Law Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods (Wholly or Partly) 
(by Sea) Note by the Secretariat’ (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group III 
(Transport Law) Nineteenth session (New York, 16–27 April 2007 A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.81)), the definition of 
‘maritime performing party’ (Draft Art 1(7) of the Draft Convention) should be edited to clarify that a rail 
carrier, even if it performs services that might be considered the carrier’s responsibilities after the arrival of the 
goods at the port of loading or prior to the departure of the goods from the port of discharge, should be 
considered a non-maritime performing party. 2. The Convention applies to actions against the carrier or a 
maritime performing party (Draft Art 4) but not to actions against a non-maritime performing party. The 
suggestion outlined in para 1 was made at the behest of the Association of American Railroads (AAR) 
(representing the United States, Canadian, and Mexican railroads). The AAR made it known to the United States 
from the beginning of the negotiation that it is concerned it might inadvertently be deemed to be a maritime 
performing party when it performs services within a port area, even though the ultimate purpose of those services 
will virtually always be to move goods into or out of a port and not to move goods from one place to another 
within a port. Therefore, the United States supports the suggestion reflected in para 1. 3. The United States 
proposes the following sentence be added at the end of Draft Art 1(7) of A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.81 (the definition of 
‘maritime performing party’), “A rail carrier, even if it performs services that are the carrier’s responsibilities 
after arrival of the goods at the port of loading or prior to the departure of the goods from the port of discharge, 
is a non-maritime performing party”. 
712 Carle & Montanari, Inc. v American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc,. 275 F Supp 76, 1967 A M C 1637 (S D N 
Y), aff’d 386 F 2d 839, 1967 A M C 2529 (2d Cir 1967). 
713 64 Misc 2d 270, 314 NYS 2d 390 (NYC Civ Ct 1970) aff’d 71 Misc 2d 365, 336 NYS 2d 217 (Sup Ct App 
Term 1st Dept 1972).  
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By contrast, in the case of Cabot Corp. v S. S. Mormacsan,714 the language in the bill 
of lading was found to be insufficiently precise to meet the standards of clarity demanded by 
Herd. In Cabot Corporation the idea that the parties have to be expressly mentioned is 
extremely stressed. In particular, the judges commented that: 
 
The failure to include similar language here would lead one to believe that the 
protection of stevedores against liability was not intended. In any case such an 
intention was not expressed with sufficient clarity of language. We will not stretch the 
language when the party drafting such a form contract has not included a provision it 
easily might have.715 
 
During this period, clarity of language was essential in order to extend the carrier’s 
COGSA benefits to ‘independent contractors’. Zawitoski reports that the mere presence of the 
term ‘independent contractor’ in the Himalaya clause was sufficient to encompass stevedores, 
terminal operators and other non-enumerated third parties.716 However federal courts in the 
United States started to distinguish between an independent contractor employed by the carrier 
and one employed by a party other than the carrier in determining the scope of protection 
offered by the simple term ‘independent contractor’ in the carrier’s Himalaya clause. In 
Toyomenka, Inc. v S.S. Tosaharu Maru,717 the Second Circuit held that a security service 
company hired by the carrier’s stevedore, was not entitled to limit its liability under a Himalaya 
clause covering “all servants, agents and independent contractors ... used or employed by the 
carrier”, since the security service company had not been employed by the carrier.718 
In the already reported case of Carle Montanari, instead one of the early leading 
cases, the bill of lading extended “all limitations of and exonerations from liability” to “all 
agents and all stevedores and other independent contractors whatsoever”.719 In this period the 
courts allowed protection only in cases where the third party meant to be protected was 
precisely mentioned and as independent contractor was considered not sufficient to protect a 
specific category of third party, conversely they held that the term agent was adequate to 
protect stevedores.720 As well as describing third parties merely as “bailees” or as “all persons 
                                                        
714 441 F 2d 476 (2 Cir 1971). 
715 Ibid. 
716 Zawitoski (n 673). 
717 Toyomenka Inc. v Tosaharu Maru (Tosaharu Maru) 523 F2d 518, 1975 AMC 1820 (2 Cir 1975). 
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rendering services in connection with the performance of this contract” did not meet the test of 
specificity in the past.721 Differently, in a case of 1990722 it was stated that the term ‘bailee’ as 
used in a bill of lading is sufficiently clear in expressing intent to extend limitation benefits to 
stevedores or other non-carriers. 
Other cases, in this period recognise that the description ‘independent contractors’ was 
considered sufficiently specific until the 1970s, around which time it came to be viewed as 
imprecise.723  
The importance of the relationship with the carrier is highlighted in Assicurazioni 
Generali v D’Amico, where the Himalaya clause had been extended to a bailee and the judges 
interpreted the situation in favour of the bailee explaining that it was the clear intention of the 
carrier, “to extend limitation of liability benefits to those who may be engaged by, and on 
behalf of the carrier to handle the subject cargo during the time in which the carrier was 
responsible for that cargo”.724  
In the aforementioned case Toyomenka, Inc. v S.S. Tosaharu Maru, for instance, the 
security company hired by the stevedores was not allowed the benefit of the clause.725 In 
Mikinberg v Baltic Steamship Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
explained its rationale for this approach:  
 
There must be a contractual relationship between [the stevedore] and [the carrier] in 
order for the provisions in the ‘Himalaya clause’ to apply. It is not enough that [the 
stevedore] merely handled the cargo shipped by [the carrier]. Otherwise, any 
transporter in the flow of commerce would be automatically protected by a single bill 
of lading regardless of its contractual privity with the shipper or carrier. We decline 
to extend COGSA protections through the ‘Himalaya clause’ to indefinite and 
unforeseeable defendants who may have only an attenuated connection to the 
‘carriage of goods by sea’.726  
 
                                                        
721 De Laval Turbine v west India Industries 502 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1974); Rupp v I.T.O. Co. 479 F 2d 674, 1973 
AMC 1093 (2 Cir. 1973); Cabot Corp v Mormacscan 441 F2d 476, 1971 AMC 1130 (2 Cir 1971), cert. denied 
404 United States. 855, 1971 AMC 565 (1971); Royal Embassy v Ioannis Martinos 1986 AMC 790, 801 (ED NC 
1984).  
722 Barretto Peat, Inc. v Luis Ayala Colon Sucrs. Inc., (1990) 896 F.2d 656. 
723 Tosaharu Maru (n 717); Schiess-Froriep Corp. v Finnsailor 574 F2d 123, 127, 1978 AMC 1101, 1107 (2 Cir 
1975), See also LaSalle Machine Tool v Maker Terminals 611 F2d 56, 60, 1978 AMC 1374, 1380 (4 Cir 1979). 
724 766, F 2d 485 (11th Cir 1985). 
725 Tosaharu Maru (n 717). 
726 (1993) 988 F 2d 327 246. 
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In a similar vein, the Vessel Gladiolus court ruled that a trucker was not an 
independent contractor “used or employed” by the ocean carrier as required by the Himalaya 
clause because it contracted with the consignee. Consequently, he was not entitled to the 
COGSA protection.727 In the case of Taisho Marine v Maersk Line, the defendant trucker 
contracted directly with the ocean carrier, and a separate bill of lading was not issued. 
Analysing the ‘nature’ of the services provided by trucker, the court held that his portion of the 
trip was within the scope of the carrier through bill of lading that required land transportation. 
The court held, therefore, that the trucker was an intended beneficiary of the bill of lading.728 
In the case of Bellmer v Terminal Service Houston it was argued by Bellmer (the 
shipper) that stevedores cannot claim the benefit of the clause because that clause is limited to 
independent contractors “engaged by the carrier”. In this case the stevedores were hired by the 
carrier’s agents. The explanation of the court is found very relevant and helpful in 
understanding the concept of a multilateral common enterprise. 
The District Court explained that it was true that the carrier’s agent hired the 
stevedores. However, the stevedores and the agents have ownership in common, occupying the 
same office and telephone number. The personnel conducting the unloading operation were a 
mixture of the stevedores and the agent. The orders to the stevedores’ drivers were usually 
given by the agent’s employees. The evidence also revealed that the owners represent various 
steamship lines and stevedoring companies in the Houston Ship Channel area.729 Therefore the 
court allowed the limitation of liability concluding that a contrary conclusion would be 
unrealistic under the facts of the case. This proves a very important point of this thesis; factual 
context is incredibly relevant for deciding the law. 
In summary, in the period between Herd and Kirby, the courts were in accord that a 
bill of lading may extend its benefits to third parties through a Himalaya clause if the bill’s 
language clearly expresses the intent to do so. Other cases, however, have yielded inconsistent 
results. Generally, the more specific the language designating the third party as entitled to the 
bill’s benefits, the better the chance that the courts had allowed, in this period, the third party’s 
protection.  
 
4.14 The case of Kirby: ‘a maritime case about a train wreck’ 
                                                        
727 Sturley, ‘An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case’ (n 109). 
728 Charles S Donovan and Jill M Haley, ‘Who Done It and Who’s Gonna Pay? Rights of Shippers and 
Consignees against Non-Ocean Carriers Performing Part of a Contract of Carriage Covered by a Through Bill of 
Lading’ (1998) 7 Journal of International Law and Practice 415.  
729 Gebr. Bellmer KG v Terminal Services Houston Inc. (1983) 711 F.2d 622. 
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 The question in Norfolk Southern Railway Company v James N. Kirby was: can a 
train company rely on a Himalaya clause if participating in a multimodal carriage of goods? In 
the Kirby case, there were two bills of lading issued. Both contained a Himalaya clause. The 
train company was not a party to both bills of lading. The court allowed the train company to 
benefit from the exclusion in the bill of lading. The facts are as follows: 
 
 The parties were Kirby, a manufacturer from Australia and ICC, a freight-forwarder; 
 the scope of the contract was transporting ten packages of machinery; 
 the port of loading was Sidney, Australia; 
 the port of unloading was Savannah, Georgia, United States; 
 the place of delivery was an inland city in Alabama; 
 two bills of lading were issued, one by the freight forwarder, ICC, to the shipper, Kirby, 
and one by the carrier, Hamburg Sud, to ICC. Both bills extended “beyond the tackles”, 
and included both sea and land leg. The two bills included provisions limiting the liability 
of the freight forwarder and carrier respectively, as well as other parties assisting in the 
performance of the contract of carriage; 
 the train involved in the land leg derailed causing $1.5 million of damages. Consequently, 
Kirby sued the Railway (Norfolk), who claimed coverage under the limitations of liability 
in both the ICC and Hamburg Sud bills of lading. 
 
The Eleventh Circuit held that Norfolk could not claim protection under the Himalaya 
clause in the first contract, the ICC bill. They excluded from the protection parties such as 
Norfolk that had not been in privity with ICC. The Court confirmed that “a special degree of 
linguistic specificity is required to extend the benefits of a Himalaya clause to an inland 
carrier”.730 The eleventh circuit strictly followed the route set by the Herd case.  
The case went to the Supreme Court, who held that contracts for the carriage of goods 
by sea must be construed like any other contracts: by their terms and consistent with the intent 
of the parties.731 The court had to address two different problems. The first regarded Admiralty 
jurisdiction and the second the attribution of liability. The second problem is of immediate 
interest for this thesis.  
The Court’s reasoning rested on three grounds. First, the need for the parties involved 
                                                        
730 Kirby (n 7). 
731 De la Mare (n 120). 
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in the carriage contracts to be able to rely on their contracts. Second, the need to retain a 
structure of interaction in this area that is consistent with the statutory and decisional law 
promoting non-discrimination in common carriage is necessary. Third, for equitable reasons, 
the shipper should be allowed, in cases such as Kirby, to sue the forwarder for any loss that 
exceeds the liability limitation they agreed upon.732 As Costabel states: 
 
Answering in the positive, the Kirby Court announced three rules. First, the land 
segments of multimodal transports fall under admiralty jurisdiction unless the ocean 
segment is ‘insubstantial’ (the ‘Jurisdiction Rule’) Second, Himalaya clauses, 
properly drafted, extend downstream to all sub-carriers, because the contemplation of 
various modes of transport means that the parties must have anticipated that a land 
carrier’s services would be necessary in performing the contract (the ‘Beneficiary 
Rule’). Third, Himalaya clauses extend upstream to the shipper (not party to a sub-
carrier’s bill of lading) only as far as limitations of liability are concerned”. For 
anything else, there is no relation of agency between the shipper and the carrier (the 
‘Agency Rule’).733 
 
Before the Kirby case, the law considered an intermodal contract to be a mixed 
contract where part was maritime and therefore governed by maritime law and part was land 
(involving inland carriers) governed by land law. However, the Kirby case changed the legal 
approach towards intermodal contracts in cases were a bill of lading issued by the carriers is 
involved. The Kirby case holds that if there is a bill of lading governing a maritime leg, the 
contract also requires a land leg so the contract has to be considered maritime as a whole. As 
stated by the Court regarding the case: 
 
The conceptual approach vindicates that interest by focusing the Court’s inquiry on 
whether the principal objective of a contract is maritime commerce. While it may once 
have seemed natural to think that only contracts embodying commercial obligations 
between the "tackles" (i.e., from port to port) have maritime objectives, the shore is 
now an artificial place to draw a line. Maritime commerce has evolved along with the 
nature of transportation and is often inseparable from some land-based obligations. 
The international transportation industry has moved into a new era, in which cargo 
                                                        
732 Ibid. 
733 Attilio M. Costabel ‘Himalaya Strain?: A Forensic Examination of Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v James N 
Kirby, Pty Ltd and Doe v Celebrity Cruises, Inc.’ 29 Tul. Mar. L.J. 217 2004–2005. 
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owners can contract for transportation across oceans and to inland destinations in a 
single transaction. The popularity of an efficient choice, to assimilate land legs into 
international ocean bills of lading, should not render bills for ocean carriage non-
maritime contracts. Lower court cases that appear to have depended solely on 
geography in fashioning a rule for identifying maritime contracts are inconsistent 
with the conceptual approach required by this Court’s precedent.734  
 
In this case, the United States Supreme Court took a significant step forward in third 
party protection making clear that the maritime nature of the bill of lading cannot be altered by 
multimodal element. Kirby express the concept that  
 
The Kirby Court’s decision made it clear that the maritime character of an ocean bill 
of lading is not altered by multimodal components … The maritime ‘nature and 
character’ of the bill of lading contract was a preeminent consideration in Kirby … 
The lesson of Kirby is that geography has no place in the maritime contract analysis, 
because that analysis must be conceptual, not spatial.735 
 
The conceptual approach articulated by the Court in this case focuses upon the 
purpose of the contract and mandates if that “purpose” is to “effectuate maritime commerce”, it 
is a maritime contract.736 In Kirby, the judges stated: 
 
We recognise that our decision does no more than provide a legal backdrop against 
which future bills of lading will be negotiated. It is not, of course, this court’s task to 
structure the international shipping industry. Future parties remain free to adapt their 
contracts to the rules set forth here, only now with the benefit of greater predictability 
concerning the rules for which their contracts might compensate.737 
 
It is believed that Kirby authority will go much further than the Court had anticipated. 
Kirby did indeed create a new, modern structure for the international shipping future. The case 
                                                        
734 Kirby (n 7). As shown by Carl R Neil, ‘Maritime Contract Law Moves Inland: The Kirby Decision’ (Lindsay, 
Hart, Neil & Weigler LLP, 2011) <http://lindsayhart.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Neil_Martime-Contract-
Law.pdf> Accessed 3 September 2014. 
735 Wyatt (n 81)  
736 Ibid. 
737 Sweeney (n 17).  
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also changed the way of evaluating third party protection (as discussed previously in Chapter 
2), and introduced the idea of substantial carriage of goods by sea.738 
Gurley contends that prior to Kirby, the general principle was “parties may benefit 
when properly described, even when not specifically listed in the clause, provided that they at 
least belong to a readily-identifiable class of beneficiaries”.739 Kirby expanded Himalaya clause 
coverage for pragmatic reasons. If the language of the Himalaya clause is plain, and if it 
extends to anyone whose services contribute to the performance of the contract, and the 
contract clearly contemplates more than ocean carriage, the terms of the bill of lading may be 
extended.740 Justice O’Connor shrewdly noted that, after Kirby, drawing a line at the shore is 
essentially artificial.  
Therefore, accepting that, as Kirby states, drawing distinctions at the shoreline is 
somehow artificial, then the same must be said for the legal implications and protection that 
follow. Kirby looks at the problem from multimodal perspective, and this work extends it to a 
supply chain perspective. It is believed that, although Kirby is a good foundation, the 
conceptual reason to extend the protection has to go even further accepting that the 
international transportation industry has indeed moved into a new era. (i.e. the multilateral 
common enterprise).  
 
4.15 Mazda Motors: the vessel as a third party 
 
One case following Kirby that deserves particular mention in this context is the case of 
Mazda Motors.741  
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had to decide 
whether the defendant ocean vessel could invoke a forum selection clause in the bills of lading 
governing the contract. The action was brought by Mazda’s subrogated insurer against the 
vessel in rem. There was a Himalaya clause in the bill of lading. The clause stated: 
 
The Merchant undertakes that no claim or allegation shall be made against any 
servant, agent or Sub-Contractor of the Carrier which imposes or attempts to impose upon any 
of them, or upon any vessel owned or operated by any of them, any liability whatsoever in 
                                                        
738 Ibid. 
739 G Gurley, ‘The Ninth Circuit Breathes Life into a Vessel as a Himalaya Beneficiary: Mazda Motors of 
America, Inc. v MV Cougar Ace’ (2009–2010) 34 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 619. 
740 Ibid. 
741 Mazda Motors (n 6). In 2010 another case that was, to a certain extent, similar to Kirby and therefore worth 
mentioning was Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp. (2010) 561 U.S.  
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connection with the Goods, and, if any such claim or allegation should nevertheless be made, 
to indemnify the Carrier against all consequences thereof. Without prejudice to the foregoing, 
every such servant, agent and Sub-Contractor shall have the benefit of all provisions herein 
benefiting the Carrier as if such provisions were expressly for their benefit; and in entering 
into this contract, the Carrier, to the extent of those provisions, does so not only on its own 
behalf, but also as agent and trustee for such servants, agents and Sub-Contractors.742 
 
Mazda Motors is a particularly relevant case not only because the court has found that 
a Himalaya clause covered a defendant vessel in rem. But also because of the reasoning of the 
court. Until Mazda Motors, the action in rem was not so strictly related to the concept of third 
party protection. When the counsel from Mazda stressed the lack of authorities supporting the 
thesis that the vessel sued in rem was a Himalaya beneficiary, the court stated that this was due 
to the function of the recent case of Kirby. In fact, the court stated that “refusing to apply the 
Himalaya clause to the defendant vessel because the otherwise unambiguous clause does not 
specifically name the vessel would contravene Kirby’s rule that Himalaya clauses need not be 
drafted with ‘linguistic specificity’”.743 
In Mazda Motors, the court held that because the vessel helped performing the 
contract of carriage, it was a Himalaya clause beneficiary and was thus entitled to rely on the 
forum selection clause.744 The court held that, like a terminal operator fall under the Himalaya 
clause as a subcontractor (because his services are the same services of the carrier), the term 
subcontractor in Mazda Motor is broadly enough to include the vessel.745 
The court applied general principles of contract interpretation to decide whether or not 
the vessel was covered by the Himalaya clause, and defined the bill of lading as “a contract like 
any other”. The court also took a broad interpretation of the term ‘subcontractor’, extending 
coverage to: "anyone assisting the performance of the carriage”. Since the vessel assisted the 
performance of the carriage, the court found her to be a sub-contractor within the meaning of 
the Himalaya clause.746 
The cases of Mazda and Kirby were decided a several years apart, highlighting the 
new modern perspective that United States courts have towards a broader approach regarding 
                                                        
742 Ibid  
743 Ibid. 
744 Ibid. In Mazda Motors the Judges stated that in order to decide whether an entity benefits from a Himalaya 
clause “the proper test is to consider the nature of the service performed compared to the carrier’s responsibility 
under the carriage contract”.  
745 Ibid. 
746 Ibid; see also Gurley (n 739). 
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third party protection.  
 
Summary of Part B 
 
As Chuah stated: “The law, for better or worse, in many jurisdictions continues to 
maintain a distinction between carrier and terminal operator though the reality is that the 
dividing line between actual carrier and terminal operator has become blurred.”747  
The decision in Kirby – although referring to a train company and not a terminal 
operator – has given credence to the idea that the line between the ocean carrier and other 
parties is now blurred.748 
United States law has generally been more willing to allow protection to third parties 
outside the contract. Cases against it, however, (such as Herd) have been useful for future 
construction of clauses and relationship, showing that the industry, regardless of what the law 
says, will always attempt to find a way to circumvent it. Furthermore, the industry uses court 
decisions and suggestions to improve their protection clause – as happened in the United States 
after Herd – until Kirby that moved the concept of protection to a new era (i.e. the conceptual 
era). 
 
Chapter conclusion  
 
 The United States and England are the jurisdictions where third party protection has 
perhaps raised the most concerns. 
As a jurisdiction, England has had the most problems with protection clauses as a 
device used for commerce. By contrast, the system in the United States has always been more 
flexible on these matters. 
It seems reasonable to assert here that the issues and controversies emerging within 
these two countries regarding third party protection have contributed to the creation of the third 
party protection position as it is known today.  
                                                        
747 Chuah (n 29). 
748 Following cases on the same matter have partially followed the ratio in Kirby. Delphi-Delco Electronics Syst. v 
M/V Nedlloyd Europa, 324 F Supp 2d 403, 419–420, 2004 AMC 1217 (SDNY 2004); Green Fire & Marine 
Insurance, Co. v. M/V Hyundai Liberty 125 S.Ct. 494 (2004), Littlefield v. Acadia Ins. Co., 392. F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2004). American Home Assurance Co. v. TGL Container Lines, 347 F. Supp. 2d 749 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
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Furthermore, because these two jurisdictions are the most influential in terms of 
shipping law – and because they have had upheavals in accepting third party protection – they 
have been uniquely placed to experience first the dilemma of whether or not to allow 
protection of third parties. Despite sharing a similar primary rationale for third party protection 
(preventing the cargo owner to get around the contract suing someone else and the benefit to 
the carrier) each jurisdiction has treated the subject differently and the resultant status of third 
party protection in each system is different.  
 On the one hand, in England, since the decision in Elder Dempster, approaches based 
on concepts such as bailment, agency, vicarious liability, carrier’s commercial benefit, public 
policy have been proposed, but no systematic approach to apply these remedies has derived 
from these concepts. The concept of agency has been applied by English judges – from 
Scrutton to The Eurymedon – in order to give protection to third parties. The concept of 
bailment instead has been decided in two different ways in the cases of The Mahkutai and The 
Pioneer Container.  
 English authorities have been shown to adopt a different approach to their American 
counterparts when dealing with third party protection. Notably, the fact that a specific approach 
has not been developed does not necessarily mean that third party protection is allowed or not 
allowed. As stated by Lord Roskill: 
 
The importance of these various decisions is this: They show a fundamental change in 
the attitude of our courts and a welcome determination to give effect to the intention 
of the parties where that intention has been clearly expressed in their contract and not 
to allow technical rules like the doctrine of consideration to stand in the way of so 
doing.749 
 
The Privy Council in The Mahkutai described the English approach to exculpatory 
clauses as a “pendulum of judicial opinion”.750 Nevertheless it has been noted that there has 
been an increasing willingness from courts in the United Kingdom to extend this protection. 
Although in some cases this has been denied, in following cases the ratio decidendi for 
denying it has been used in order to allow this protection to an even greater extent.751 The 
Starsin represented a retrograde step, with the House of Lords restricting the expansion of 
Himalaya clause jurisprudence. The Lords not only held contractual clauses extending liability 
                                                        
749 Lord Roskill (n 1) 11. 
750 The Mahkutai (n 533) 658. See generally De la Mare (n 120). 
751 See, for example, how the four criteria of Lord Reid in Scrutton were used in The Eurymedon (n 338). 
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beyond those allowed by the Hague Rules to be null and void, but also that carriers could not 
claim immunity through Himalaya clauses, and that “non-carrier owners may not rely on the 
independent contractor language of a Himalaya clause to shield themselves from liability to 
shippers for damage to cargo”.752 
In addition, English law has implemented a statutory remedy for the first time, after 
many calls to do so: the Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. The Act does not solve all 
the problems and it seems that an implied contract by means of bailment, agency or protection 
clauses has still to be provided. However, the Act surely shows the willingness of the English 
legislature to change its approach to third party protection.  
Thus, a means of looking at the topic more broadly has been proposed, adopting the 
concept of bailment to extend protection outside the contract (shipowner under bareboat – 
vessel – other third parties). Moreover, new light has been shed on third party protection under 
the reliance perspective of contract theory. 
On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the United States has since the early days of 
the third party protection been more amenable to extending protection to third parties. The 
doctrines of privity and consideration simply did not hold the same weight as they did in 
England. Thus, allowing third party protection has been an easier task for judges in the United 
States.  
The approach of the United States to third party protection is, relatively speaking, new 
and advanced; to wit, the Kirby rule. Additionally, in this case there is a new justification for 
third party protection: the reality of shipping and global trade more broadly. The Kirby case 
showed that the carriage of goods by sea has extended inland, not only geographically but also 
conceptually.753 
This research argues that today’s supply chain must be viewed a whole. Even though 
the Kirby case still indicates that the contract has to have a maritime objective, this research 
furthers this concept by stating that the contract has to have the facade of the multilateral 
common enterprise when dealing with a maritime contract. The attached table clearly shows 
that, although there has been an improvement in acknowledging third party protection in the 
carriage of goods by sea, reference to the concept of multilateral common enterprise and 
supply chain is almost negligible. Reliance, bailment, vessel as a third party, conceptual 
approach, all support the concept of multimodal common enterprise.  
                                                        
752 See generally De la Mare (n 120). See also Tetley (n 26). 
753 This has been further enhanced by the Mazda Motors (n 6) case, “The parties agree that, by transporting the 
cargo, the vessel ratified the bills of lading otherwise Mazda would have no basis for holding the vessel liable in 
rem”. 
192 
 
The thesis shows that substantive law in shipping still plays a key role in third party 
protection, despite the increasing dependence on private remedies and international solutions. 
It also shows that, given the concept of the multilateral common enterprise, a more multilateral 
approach to contract law could be given to third party protection in the carriage of goods by 
sea. In this case, this work suggests supplementing it with the involuntary bailment applied in 
third party protection and the reliance perspective contract theory.  
Case law regarding third party protection contains a diversity of opinions regarding 
the subject. However the pragmatic approach of case law seems to function better at doing 
justice to the multilateral common enterprise.  
It is also believed that a commercial rather than geographic approach has more 
relevance in the United States than elsewhere; a country that is willing to improve its 
multimodal network cannot establish its law on a geographical mode. 
Having drawn this framework, this thesis highlights the need to stop giving justice 
only to the intention of the two parties of a contract (in the carriage of goods by sea) and move 
to focusing on the intention of all the parties that participate (even if only in a factual way) in 
the common enterprise.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Remarks and areas of recommended future research 
 
 
The law is developed by the application of old principles to new circumstances. 
Therein lies its genius.754 
  
                                                        
754 Midland Silicones (n 5). 
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5.1 Remarks 
 
The late Professor Tetley once asked whether a person without entering into a contract 
could benefit from its terms (in particular a third party from a bill of lading). He replied that, 
under common law, it is not possible unless the third party carries out one of the carriers’ 
duties. He then explained that carriers’ duties are to carry, discharge and deliver the goods. 
Only then can the third party benefit from the protection and only if cargo is damaged during 
the carrier’s stage of operation.755 
The fact that the carrier cannot carry out the whole job alone and that he needs a 
network of other parties at hand it is undebated. The issue raised is that in the past the meaning 
of carriage was clearly defined; now it is more ample and thus blurred. As Chuah explains, the 
distinction between sea and land is at present commercially artificial.756 In the context of a 
supply chain, the difference between what is and is not considered carriage no longer exists, 
rendering each party’s role very complicated. 
This research has focused on third party protection in the carriage of goods by sea, 
with an objective to rationalise it in the light of the changes as explained above. The 
methodology of the thesis has outlined the difference between bilateral risk allocation, upon 
which the law of third parties still relies, and the current factual context of the carriage of 
goods by sea that in turn places it in a bigger scenario, comprehensive of multilateral transport 
and supply chains. However, this depiction presents a theoretical problem that is, in fact, the 
foundation of the conceptual thread of the thesis. The boundaries of third party protection have 
therefore become inadequately defined. This thesis therefore argues that, for the better 
protection of third party’s legitimate interests, an approach should be put forward that takes 
into consideration the role of the mentioned factual enterprise. Third parties should be regarded 
as part of the multilateral common enterprise, and it should be ascertained whether or not they 
should still receive protection based on the bilateral relationship between carrier and shipper, a 
question currently decided by contractual autonomy of the party and geographically limited by 
the international community. 
Since third parties constitute a link between the carriage of goods by sea and the 
supply chain, any attempts to geographically draw a line would not be prudent. On the 
contrary, the protection should be understood and conceptualised regarding the involvement of 
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third parties and their role in the chain in order to create a sturdy foundation for their future 
protection. 
Therefore, this thesis focused on third parties being an integral part of the enterprise 
and only under this light it is possible to define any new protection. It proposes that third 
parties have become an integral part of the new carriage structure, therefore becoming ‘primary 
parties’, instead of ‘third parties’ existing outside of the enterprise and thus the contract as in 
accordance with the Contract (Right of Third Parties) 1999. This work claims that this answer 
should be conceptually grounded and not sterilised by a simple line. 
If third party protection continues to be analysed from a traditional perspective, the 
whole sector runs the risk of not finding a proper or satisfactory solution. If, however, it is 
conceptualised and analysed from the roots up, and rendered with the modern industry in mind, 
future legislations could be implemented.  
Currently, the shipping industry views the role of third parties in an inappropriate 
way; it considers them an appendix to the enterprise, rather than an essential part of it. This 
misinterpretation creates obstacles along the route to a solution. Consequently, it is necessary 
to change the perceived position of third parties from appendices to central parts of the 
enterprise. 
Throughout this thesis, the author explores the reasons on which the current 
understanding of third party protection has been developed. 
First, the economic factual context of the shipping industry has indisputably changed, 
moving the industry to a wider framework. Consequently, this structure should be taken into 
account when addressing third party issues. A lack uniform and consistent solutions to the 
problem brings further complexity. The result is an arbitrary protection, left to the will of the 
parties via contract clauses. Uniformity has to be a prime consideration, especially in a field 
such as maritime law, which transcends national barriers. As reported by Margetson, in the 
1874 case of Lottowanna, the United States Supreme Court held: 
 
The maritime law is part of the law of nations, one of the great beauties of which is its 
universality. Uniformity has been declared to be its essence. The worst maritime code 
would be one which should be dictated by the separate interest and influenced by the 
peculiar manner of only one people.757 
 
                                                        
757 N J Margetson, ‘The system of liability of articles III and IV of the Hague (Visby) Rules’ (PhD thesis, 
University of Amsterdam 2008). 
196 
 
With this in mind, this work has looked at the uniformity of third party protection in 
order to create a stable default approach for their legal defence. In a leading case regarding 
exclusion clauses,758 Lord Diplock provided a somewhat more practical and commercially 
orientated approach: 
 
In commercial contracts negotiated between business men capable of looking after 
their own interests and of deciding how risks inherent in the performance of various 
kinds of contract can be most economically borne (generally by insurance), it is, in my 
view, wrong to place a strained construction upon words in an exclusion clauses.759  
 
He then followed on to say: 
 
In commercial matters generally, when the parties are not of unequal bargaining 
power, and when risks are normally borne by insurance, not only is the case for 
judicial intervention undemonstrated, but there is everything to be said…for leaving 
the parties free to apportion the risks as they think fit and for respecting their 
decision.760 
 
This thesis takes this into consideration but argues that it is now time in carriage of 
goods by sea to expand the apportionment of risk to a multilateral common enterprise and not 
only to the two included parties.  
The freedom of contract that Sir Norman Hill mentions in the preparatory work of the 
Hague Rules should be extended to numerous categories: “Now surely the only possible basis 
of freedom in international commerce is freedom to the individual to make such contracts as he 
thinks will best help him in the conduct of his trade”.761  
More support for the aforementioned comes from an old proposal made by a 
delegation from the Netherlands:  
 
The difficulty is this. Here in paragraph 3 it is clearly shown that an amount up to the 
maximum provided for in the Convention may be claimed against the carrier, his 
                                                        
758 Photo Production ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd. (1980) AC 827, 851. 
759 Ibid. 851. 
760 Ibid. 843. 
761 Travaux Préparatoires (n 308) 32 (in 1921 at a Conference attended by representatives of the shipowning 
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servants, agents and independent contractors, in all against three or four classes of 
persons and it may be ten, fifteen or twenty persons. Now the only question I want to 
put before this Committee is would it not be equitable to have provisions allowing a 
man who under these provisions has to pay the full maximum to ask for contributions 
from the other people who are liable to the same maximum? Would it not be a good 
thing if either in this meeting or in the Maritime Committee something was said on 
that question?762 
 
Although this was presented last century, it gives an idea that the apportionment of 
risk was already becoming to be considered multilaterally. Today, this concept is a reality. 
Also the institute of unification of private law (UNIDROIT) in its body of principle in 2010, 
restating the importance of freedom of contract in today’s international trade,763 extended it 
(although with certain limitations and specifying that the main parties are conferring the right) 
to third parties.764 
So far the protection has been mainly regulated by autonomy of parties through 
contract clauses. In the case that elaborated the agency theory and upon which the Himalaya 
clause has now effect in the United Kingdom, Viscount Simonds commented: 
 
For to me heterodoxy, or, as some might say, heresy, is not the more attractive 
because it is dignified by the name of reform. Nor will I easily be led by an 
undiscerning zeal for some abstract kind of justice to ignore our first duty, which is to 
administer justice according to law, the law which is established for us by Act of 
                                                        
762 Travaux Preparatoires (n 308) 618. 
763 In fact at Art 1 (ibid.) they state, “Freedom of contract is a basic and paramount principle in the context of 
international trade. The possibility for parties freely to agree on the terms of individual transactions, are the 
cornerstone of an open, market orientated and competitive international economic order If the parties to a contract 
wish to extend benefit to a third party they can. The conferment of rights in the beneficiary includes the right to 
invoke a clause in the contract which excludes or limits the liability of the beneficiary”. 
764 Even more specifically at section 2 called ‘Third parties rights’ they state: 
“ARTICLE 5.2.1 (Contracts in favour of third parties) (1) The parties (the “promisor” and the “promisee”) may 
confer by express or implied agreement a right on a third party (the “beneficiary”). (2) The existence and content 
of the beneficiary’s right against the promisor are determined by the agreement of the parties and are subject to 
any conditions or other limitations under the agreement. 
ARTICLE 5.2.2 (Third party identifiable) The beneficiary must be identifiable with adequate certainty by the 
contract but need not be in existence at the time the contract is made.  
ARTICLE 5.2.3 (Exclusion and limitation clauses) The conferment of rights in the beneficiary includes the right 
to invoke a clause in the contract which excludes or limits the liability of the beneficiary.  
ARTICLE 5.2.4 (Defences) The promisor may assert against the beneficiary all defences which the promisor 
could assert against the promisee.” 
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Parliament or the binding authority of precedent. The law is developed by the 
application of old principles to new circumstances. Therein lies its genius.765  
 
As anticipated in the foundation, Tetley commented that the Himalaya clause is “an 
ingenious, short-term solution to a difficult problem, but is a solution which raises infinitely 
more problems than it solves”.766 
If this sentence were contextualised in 1961, when the Scrutton case was decided in 
England – and, in the same period, Herd in the United States – and when one could view the 
context around such case, it would be seen as a heterodoxy and heresy. 
On the other hand with today’s shipping context, it appears the only practical solution 
offered. It nonetheless remains unsatisfactory because it leaves third party protection to the 
unmethodical will of the parties to the contract.  
Moving from the micro level of autonomy of party to the macro level of the 
international legislation, UNCITRAL has made a substantial effort in order to find a more 
adequate solution and, as this thesis has argued, the approach of the Rotterdam Rules is not 
completely wrong. The Rotterdam Rules are bold and ambitious, as Thomas has defined 
them,767 but their shortcomings stem from the fact that they rely on the drawing of a 
geographical line. If the concern is whether or not they are appropriate for the current shipping 
industry, this thesis states they are a reasonable but unworkable compromise. The shipping 
industry is evolving very fast and the Rotterdam Rules arise from the failure of the multimodal 
conventions of the 1980s; something that gave birth to the Rules’ main rationale of ‘maritime 
plus’ compromise. 
In favour of the Rotterdam Rules, Berlingieri states that, in many jurisdictions, the 
freedom of contract for third parties is restricted, thus affording them a high level of protection 
from the Rules, which also ensure uniformity.768 However, overwhelming evidence shows that 
many third parties are against this convention for many reasons, such as but not limited to, the 
fact it confuses their area of operation.  
As previously mentioned, the Rotterdam Rules have rightly addressed part of the 
issue. The approach of viewing the carriage of goods by sea as being part of something broader 
is considered as being correct. Undeniably, it is hard for an international convention to deal 
                                                        
765 Midland Silicones (n 5). 
766 Tetley, (n 27). 
767 D. Rhidian Thomas “And then there were the Rotterdam Rules” Editorial of the Journal of International 
Maritime Law (JIML) (2008) 14 JIML 189-190;  
768 Berlingieri (n 20). 
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with such matter; realistically a convention that deals with supply chains is not easily 
obtainable. Therefore, the Rotterdam Rules had to draw a line somewhere, and in general terms 
it was probably wise (especially after the failure of the multimodal convention) to produce a 
door-to-door convention, with port-to-port geographic protection. In order to do this, however, 
the Rotterdam Rules wrongly decided to extend the Himalaya protection only to maritime-
related third parties. Furthermore, the swiftness with which the Rotterdam Rules were ratified 
suggests they may not be suitable as the legislative future of the carriage of goods by sea. 
Therefore, this work suggests that the international community should focus on a new regime 
with different approaches or to amend the existing one with a protocol, approaching third party 
protection in a less geographic but more commercial way. Resuming the not travelled by 
functional approach mentioned in the travaux preparatoire that this thesis considered in 
Chapter 3.  
Moving to the common law domestic tradition analysed, England and the United 
States present considerable issues. First, they hold a considerable sway over shipping law. 
Second, there are provisions in their respective domestic laws that make the potential 
protection hard to achieve. 
The shipping industry relies on these jurisdictions and third party protection has 
become an important issue to tackle. Law is not always in harmony with trade. Consequently, 
some authorities in these jurisdictions have been considering the evolution of the role of third 
parties and the need for the shipping industry to have its third party protection progressively 
expanded. This thesis demonstrates that a change in the economic factual context of the 
shipping industry has produced a legal need in the context of third party protection, suggesting 
that it is time to take this protection to a multilateral level. 
This thesis has emphasised that third party protection cannot be viewed only as a 
remedy but has to be understood from the origin of the issue in order to be adapted to better 
serve our times. Third party protection should be drawn from principles of need and, at this 
moment, the need is for a multilateral rather than bilateral approach to the protection of third 
parties. 
As previously mentioned, England and the United States are both countries with 
common law traditions.769 They have the flexibility of the common law jurisdiction, which 
perhaps explains why so many major commercial contracts – especially shipping contracts – 
are drawn up under these jurisdictions. English law in particular, however, has had problems in 
accepting the principle that someone outside a contract should benefit from it. This has not 
                                                        
769 With one major difference: in the US maritime law is a matter of federal law. 
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always been the case. Before 1900, in fact, the situation was different. It has changed as a 
result of the context and consequently the law has altered in step. Nevertheless, change is now 
required again.  
That England and the United States share the same legal system does not mean they 
approach third party protection in a similar way. After a century of problems, England has now 
put third party protection on a statutory footing with the Contract (Right of Third Parties) Act, 
1999.770  
In the case of the carriage of goods by sea, however, the Act alone might not be 
enough. Of further interest is how the courts have responded to the need for multilateral 
protection. English courts have established (through a series of decisions) a path for third party 
protection through the potential pitfalls of Himalaya clauses, Lord Reid’s agency theory, and 
so on. With the Kirby case, United States courts have probably fully recognised the 
commercial, practical approach that has to be given to this protection; an encouraging first step 
towards the future. The Kirby decision is substantially different from the geographic protection 
that the international community proposes with the Rotterdam Rules. However, as the annex 
table of this thesis shows, references to the multilateral protection resulting on the supply chain 
are very limited. 
 The industry’s legal needs derive from the context of the moment. Factual context 
influences the development of a protection such as third party protection due to the interest in 
that protection. The concept of third party protection is not an absolute and unchangeable 
concept and the protection changes according to the interest of the moment. This thesis argues 
that current third party protection does not meet the legal needs of the industry. This thesis also 
argues that legal protection is used as a way to better allocate risks between parties and 
nowadays the risk of the shipping industry has to be seen as a multilateral risk and can no 
longer be allocated between two parties.  
 For example, third party protection in the United States is influenced by the country’s 
multilateral factual context. The legal protection of categories such as third parties cannot be 
separated from the economic factual context. Doing so would be to underestimate the potential 
benefit that good protection could bring to the industry as a whole. Each jurisdiction is 
influenced in a different way by its own factual context, and tends to address third party 
protection and define the legal route to achieve it differently as well.  
                                                        
770 Merkin (n 30) reports that the majority of members of the European Union are favourable to the recognition of 
the rights of third party beneficiaries under contracts. 
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 Third party protection in the law of England and the United States has been 
challenged in this thesis on the ground that autonomy of parties is very much considered to be 
the easiest way to solve the problem; in certain circumstances the will of the contracted parties 
is normally achieved. However, in the context of third party protection in the carriage of goods 
by sea, it is dangerous to leave the regulation of the topic solely to the will of the contracted 
parties; by the very nature of the contract, they are the first and second party and the third party 
is thus not represented. On the contrary, sovereignty law should interfere and make sure that 
the problem is tackled in a correct manner.  
The protection of third parties has been encouraged by different aspects of law. 
Specifically: 
 
 From case law, this thesis shows that there is a line of authority starting with the Elder 
Dempster case771 to the notable The Himalaya case.772 Furthermore, from the Scrutton 
case773 where the problem of consideration was formally declared, to the The Eurymedon 
case,774 where how to deal with consideration for third parties was explained. The same has 
been done in the United States from Herd to Kirby and then implemented by subsequent 
cases. However, there is still high dependence on having clauses very precisely written on 
who can be protected and the intention of the parties has to be precisely expressed with 
nothing left to interpretation.775 
 Drawing one’s attention to statutory law776 (as explained in Chapter 4), a significant 
example is the Contract (Right of Third Parties) Act, 1999, changing the attitude towards 
third party protection and presenting another way around the concept of privity and 
consideration. It is arguable that the Act completely removed the concept of Privity and 
Consideration but its significance is well expressed by Vlasto and Clark in their article 
                                                        
771 Elder, Dempster (n 3). 
772 The Himalaya (n 4). 
773 In Midland Silicones (n 5) Lord Reid raised the problem of consideration in order to permit protection of third 
parties. 
774 The answer was supplied in The Eurymedon (n 338). The Privy Council held that the consideration was the 
discharging of the goods by the stevedore for the benefit of the shipper. 
775 Even the Kirby (n 7) case amongst them. 
776 It might be worth restating that Civil Law has always had less problems with third party protection. Reference 
has to be made to, amongst others, Ralph De Wit, Multimodal Transport Carrier Liability and Documentation, 
1995, Lloyds of London Press Ltd 1995, MacMillan (n 506); Tetley (n 26) and William Tetley, “The Himalaya 
clause, "stipulation pour autrui" Non-Responsibility Clauses and Gross Negligence under the Civil Code” (1979) 
20 Le Cahiers de Droit 3, 449–483.  
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‘The Effect of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 on Voyage and Time 
Charter Parties’.777 
 
Theoretically, this thesis also suggests that the reliance perspective could supplement 
third party protection in the carriage of goods by sea. The reliance perspective could be an 
alternative method to deal with the problem, instead of the classical perspective that sees the 
parties as a foundation of a legal relationship. The reliance perspective could be used as a way 
to accept that whoever is in need and therefore relies on that specific protection can benefit 
from it even if the contract does not include them. 
This thesis has proved following premises: 
 
1) The factual context of the shipping industry has changed. 
2) As a result, the third party is part of the enterprise yet not outside the enterprise. 
3) The law is still based on an outdated system. 
 
In a final analysis, it is believed that third party protection can indeed be approached 
from a multilateral perspective. This, of course, requires a different framework.778 This thesis 
demonstrates that, at the current state, from a purely contractual perspective, third parties 
receive a random level of protection linked to the willingness of the two main parties. 
Contractually, Himalaya clauses and similar clauses could provide protection for a broader 
category of third parties. When the parties to a contract wish to extend their contractual 
protection to a non-contractual claim brought against a third party by the owner of goods, the 
mechanism provided by a Himalaya clause gives adequate effect to the commercial expectation 
of the parties. This thesis contends that international conventions should follow a commercial 
rather than geographic approach. Among these conventions and their drafters, there has been a 
growing interest in protecting third party interests, from the first attempt in the Harter Act that 
merely considers anyone outside the relationship, to the Rotterdam Rules that (arguably) 
                                                        
777 Vlasto and Clark (n 631). “It is rare that a single piece of legislation removes a principle of English law 
hitherto considered an essential foundation. The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999’ (Act) did just that 
by removing the English law principle of privity of contract which had been established law since the early 
nineteenth century, albeit a concept which had attracted criticism from the judiciary on a number of occasions”.  
778 Alternatively, following the example of other industries that already work as a network, a multilateral approach 
could be adopted where the party with the greatest interest at stake shoulders the risk for its chain of contractors, 
channelling full liabilities towards itself. Or with a multilateral insurance framework. The thesis will deal with 
both on the future recommended research section.  
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dedicate an extensive part of the convention to third parties.779 The relevant international 
community should focus on a new approach that takes into account the above or amending the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
Regarding domestic law, substantive law still plays an important role in third party 
protection, despite the increasing dependence on private remedies and international solutions. 
The pragmatism of case law in common law countries could surely match the reality of the 
multilateral common enterprise. 
Returning to the first ‘contemporary’ decision regarding the topic – that of Elder 
Dempster – Hallebeek and Dundorp,780 argue that the decision to allow a shipowner to be 
protected by a bill of lading to which he was not part reflected the general belief in the 
commercial world at the time; it was right to protect him for commercial reasons. Digging a 
little deeper, Hallebeek and Dundorp explain that the reasoning was more likely to have been 
dictated by the commercial absurdity of the contrary than by any doctrinal nicety.  
Today, almost 100 years later, the position – at least in terms of a theoretical answer –
has not yet been given. Many decisions regarding the field have been influenced more by 
practical reasons (and still from the absurdity of the contrary) than by a desire for clarification. 
Throughout this thesis, it has been proved (given the multilateral argument) that a 
third party should now be entitled to protection according to their role, not their commercial 
relationship with the main parties.  
It seems inarguable that, in order to achieve any changes, parties (carriers, shippers, 
third parties, and insurers) must acknowledge and allocate their risks accordingly. This thesis 
provides a theoretical starting point, from which different options are available to the shipping 
community and international legislators. It does not seek to change the whole industry, 
particularly given the obstacles that any implementation is likely to face: 
 
Concluding these remarks on liability for damage and allocation of risks in maritime 
shipping one must be aware of difficulties which may stand in way of a reform of 
maritime law of damages. In view of the acceleration of change, to which we are 
generally ill-adapted, we face the crisis of consciousness, which is a very serious 
crisis of farreaching consequences. It is manifested by a seemingly irrational 
                                                        
779 On the topic, amongst the others see Reynolds, (n 314). The latest attempt, the Rotterdam Rules are far from 
being ratified and have been criticised extensively. See generally Stefano Zunarelli, ‘Elementi Di Novita’ E Di 
Continuita’ Della Regolamentazione Della Responsabilita’ Del Vettore Marittimo Di Cose Nell’attivita’ Del 
Gruppo Di Lavoro Dell’ UNCITRAL’ (UNCITRAL 2008) <http://www.aidim.org/pdf/rel_zunarelli.pdf> 
Accessed 7 September 2013; Chuah (n 29); Corcione (n 70). 
780 Hallebeek and Dondorp (n 91). 
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resistance to change. In international shipping relationships the resistance to change 
has traditionally been strong; in this sphere of intertwined conflicting interests 
considerable efforts are needed to disturb the established balance of interests.781 
 
The shipping industry has a seemingly irrational resistance to change but the 
established ‘balance of interests’ should be revised and adapted to the current climate.  
In a final consideration, Maitland argues that legal history should enable every age to 
be the master of its own law and not the slave of its past.782 The shipping industry should 
accordingly focus on an alternative, innovative solution, rather than doggedly persevering with 
existing measures. 
 
5.2 Areas of recommended future research: solutions or new issues? 
 
Over two decades ago, the historian Maury Klein identified a paradox of academic 
research that, while aimed at his fellow historians, is pertinent to scholars of all stripes: “… the 
more we do, the more remains to be done. The more we learn about a subject, the less we really 
know about it. For every question answered a dozen more spring up”.783 This has particular 
relevance for PhD researches where boundaries are not just important; they are essential.  
It is appropriate, then, that this thesis should finish with a discussion of its 
delimitations. From the outset, the aim was not to offer a watertight solution to a problem, even 
though – after careful research – this is a tempting proposition. Instead it sought to scrutinise 
the problem in question, and cast it in a new light under which solutions should be investigated 
in the future.  
There is a fine line between the necessary boundaries of this research and the tempting 
ground of proposed solutions. In an effort to tread this line, a framework of possible solutions, 
informed by five years’ worth of research, are outlined below. The hope is that this framework 
will provide a springboard or, at least, a starting point for others who may choose to shoulder 
the burden of doing the research necessary to arrive at an appropriate solution. 
 
5.2.1 Risk management 
                                                        
781 Lopuski (n 99). 
782 Quoted in K O Shatwell, ‘The Doctrine of Consideration in the Modern Law’ (1953–1955) 1 Sydney Law 
Review 289. 
783 Maury Klein, Unfinished Business: The Railroad in American Life, (1st edn, University Press of New England 
1994) 
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As explained in Chapter 2, there are two ways of managing risks: controlling it, and 
transferring it. These two concepts are central to the foundation of the solutions and the 
framework for future researches.  
 
5.2.1.1 Control: channelling of liability 
 
This thesis has essentially defined the concept of multilateral common enterprise as a 
network – although not a formal one – with a common goal. Furthermore, it is argued that, 
when issues of protection arise amongst participants in this multilateral common enterprise, 
perspectives should be adjusted to encompass and give consideration to networked aspects of 
the enterprise, rather than focusing solely on single, individual relationships. 
Adams and Brownsword define a network of contracts as a set of contracts where 
there is a principal contract giving the set an overall objective, and secondary contracts that 
contribute – directly or indirectly – to the attainment of the overall objective. They go on to 
explain that the network of contractors expands until a sufficiency of contractors are obligated, 
whether to the parties to the principal contract or to other contractors within the set, in order to 
attain the overall objective.784 
Following such assertions, it seems reasonable to consider how this theoretical 
definition operates in practice. There are many such fields where this concept is in play, and 
future research could, therefore, be usefully undertaken to evaluate the definition’s accuracy, 
efficacy, and potential impact on the carriage of goods by sea. This thesis selected the offshore 
oil and gas industry. 
The offshore oil and gas market is closely aligned with shipping, and can almost be 
considered two parts of the same industry; offshore being the upstream, shipping being the 
downstream. For instance, they share similar features as the role of the shipowner, the 
insurance (P&I Clubs) and the Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO).  
In the offshore oil and gas industry, the legal protection schemes in place operate 
under a rationale that assumes the party in the best position should bear the risk. 
Future research could use the offshore system as a lens through which to consider the 
future of third party protection, and as a model for implementing third party protection in the 
carriage of goods by sea. While doing this, consideration should be given to the channeling 
                                                        
784 John Adams and Roger Brownsword, ‘Privity and the concept of a network contract’ (1990) 10 Legal Stud. 12. 
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protection already referred to in this thesis, and its efficiency in the new carriage of goods by 
sea scenario should be tested.785 
Offshore protection uses a scheme called ‘knock-for-knock’ that has previously been 
defined as a “crude and workable” structure.786 The Pooling Agreement of P&I Clubs explains 
and endorses knock-for-knock with a provision that stipulates: 
 
Each party to a contract shall be similarly responsible for loss of or damage to, 
and/or death of or injury to any of its own property or personnel and/or the property 
or personnel of its contractors and/or of its and their sub-contractors and/or of other 
third parties; and that (ii) such responsibility shall be without recourse to the other 
party, and arise notwithstanding any fault or neglect of any party; and that (iii) each 
party shall, in respect of those losses, damages or other liabilities for which It has 
assumed responsibility, correspondingly indemnify the other against any liability that 
that party shall incur in relation thereto.787 
 
Slater, Ballew and Sartain aptly describe the offshore industry as a highly risky and 
complex field involving multiple parties, each with their own risk profile and capacity for 
assumption of risks (bargaining power, market power, financial possibility, and so on).788 
The fine detail present in the drafting and managing of contracts between its parties 
bears witness to the complexity of the sector.789 Typically, offshore projects rely on complex 
networks of contracts to govern the relationship between the many parties involved.790 
The same complexity led to the industry’s use of the knock-for-knock; an almost 
unique791system of allocating liabilities.792 
                                                        
785 For example as reported in chapter 3, channeling of liability was proposed by ICS, IG of P&I during the 
Rotterdam Rules Travaux Preparatoire. In any case, it must be said that there are other systems working as such 
for example construction system/construction Law. Most recently the Knock-for-Knock has been applied also to 
charters servicing wind farms (WINDTIME).  
786 Chidi Egbochue, ‘Reviewing ‘knock for knock’ indemnities following the Macondo Well blowout’ (2013) 7 
Construction Law International 4. 
787 Pooling Agreement at page 4. The pooling agreement has the only definition of K4K according to Fabien 
Lerede, (Chapter 9: Knock-For-Knock: The P&I Perspective) in Baris Soyer and Andrew Tettenborn, Offshore 
Contracts and Liabilities (Informa Law from Routledge 2014). 
788 Robert Slater, J. Wayne Ballew, Y Charles W. Sartain, ‘Our Fault, My Fault, Their Fault … Does It Even 
Matter? Indemnification And Exculpatory Agreements In The Oil Patch’ (2013) AAPL Southwest Land Institute 
– Dallas April 30, 2013. 
789 Standard P&I Club Bulletin, November 2008. 
790 operators, joint ventures, contractors, sub-contractors, and service providers. Ibid. 
791 Save for other fields such as construction law, even though they are not exactly the same. Under the traditional 
construction contracting system, the person who carries out this work is the main contractor. The contractor sub-
contracts or sub-lets parts of his work to one or more sub-contractors. Uff reports that most of the larger 
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In the House of Lords, Lord Bingham has given his approval to the basis of the knock-
for-knock. Apart from cases where negligence or breach of statutory duty of the party seeking 
indemnity is the sole cause of death or injury, he concurs that no limits should exist to the rule 
that, regardless of fault, each primary party793 assumes responsibility for compensating its own 
employees.794 
The notion of the ‘group’ warrants special attention. For the purpose of liability 
allocation, both primary party to the knock-for-knock agreement and all theirs contractors and 
sub-contractors represent a specific group. The loss, damage or injury suffered by a primary 
party – or by any member of that primary party’s group – is to be shouldered by that primary 
party alone. This still holds even if the negligence of the other primary party or any member of 
that party’s group has caused the loss, damage or injury.795 
Offshore projects will tend to involve one or more main contracts, such as the contract 
between an oil-rig operator and a contractor (e.g., the shipowner of a platform supply vessel). 
Their group will identify all the other parties that are involved in that project but do not have a 
contractual relationship with the other primary party.796 In the aforementioned example, the 
contract regulating the relationship between the owner of the supply vessel and the oil-rig 
operator is a BIMCO Supply Time contract. This contractual template defines an owner’s 
group as: 
 
Owners, their contractors and sub-contractors, and employees of any of the foregoing 
and charterers group as charterers, their contractors, sub-contractors, co-ventures 
and customers (having a contractual relationship with the Charterers, always with 
respect to the job or project on which the Vessel is employed) and employees of the 
foregoing.797 
 
As explained by Taylor, one effect of adopting the group approach is that, in practice, 
there may be relatively few true ‘third parties’ for the purpose of indemnity between the 
                                                                                                                                                                               
contracting companies now see their role as being managers of the sub-contractors who will perform the physical 
work. (See generally Construction Law, John Uff, Eleventh Edition, 138). 
792 Tim Taylor, ‘Offshore Energy Construction Insurance: Allocation of Risk Issues’ (2013) 87 Tul. L. Rev1165. 
793 For example, the operator of an oil rig and the contractors. 
794 In Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd [2002] UKHL 4. As also detailed by Soyer and 
Tettenborn, (n 787). 
795 Soyer and Tettenborn Ibid. 
796 Specifically, this group might include the contractor’s employees, affiliates, agents, and sub-contractors. In the 
case of the company, its group would normally include the company’s employees, affiliates, co-venturers, and 
other contractors engaged by the company to provide related services. 
797 BIMCO SUPPLYTIME 2005 Time charter for Offshore Service Vessels clause 14, Liabilities and Indemnities. 
In many cases, oil-rig operators will propose their own contract with its own terms. 
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operator and the contractor.798 For example, according to a similar agreement drawn up by BP: 
“A third party shall mean any person not included in the charterers group or owners group”.799 
Usually, the scope of the group definition is very broad and, consequently, it is 
unlikely that a party will be excluded. As a result, the instances in which it is necessary to 
determine actual fault – in the sense of negligence or breach of contract – are very rare.800  
Knock-for-knock agreements in some ways translate the concept of multilateral 
common enterprise into the concept of a group. The primary difference is that while the 
concept of ‘group’ is formally accepted by the industry, the notion of multilateral common 
enterprise has been put forward by this research. 
It has been aptly reported that contracting under terms of the knock-for-knock 
agreement is, in the offshore market, vital for securing insurance coverage from the P&I 
Clubs.801 
An obvious advantage of this is the ability to channel claims to one sole party. This 
party will be obliged, therefore, to ensure adequate insurance is taken out to protect the 
interests of the various parties to the knock-for-knock agreement. The advantages of such a 
scheme are varied and much debated. Amongst others, such a scheme reduces the cost of 
inquiry and litigation, strips away layers of insurance, minimizes disruption of the primary 
activity, facilitates settlements, and encourages co-operation in the establishment of good and 
safe work practices.802 
That entities such as BIMCO and insurance P&I clubs play common roles in both 
fields (i.e. shipping and offshore) offers an encouraging starting point for the implementation 
of such a scheme in the sphere of the carriage of goods by sea. 
Nonetheless, in some respects the two businesses differ substantially in nature, and 
this brings its own ramifications. In the shipping sector, the cargo is sold continuously and the 
parties involved enter and exit the business continuously. Offshore projects are, on the other 
hand, much more stable and the relevant knock-for-knock group is fairly easy to identify. 
Furthermore, it is clear in most offshore agreements that the oil-rig operator is the party 
assuming the most risk. This is in stark contrast with agreements covering the carriage of 
goods by sea, in which the risk and commercial balance is much more evenly distributed, 
making it harder to establish which party would bear the risk in a knock-for-knock agreement. 
                                                        
798 Taylor (n 792). 
799 Clause 48.12 definition BP charterparty BPSUPPLYTIME3 TIME CHARTERPARTY, 
800 Taylor (n 792) 
801 Soyer and Tettenborn (n 787). 
802 Ibid. 
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Future research could evaluate the knock-for-knock model in the context of 
multilateral common enterprise, and examine to what extent such a model – particularly the 
‘group’ concept – could be used in the implementation of third party protection.  
 
5.2.1.2 Transfer: multilateral marine insurance 
 
Risk transfer is the other side of the risk management coin. Within a multilateral 
common enterprise, the allocation of risk can be complicated. There are many different aspects 
to consider, including which party should insure the risk and the idea that the risk to insure 
must surely extend beyond maritime boundaries. As reported by Lemon it is not only marine-
related parties such as shipowners, ship operators, charterers, terminal operators, wharfingers, 
and stevedores that require insurance to protect them against such risks; parties involved at any 
point in the cargo chain need insurance, regardless of their position or sphere of operation.803  
Support for multilateral insurance has also been given by the International Union of 
Marine Insurance (IUMI).804 IUMI that represents insurers of both carriers and cargo interests, 
supports the creation of a modern uniform, treaty for the carriage of goods by sea that would be 
fair, balanced and reasonable for all parties involved.805  
At the moment, the general scheme that could give coverage to a multilateral common 
enterprise offers the following framework: 
 
 P&I cover: 
 
P&I clubs currently insure shipowners beyond their liability under international 
conventions. The P&I clubs’ standard terms, however, do not always cover the specialized 
needs of shipowners engaged in multimodal transportation. Liability for cargo ought to be 
limited to the period during which the carrier has responsibility for the cargo. In any contract 
governed by the Hague and Hague-Visby rules, for instance, it should be limited to tackle-to-
                                                        
803 Robert T Lemon II, ‘Allocation of Marine Risks: An Overview of the Marine Insurance Package’ (2006–2007) 
81 Tulane Law Review 1467.  
804 IUMI was founded in 1874 and represents 53 national marine insurance associations from markets all over the 
world. IUMI members cover 80 per cent of the world premium in marine insurance, totaling approximately USD 
10.5 billion (2001). 
805 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Preparation of a draft instrument on the carriage of 
goods’ (n 489). 
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tackle.806 However, extending on a door to door basis the operation of a containership, the 
clubs cover shipowners liabilities for cargo arising in connection with the operation of the ship. 
If, on the other hand, the claims are brought directly by the third party in tort, there is no cover 
for them.807 
 
 Through Transport Insurances: 
 
What the P&I clubs do not cover, has traditionally been supplemented by insurers 
such as the TT Club. ‘TT’ stands for ‘through transport’, reflecting the door-to-door nature of 
this approach. They are a club in the sense of mutuality (like the P&I clubs), and the TT Club 
aims and claims to be an insurer for all the operators involved in a specific supply chain 
process.808 The TT club insures risks for NVOCCs, freight forwarders, port terminals, and so 
on. 
The TT Club was created to fill the gap left by the P&I clubs when multimodalism 
became prevalent throughout the industry, i.e., when the P&I clubs wanted to remain ‘water-
borne’ insurers. TT insurance covers five main areas: 
 
1) Container risks for ship operators and others. 
2) Transport and logistics operator liabilities. 
3) Cargo handling facility liabilities and assets. 
4) Port authority liabilities and assets. 
5) Forwarders’ cargo all risks. 
 
The aim of P&I and TT clubs is to operate in concert to minimise the likelihood of 
gaps between covers, or overlapping covers.809 
                                                        
806 Amongst others: Gold, E., Gard Handbook on P&I Insurance (5th ed., Arendal: Gard Assuranceforeningen, 
2002); Hazelwood, Steven J., P&I Clubs: Law and Practice (3rd ed, London: Lloyd’s of London Press, 2000); The 
London P&I Club 2016-2017 Rules  
<https://www.londonpandi.com/_common/updateable/downloads/documents/5rules2016.pdf> Accessed 20 
February 2016; Understanding P&I Club, A Presentation by Gillian Musgrave – Regional Claims Director, 
Standard Asia & David Heaselden – Loss Prevention Director, Shipowners’ Mutual. 
 <http://www.gia.org.sg/pdfs/Industry/Marine/MKSS/SS18_Presentation.pdf> Accessed 14 March 2015. 
807 Ibid. 
808 Anon., ‘Supply Chain Claims – The Same Old Story’ (TT Club, 16 September 2015) <http://www.ttclub.com 
/news-events/articles/article/supply-chain-claims-the-same-old-story-133454/> Accessed 9 January 2016. 
809 Anon., ‘Ship Operator Cover Liability, equipment and property insurance for ship operators’ (TT Club Bulletin, 
2015) <http://www.ttclub.com/fileadmin/uploads/tt-club/Publications___Resources/New_Document_Store_2015/ 
Ship_Operator_Cover.pdf> Accessed 11 February 2015. 
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Future research should take this framework as a foundation but also consider its 
problems. First, the fact that a club should ensure, so far as possible, that the insured owner 
preserves his rights of recourse against others involved in the performance of the contract of 
carriage. This will be of particular importance in the case of a combined transport bill of 
lading, where the insured owner issuing the bill of lading must preserve his rights of recourse 
against his sub-carriers, even if the sub-carrier is a subsidiary or associated company of the 
insured owner. This, however, runs counter to the concept of multilateral common enterprise. 
Other problems include: that this extension is not poolable and therefore the insurance 
costs are increased; that a similar coverage is not available for breaking bulk cargo; that in this 
case parties are not protected from tort claims; and that, although the TT Club claims to cover 
the whole supply chain, it is not an easily identifiable branch and, in reality, it seems they are 
more focused on a classic multimodal/door-to-door journey. 
The key issue is that, if a network of parties – such as the multilateral common 
enterprise – is not formally recognised as such, and companies still work on their own risks, 
each party will be accountable for its own insurance and therefore the general cost and level of 
insurance would certainly increase. 
Thus, motivation and scope exist to research explore the concept of multilateral 
insurance. Consider Lemon’s suggestion for insurance that could integrate commercial general 
liability, marine P&I policy, stevedores, terminal operators’ liability and contractual liability. 
This would be insurance covering all categories of participant (including those performing both 
sea and land-based activities), focusing mainly on the commercial rather than geographical 
aspect of the job, and could be taken out by a single party.810 
A maritime insurance that takes into consideration not only different phases of the 
carriage but also ancillary services and the network of parties as a whole is, at the time of 
writing, currently unexplored. In this respect, the outcome of the Feseay case, which reviewed 
the concept of insurable interest, might be of use.811 In it, the Court of Appeal stressed two 
things relevant for this study. First, in modern insurance, particular attention must be paid to 
commercial relations. Second that the concept of insurable interest probably ought to be 
abolished or at least reviewed.812 The idea of an insurable interest has changed dramatically 
                                                        
810 Robert T Lemon II (n 803). 
811 Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada and another; Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association 
(Bermuda) Ltd v Feasey (2003) EWCA Civ 885. 
812 David Lord, ‘Insurable Interest: Is There a Rule?’ (3 Stone Buildings, 12 October 2005) 159 
<http://clients.squareeye.net/uploads/3sb/events/121005_lord.pdf > Accessed 5 May 2013. 
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over the years – in line with a changing market – and the Court of Appeal has considerably 
reconsidered the definition.813 
Once again, the offshore sector – particularly the construction phases814  – could 
provide valuable input here. Oil and gas companies (known as principals) often maintain in 
contractual negotiations that any Contractors’ All Risks (CAR) cover provided will adequately 
protect the majority of contractors’ and sub-contractors’ insurable risks, based on the main 
policy outlined in WELCAR 2001. However as many offshore contractors and service 
providers will have experienced, the coverage provided by the principal is often not able or 
adequate to protect these risks to the extent desired by the contractor.815  
In a general coverage (such as that provided by WELCAR 2001), the principal assured 
is defined as: 
 
1) Company and/or joint venturers as they may now or subsequently exist. 
2) Parent and/or subsidiary and/or affiliated and/or associated and/or inter-related 
companies of the above as they are now or may hereafter be constituted and their 
directors, officers and employees, while acting in their capacities as such. 
 
While other assureds are defined as: 
 
Project managers and any other company, firm, person or party (including 
contractors and/or sub-contractors and/or manufacturers and/or suppliers) with 
whom the Assured(s) named in i, ii, iii and iv have entered into written contract(s) 
directly in connection with the Project.816 
 
Taking these problems into consideration, future research could evaluate the gaps in 
the framework covering all of the transportation means, as well as all the accompanying 
                                                        
813 Robert Merkin, Reforming Insurance Law: Is there a Case for Reverse Transportation? A Report for the 
English and Scottish Law Commissions on the Australian Experience of Insurance Law Reform (London, UK, 
Edinburgh, Scotland, Law Commission/Scottish Law Commission 2006). 
814 Standard Bulletin, February 2013, reports that: From the club’s perspective, offshore construction operations 
typically fall into three categories: A. Fixed platform construction and associated sub-sea field development 
(including float-over, lift-on, pipe- or cable-lay operations, sub-sea installation and windfarm construction). B. 
FPSO navigation from yard to field (whether under own steam, wet tow or dry tow), including hook-up, 
installation and pre-production testing up to point of delivery to the ultimate client. C. Maintenance or servicing of 
oil field infrastructure (including maintenance, sub-sea and ROV operations). 
815 Gayner Warner, ‘Suitability of CAR cover for offshore contractors’ (Marine and Offshore Contractors Group, 
October 2012) <http://standard-club.com/media/1557668/suitability-of-car-cover-for-offshore-contractors.pdf> 
Accessed 2 March 2016. 
816 WELCAR 2001 OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION PROJECT POLICY. 
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activities with a single insurance policy. Ultimately, this could lead to fruitful suggestions for a 
new insurance model for the multimodal common enterprise.  
 
5.2.2 Civil law perspective  
 
An analysis of specific civil law countries has been intentionally left outside the 
thesis; civil law traditions do not have specific issues with recognising that a third party can be 
protected by a contract.817 Nevertheless, the provisions of civil law countries in favour of third 
parties have been part of the research. The author puts them forward as an example for 
implementation of the protection of third parties in the carriage of goods by sea.818 In particular 
this section advances the provisions of certain specific countries which disclose the theoretical 
pillars of this thesis. Specifically: the concept that since the carriage of goods by sea has 
become a multilateral common enterprise, protection of third parties should follow this 
structure; the idea of channeling the claims to only one party; and finally the idea of using a 
material factor borrowed from the factual context to allow third party protection. 
As Tetley states, not only common jurisdictions but also civil one held that only the 
parties to a contract are to be affected by it.819 The same Tetley however details their 
exceptions.820 
Some legal systems grant servants and independent contractors of the carrier 
immunity from liability towards third parties – including cargo interests – except in case of 
willful misconduct.821 
 Under Belgian law, servants and ‘performance agents’ of the carrier (e.g., stevedores) 
benefit from such immunity from liability.822 As De With says, Belgian law recognises that 
carriage by sea involves complex contract networks and the Belgian provision avoids, the 
difficulties with identity of carrier clauses, which attempt to single out one particular party in 
                                                        
817 Canada represents an interesting jurisdiction in this respect. In Canada, under Common Law there is a problem 
of linking a limitation clause to someone who is not part of the contract. Conversely, under the Civil Law tradition 
of the state of Quebec, contracts in favor of a third party, and Himalaya clauses are accepted.  
818 One must acknowledge that the essence of this research is not comparative law. 
819 Tetley (n 27) mentions the following article for each jurisdiction: Art 1440 cc (Québec 1994); Art 1165 cc 
(France); Art. 1165 cc (Belgium); Arts 1983 and 1985 cc (Louisiana); Art 1372 cc (Italy) and Art 1257 cc (Spain).  
820 Arts 1444–1452 cc (Québec 1994); Arts 1119–1122 cc (France); Arts 1119–1122 cc (Belgium); Arts 1985 and 
1978–1982 cc (Louisiana); Art 1411–1413 cc (Italy); Art 1257 cc (Spain) and Art 328 BGB (Germany). 
821 Massimo Piras, La clausola Himalaya, trattato breve di diritto marittimo (capitol xiii) Giuffrè 2008 281–292 
Under Italian law, for instance, there is no a specific rule for this kind of contract apart from the general rule that 
states willful misconduct is not allowed. For clauses such as the Himalaya clause, these have to be approved by 
the shipper in writing according to what is called “clausole vessatorie”, Articles 1341 and 1342 c.c. 
822 Cécile Legros, ‘Relations Between the Rotterdam Rules and the Convention on the Carriage of Goods by 
Road’ (2011–2012) 36 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 725. As Vasto and Clark report (n 631) in Belgium 
stevedores have a full immunity under National Law. 
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the network as carrier against whom an action should be brought, to the exclusion of all 
others.823 A rule to the effect that all persons for whom the carrier is vicariously liable can 
invoke the same protection allowed to the carrier has been adopted by Scandinavian 
countries.824 In French law, contracts only have effect between the parties to them. Parties may, 
however, expressly or impliedly confer rights in contracts for the benefit of a third party in 
such a way that the third party may enforce those rights by suing the promisor under the 
contract.825 
The most relevant positions are those of Germany and the Netherlands. Under German 
law, the protection for third parties derives from economic and risk efficiency, applying what is 
called the ‘material factor’. Germany recognises contracts for the benefit of third parties and 
applies more liberal rules of contract construction. Due to these differences in domestic law, 
the German courts have inferred enforceable Himalaya clauses even when the bills of lading 
did not contain them. 
Under German statutory law, therefore, the logic of a protection clause is not at issue. 
Stevedores can rely on a protection clause that extends the carrier’s legal protection to third 
parties. Contracts for the benefit of a third party are expressly permitted by the German Civil 
Code. Carrier and shipper can extend to stevedores the benefits of the contract. Even when 
there is no protection clause, German law also allows for a third party to claim the benefit of 
the carrier’s limitations on liability.  
The rationale behind third party protection under German case law, according to 
Sturley, includes: 
 
1) The shipper’s knowledge that people such as the master would perform the contract. 
2) The fact that the shipper’s interest, is the same no matter who performed the contract.  
3) The purpose of the exclusionary clause is to establish the carrier’s risk, which was a 
factor in setting the freight rate. A risk of higher liability would result in a higher 
freight rate. Since the purpose of the clause rather than its wording is the material 
factor, the court would not allow the shipper to evade the exclusion after paying the 
lower rate.826 
                                                        
823 De Wit (n 776) 
824 Ibid.  
825 Vlasto and Clark (n 631). This is made possible by operation of the concept of stipulation pour autrui 
(stipulation for another). See generally Art 1444 cc (Québec 1994); Art 1121 cc (France); Art 1121 cc (Belgium); 
Art 1978 cc (Louisiana); Art 1411 cc (Italy); Art 1257 cc (Spain); Art 328 BGB (Germany); Art 6:253–256 cc 
(Netherlands 1991).  
826 Sturley (n 670). 
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Furthermore, Sturley reports, more recent decisions have extended the principle 
beyond the carrier’s employees. In a case of forty years ago in which the shipper tried to sue a 
carrier contractor, the Court allowed the protection stating that it was implicit in the carrier 
interests in limiting its liability and implicit in the fact that carrier offered lower rates to the 
shipper in return.827 
Hallebeek and Dondorp point out that, under German law, future persons can be 
named as beneficiaries of a third party benefit contract. Generically definitions can also be 
constructed for members of a class of persons; that the third party is ascertainable, for example, 
is sufficient. Third party rights come into existence as and when the third party is determined. 
The Netherlands adopt a similar approach. Third parties do not have to be designated 
specifically, nor is it necessary that they exist at the time of contracting. Dutch law goes a step 
further – following the contract’s acceptance – as part of the contract. In situations with only 
one third party, a three-party contract comes into existence. This contract is governed by the 
rules of multiparty contracts.828  
According to De Wit, under Dutch law a sub-contractor can rely on the terms and 
conditions of his contract with his principal in order to defend himself against a claimant with 
whom he had no contract and who had sued him in tort. In other words, a protection provision 
in the subcontractor defendant’s contract provides the defence against an action in tort.829 A 
claimant who has accepted that his contracting party may rely on certain protection clauses 
must be prepared to let these clauses operate to the benefit of other parties to the contract 
network. 
Following this concept, in any contract network for the carriage of goods, parties who 
are member of the contract network (De Wit says created by the multimodal transport operator 
– this thesis says by the multilateral common enterprise) would be protected by the rule. The 
same system applies to all servants of third parties. They might rely on the contract on which 
their principal would rely.830 
As already demonstrated, civil law traditions do not have problems with the extension 
of protection to a party who is not part of a contract. Some countries (such as Belgium) narrow 
this provision to cover only some categories of third parties. Scandinavian countries still rely 
on the carrier’s vicarious liability. Stipulation pur autri is a pillar in the French system and in 
                                                        
827 Sturley (n 670). 
828 Hallebeek and Dondorp (n 91) 132, 156. 
829 De Wit (n 776) 
830 De Wit, ibid. 
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civil law traditions more generally. The most relevant approach seems to be that of the German 
system, which relies on the fact that, in reality, it is not the carrier who performs the job but 
third parties and they should be protected as such. The Dutch approach also recognises the 
network of interests. 
Future research could look at these aspects in relation to third parties. There is scope 
for applying the civil law concepts of third party protection and evaluating the extent to which 
it could implement the multilateral common enterprise.  
 
Chapter conclusion 
 
This thesis seeks to make an original and significant contribution to research by 
offering a network/systemic tool with which to analyse the legal aspects of the carriage of 
goods by sea within supply chain networks. The research framework could also apply to other 
modes within international transport. It also provides a foundation for players in the industry, 
permitting and encouraging a deeper understanding of the carriage of goods by sea within the 
supply chain network structure.  
This research establishes a new theoretical framework around third party protection in 
the carriage of goods by sea. The author has worked extensively towards understanding other 
aspects of this research. This has contributed to the comprehension and development of the 
theoretical framework, methodology and research question. This thesis has highlighted a 
number of areas in which further research would be worthwhile. Whilst some of these were 
addressed by the research in this thesis, others are as yet unexplored. 
This research encourages future research to be undertaken either by extending this 
argument further, or by considering the issues from a new and different perspective. To that 
end, the author felt it appropriate to delineate the boundaries of specific topics in order to 
create a framework for recommended areas of investigation.  
The main difficulties in this research have been contract theory, the application of 
economic concepts and, above all, the concept of bailment. As a final remark it seems right, 
therefore, to quote Coggs v Bernard: 
 
I have said thus much in this case, because it is of great consequence that the law 
should be settled on this point; but I do not know whether I may have settled it, or may 
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not rather have unsettled it. But however that may happen, I have stirred these points 
which wiser head in time may settle.831 
 
By building a new theoretical framework for third party protection, this research has 
cast new light on future issues ripe for debate. The author truly hopes that, as is so often the 
case, this ending will represent a new beginning for someone else. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
831 (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909. 
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TABLE OF UNITED STATES CASE LAW 
 
 
The table below provides an overview of US cases to support Chapter 4. The list of 
cases covers, in a statistic way, the US cases cited in Chapter 4.  
In particular: 
In the first column it is reported the name of the case.  
In the second, the category of third party asking for legal protection.  
In particular: 
 
 Carrier’s Agent 
 Charterers 
 Crane Operator 
 Dry Dock Operator (DDO) 
 Inland Carrier 
 Lighterman  
 Overland Carrier (OC) 
 Port Captain  
 Pre-Carrier 
 Railroad Company (RC) 
 Shipowners 
 Stevedores 
 Terminal Operators (TO) 
 Trucker 
 
 In the third column the type of protection. In particular: 
 
 
 1 year statute limitation (1YSL) 
 Economic Limitation of Liability ($) 
 Error in navigation (EIN) 
 Forum Selection Clause (FSC) 
 
 
In the forth the decision. In particular: 
 
 
 Allowed (A) 
 Denied (D) 
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The year is shown in the fifth. In following column, the devise which was used by the third 
party is listed.  
 
In particular: 
 
 Bailment (B) 
 Himalaya Clause (H) 
 Others (O) 
 
Finally, the last column shows whether in these cases, some sort of reference to the Multilateral 
Common Enterprise has been found.   
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Case Third party Protection Decision Year Device MCE Reference 
Acciai Speciali Terni USA Inc 
v. 
M/V Berane 
Stevedores FSC A 2002 H No 
Akiyama Corp. Of America 
v. 
M.V. Hanjin Marseilles 
Stevedores 
TO 
$ A 1998 H No 
Almacen Boyaca Cia. 
v. 
Gran Golfo Express 
Pre-carrier $ D 1991 H No 
Assicurazioni Generali 
v 
D’Amico 
Stevedores $ A 1995 B No 
B. Elliott (Canada) Ltd. 
v. 
John T. Clark & Son 
Stevedores 1YSL A 1983 O No 
Barretto Peat, Inc. 
v. 
Luis Ayala Colon Sucrs, Inc. 
Carrier's agent 1YSL A 1990 H No 
Bernard Screen Printing Corp. 
v. 
Meyer Line. 
Stevedores $ A 1972 O No 
Birdsall, Inc. 
v. 
Tramore Trading Co 
Carrier's agent 1YSL D 1991 H No 
Breda Costruzioni Ferroviarie, S.p.A. 
v. 
M/V American 
Stevedores 
TO 
$ A 1992 H No 
Brown & Root 
v. 
M/V Peisander 
Stevedores $ A 1981 H No 
Cabot Corp. 
v. 
S. S. Mormacsan 
Stevedores $ D 1971 O No 
Carle & Montanari,Inc. Stevedores $ A 1967 O No 
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Case Third party Protection Decision Year Device MCE Reference 
v. 
American Export IsbrandtsenLines, Inc 
Caterpillar Overseas S.A. 
v. 
Marine Transport Inc 
Trucker $ D 1990 H No 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyds 
v. 
Barber Blue Sea Line 
Agent $ A 1982 H No 
Colgate Palmolive Co. 
v. 
S.S. Dart Canada 
TO $ D 1983 O No 
Collins & Co. 
v. 
Panama Railway Co., 
Stevedores $ A 1952 O No 
Cosa Export Co., Inc. 
v. 
Transamerican Freight Lines 
TO $ D 1963 H No 
Croft & Skully 
v. 
MV Skulptor Vuchetich 
Stevedores $ A 1982 H No 
De Laval Turbine Co 
v. 
West India Industries 
Stevedores 
OC 
$ D 1974 O No 
Dorsid Trading Corp. 
v. 
S.S. Fletero 
Stevedores 1YSL A 1972 O No 
Elgin Nat’l Indus. 
v. 
S.S. Weser Express 
Stevedores $ A 1973 H No 
EM Chemicals 
v. 
S.S. Sloman Najade 
TO $ A 1987 O No 
Ford Motor Co. Stevedores $ A 1954 O No 
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Case Third party Protection Decision Year Device MCE Reference 
v. 
Jarka Corp 
Gebr. Bellmer KG 
v. 
Terminal Services Houston, Inc. 
Stevedores $ A 1983 H Yes 
General Elec. Co. 
v. 
Inter-Ocean Shipping 
Stevedores 
Port Captain 
1YSL/$ A 1994 H No 
Grace Line 
v. 
Todd Shipyards Corp 
DDO 1YSL A 1974 H No 
Granite State Ins Co 
v. 
Hanjin shipping 
RC 1YSL A 1994 H No 
Herd & Co. 
v. 
Krawill Machinery Corp 
Stevedores $ D 1959 O No 
Herr-Voss Corporation 
v. 
Columbus Line 
Trucker $ A 1992 H No 
Hoechst Celanese Corp. 
v. 
M/V Trident Amber 
NVOCC $ A 1992 H No 
Indemnity insurance Co. Of North America 
v. 
Schneider Freigh USA 
Stevedores 
TO 
FSC A 2001 H No 
Instel Corp. 
v. 
M/V Antonia Johnson 
Stevedores 
Agent 
1YSL A 1982 H No 
Institute of London Underwriters 
v. 
Sea-Land Servs. 
Stevedores $ A 1989 H No 
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Case Third party Protection Decision Year Device MCE Reference 
Jagenberg, Inc. 
v. 
Georgia Ports Auth 
Port Authority $ D 1995 H No 
Jenkins 
v. 
M/V Ever Greet, 
TO $ A 1990 H No 
Jockey Int'l, Inc 
v. 
M/V Leverkusen express 
NVOCC FSC A 2002 O No 
Koppers Co., Inc. 
v. 
S/S Defiance 
Stevedores 
TO 
$ A 1983 O No 
LaSalle Machine Tool, Inc. 
v. 
Maker Terminals, Inc., 
Stevedores 
TO 
$ D 1979 O No 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyds 
v. 
Barber Blue Sea Line, 
Stevedores $ A 1982 H No 
Lucky- Goldstar Int'l (America), Inc. 
v. 
S.S. California Mercury 
RC $ D 1990 H No 
Machine Corp. 
v. 
S.S. Tiber, 
Shipowners 
Stevedores 
$ A 1971 O No 
Mazda Motors of America, Inc. 
v. 
M//V Cougar Ace 
Vessel FSC A 2009 H No 
Mediterranean Marine Lines 
v. 
John T. Clark 
Stevedores 
FF 
$ * 1980 H No 
Middle East Export Co. 
v. 
Concordia Line 
Stevedores $/1YSL A 1970 B No 
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Case Third party Protection Decision Year Device MCE Reference 
Miehle Co.  
v. 
Hapag-Lloyd  
Stevedores $ A 1974 H No 
Mikinberg 
v. 
Baltic Steamship Co 
Stevedores $/1YSL D 1993 H No 
Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. 
v. 
M/V Visva Shobha 
Stevedores 
Crane Operators 
$ A 1980 O No 
Mori Seiki USA, Inc. 
v. 
M/V Alligator Triumph 
Vessels 
Charterers 
TO  
Stevedores 
$ A 1993 H No 
Mori Seiki USA, Inc. 
v. 
M/V Shin Kashu Maru, 
Shipowners 
RC 
$ D 1988 O No 
National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia 
v. 
Isbrandtsen Co. 
TO 1YSL A 1957 O No 
Norfolk Southern Railway 
v. 
James N. Kirby, Pty ltd 
RC $ A 2004 H No 
Prebena Wire Bending Machinery Co. 
v. 
Transit Wordwide Corp 
Stevedores 1YSL D 1999 H No 
Rockwell Int’l Corp. 
v. 
M/V Incotrans Spirit, 
Stevedores $ A 1993 O No 
Royal Embassy 
v. 
Ioannis Martinos 
Stevedores $ D 1986 B No 
Royal Ins. Co. 
v. 
Westwood Transpacific Serv 
RC $ A 1993 H No 
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Case Third party Protection Decision Year Device MCE Reference 
Rupp 
v. 
I.t.O. Co 
Stevedores $ D 1973 O No 
Schiess-Froriep Corp 
v. 
Finnsailor 
Stevedores 1YSL D 1978 O No 
Secrest Machine Corporation 
v  
S.S. Tiber 
Stevedores $ A 1971 O No 
SPM Corp. 
v. 
M/V Ming Moon 
Stevedores $ D 1994 H No 
Steel Coils, Inc 
v. 
M/V Lake Merion 
Shipowner FCP D 2002 O No 
Stolk Tank Containers, Inc 
v. 
Evergreen Marine Corp 
Shipowner $ D 1992 B No 
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. 
v. 
S.S. Aurora H 
Stevedores 
TO 
1YSL D 1972 O No 
Taisho Marine 
v. 
Maersk Line 
Trucker $ A 1992 H No 
Taisho Marine & Fire Insurance Co 
v. 
The Vessel Gladiolus 
Trucker 1YSL D 1985 H No 
Tessler Brother 
v. 
Italpacific Line 
Stevedores $ A 1974 H No 
Toyomenka, Inc. 
v. 
S.S. Tosaharu Maru 
Security Service $ D 1975 O No 
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Case Third party Protection Decision Year Device MCE Reference 
Toyomenka, Inc. 
v. 
Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha 
Stevedores 1YSL D 1972 O No 
United States Fire Insurance Company 
v. 
Lions Gate Bridge 
Stevedores 
TO 
$ D 1997 H No 
United States 
v. 
The South Star 
Ship’s agent 
Stevedores 
1YSL A 1954 O No 
Virgin Island Corp. 
v. 
Merwin Lighterage Co., Inc. 
Lighterman $ A 1958 B No 
Vistar, S.A. 
v. 
M/V Sea Land Express 
Inland carrier $ A 1986 O No 
Warta Ins. Co. 
v. 
Calumet Harbor Terminals 
Stevedores $ D 1978 H No 
Wemhoener Pressen 
v. 
Ceres Marine Terminals 
TO $ A 1999 H No 
 
 
 
*Affirmed for Stevedores and denied for Freight Forwarders
227 
 
 
TABLE OF CASES 
Acciai Speciali Terni USA Inc v M/V Berane (2002) 181 F.Supp.2d 458 
Adler v Dickson (1954) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 267; (1955) 1 QB 158 
Air New Zealand Ltd v The Ship Contship Americana (1992) 1 NZLR 425 
Akiyama Corp. Of America v M.V Hanjin Marseilles (1998) 162 F.3d 571 
AllPacific Trading, Inc. v Vessel M/V Hanjin Yosu 7 F 3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1993) 
Almacen Boyaca Cia. v Gran Golfo Express (1991) 771 F.Supp. 354 
Assicurazioni Generali v D’Amico (1985) 766 F.2d 485  
B. Elliott (Canada) Ltd. v John T. Clark & Son (1983) 704 F.2d 1305  
Baretto Peat, Inc. v Luis Ayala Colon Sucrs, Inc. (1990) 896 F.2d 656 
Bernard Screen Printing Corp. v Meyer Line. (1972) 464 F.2d 934 
Berting v Norman (1911) 101 Ark 75, 141 SW 201 
Birdsall, Inc. v Tramore Trading Co (1991) 771 F.Supp. 1193 
Bohannon v Springfield (1846) ALA 789; 
Breda Costruzioni Ferroviarie, S.p.A. v M/V American (1992) AMC 2052 
Brown & Root v M/V Peisander (1981) 648 F.2d 415 
Cabot Corp. v S. S. Mormacsan (1971) 441 F.2d 476 
Carle & Montanari, Inc. v American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. (1967) 275 F.Supp. 76 
Caterpillar Overseas S.A. v Marine Transport Inc. (1990) 900 F.2d 714 
Central London Property Trust Ltd. v High Trees House Ltd. (1947) KB 130 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyds' v Barber Blue Sea Line 
Chapman Marine Pty Ltd v Wilhemsen Lines (1999) FCA 178 
Chappell & Co Ltd v Nestle Co Ltd (1960) AC 87 
China Pacific S.A. v Food Corporation of India (1982) AC 939 
Colgate Palmolive Co. v S.S. Dart Canada (1983) 724 F.2d 313 
228 
 
Collins & Co. v Panama Railway Co. (1952) 197 F. 2d 893 
Compania Portorafti Commerciale S.A. v Ultramar Panama Inc. (No. 2) (1990) 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 395 
Cosa Export Co., Inc. v Transamerican Freight Lines (1963) 303 N.Y.S.2d 1003 
Croft & Skully v MV Skulptor Vuchetich (1982) 664 F.2d 1277  
Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153 
Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd (1994) EWCA Civ 6. 
De Laval Turbine Co v West India Industries (1974) 502 F.2d 259  
Delphi-Delco Electronics Syst. v M/V Nedlloyd Europa, 324 F Supp 2d 403, 419-420, 
2004 AMC 1217 (SDNY 2004) 
Dorsid Trading Corp. v S.S. Fletero (1972) 342 F.Supp. 1 
Dresser U.K. Ltd. v Falcongate Freight Management Ltd. (1992) QB 502 
Drive Yourself Hire Co. (London) Ltd. v Strutt (1954) 1 QB 250 
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v Selfridge & Co. Ltd (1915) AC 847 
Elder Dempster & Co. Ltd v Patterson, Zochonis & Co. (1924) A.C. 522 
Elgin Nat'l Indus. v S.S. Weser Express (1973) 
EM Chem. v S.S. Sloman Najade, (1987) 670 F.Supp. 87 
Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada and another; Steamship Mutual 
Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd v Feasey [2003] EWCA Civ 885 
Ford Motor Co. v Jarka Corp (1954) 134 N.Y.S.2d 52 
Foulke v New York Consolidated R.R. (1920) 228 NY 269, 127 NE 237 
Gadsen v VCSC (1977) 1 NSWLR 575 
Gebr. Bellmer KG v Terminal Services Houston, Inc. (1983) 711 F.2d 622 
General Elec. Co. v Inter-Ocean Shipping (1994) 862 F.Supp. 166 
Gilbert Stokes v Dalgety and Waters Trading (1948) 81 LI. L. Rep. 337 
Gilchrist Watt and Sanderson Pty. Ltd. v York Products Pty. Ltd. (1970) 1 WLR 1262 
Gillespie Bros. & Co. Ltd. v Roy Bowles Transport Ltd. (1973) QB 400 
229 
 
Grace Line v Todd Shipyards Corp (1974) 500 F.2d 361 
Granite State Ins Co v Hanjin shipping (1994) AMC 196  
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates (1994) 3 All ER 506 
Herd & Co. v Krawill Machinery Corp (1954) 359 US 297, 79 S.Ct. 766 
Herr-Voss Corporation v Columbus Line (1992) AMC 77  
Hispanica de Petroleos S.A. v Vencedora Oceanica Navegacion S.A. (1987) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
321 
Hoechst Celanese Corp. v M/V Trident Amber (1992) AMC 2769 
Homburg Houtimport B.V. v Agrosin Private Ltd. and others (The Starsin) 
Indemnity insurance Co. Of North America v Schneider Freigh USA (2004) 1 AC 715 
Instel Corp. v M/V Antonia Johnson (1982) 549 F.Supp. 526 
Institute of London Underwriters v Sea-Land Servs., (1989) 881 F.2d 761 
Insurance Company of North America (Plaintiff-Appellee) v S/S American Argosy, her 
engines, tackle, boilers, etc., (1984) 732 F.2d 299 
Jagenberg, Inc. v Georgia Ports Auth (1995) 882 F.Supp. 1065 
Jamaica Nutrition Holdings Ltd. v United Shipping Co. (1981) 643 F.2d 376 
Jenkins v M/V Ever Greet, (1990) AMC 1868  
Jockey Int'l, Inc. v M/V Leverkusen express (2002) 217 F.Supp.2d 447 
Johnson Matthey & Co. Ltd. v Constantine Terminals Ltd. (1976) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 215 
KH Enterprise v Pioneer Container (1994) 2 AC 324, 340 
Koppers Co., Inc. v S/S Defiance (1983) 704 F.2d 1309 
LaSalle Machine Tool, Inc. v Maher Terminals, Inc., (1979) 611 F.2d 56 
Lawrence v Fox (1859) 20 NY 268 (NYCA) 
Lloyds' v Barber Blue Sea Line (1982) AMC 2638 
Lucky-Goldstar Int'l (America), Inc. v S.S. California Mercury (1990) 750 F.Supp. 141 
Machine Corp. v S.S. Tiber (1971) 450 F.2d 285 
230 
 
Mamimye Brothers v Barber Steamship Lines, Inc. (1996) 360 F.2d 774 
Mazda Motors of America, Inc. v M/V Cougar Ace (2009) AMC 1220 (9th Cir.)  
Mediterranean Marine Lines v John T. Clark (1980) 485 F.Supp. 1330 
Middle East Export Co. v Concordia Line, (1970) 64 Misc.2d 270, 314 NYS.2d 390 
Mikimberg v Baltic Steamship 
Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v M/V Visva Shobha (1980) 494 F.Supp. 1005 
Mori Seiki USA, Inc. v M/V Alligator Triumph (1993) 990 F.2d 444 
Mori Seiki USA, Inc. v M/V Shin Kashu Maru, (1998) 702 F.Supp. 613 
Morris v C.W. Martin & Sons Ltd (1966) 1 QB 716 
Municipal Council v Prabhu Narain (1968) AIR Raj 297 
National Federation of Coffee Growers of Columbia v Isbrandtsen Co. (1975) AC 154  
New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd v A.M. Satterthwaite & Co. Ltd. (1974) UKPC 1 
Norfolk Southern Railway Company, Petitioner, v James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd. (2004) 543 US 
14, 125 S.Ct. 385 
Philip Bros. v Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (1982) 664 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir.) 
Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd. (1980) AC 827, 851 
Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Aust.) Pty Ltd (1980) 3 All ER 
257; (The New York Star) (1981) 1 WLR 138 
Port Swettenham Authority v T.W. Wu & Co. (M) Sdn. Bhd. (1979) AC 580 
Prebena Wire Bending Machinery Co. v Transit Wordwide Corp (1999) AMC 2623 
Pyrene v Scindia Navigation Co Ltd (1954) 2 QB 402  
Reid v Fargo (1916) 241 US 544, 36 S.Ct. 712 
Rockwell Int'l Corp. v M/V Incotrans Spirit (1869) 707 F.Supp. 272 
Royal Embassy v Ioannis Martinos (1986) AMC 769 
Royal Ins. Co. v Westwood Transpacific Serv. (1991) AMC 1028 
Rupp v I.Tt.O. & Co. (1973) 479 F.2d 674  
231 
 
Schiess-Froriep Corp. v Finnsailor (1978) 574 F.2d 123  
Scholastic Inc. v M/V Kitano (2005) 362 F Supp 2d 449 Dist Court SD New York 
Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd (1961) UKHL 4; (1962) AC 446 
Secrest Machine Corporation v S.S. Tiber (1971) 450 F.2d 285 
Shadwell v Shadwell (1860) EWHC CP J88 
Singer Co. (U.K.) Ltd. v Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority (1988) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 164 
SPM Corp. v M/V Ming Moon (1994) 22 F.3d 523  
Stolk Tank Containers, Inc. v Evergreen Marine Corp (1992) 962 F.2d 276  
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v S.S. Aurora H (1972) 342 F.Supp. 298 
Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd. (2006) 227 ALR 46 
Taisho Marine & Fire Insurance Co v The Vessel Gladiolus (1985) 762 F.2d 1364 
Tessler Brother v Italpacific Line (1974) 494 F.2d 438 
The Mahkutai (1996) 3 All ER 502  
Thomas v Thomas [1842] 2 QB 851 
Toyomenka, Inc. v S.S. Tosaharu Maru (1975) 523 F.2d 518 
Toyomenka, Inc. v Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha1 (1972) 342 F.Supp. 292 
Tweddle v Atkinson [1861] EWHC QB J57 
U.S. v The South Star (1954) 210 F.2d 44 
Ultimo Cabinet Corp. v M/V Mason Lykes (1991) A.M.C. 1343 
Virgin Island Corp. v Merwin Lighterage Co., Inc. (1958) 251 F.2d 872 
Vistar, S.A. v M/V Sea Land Express (1986) 792 F.2d 469 
Warta Ins. Co. v Calumet Harbor Terminals (1978) A.M.C. 2244 
Wemhoener Pressen v Ceres Marine Terminals (1993) 5 F.3d 734 
White v Jones (1995) UKHL 5 
Wilson v Darling Island Stevedores & Lighterage Co. (1956) 95 CLR 43 
232 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Books 
 
Aiyar P R, The Major Law Lexicon (Wadhwa and Company, 2010) 
Arinatiwe P W, Risk Allocation in Oil and Gas Service Contracts (Lambert Academic 
Publishing, 2014) 
Atiyah P S, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press, 1979) 
Bell A P, Modern Law of Personal Property in England and Ireland (Butterworths, 1988) 
Benson P (ed), The Theory of Contract Law: New Essays (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
Billah M M, Effects of Insurance on Maritime Liability Law A Legal and Economic Analysis 
(Springer Science & Business Media, 2014) 
Billins R, Agency Law (Longman, 1993) 
Chitty J, Chitty on Contracts (26th ed., vol. 2, Sweet and Maxwell, 1989) 
Christopher M, Logistics and Supply Chain Management (2nd ed., Prentice Hall, 2011) 
Conaghan C, The New Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 
De Wit R, Multimodal Transport Carrier Liability and Documentation, (Lloyds of London 
Press Ltd 1995) 
Downie D, Contractual Risk Allocation (Inter Alia Publishing, 2012)  
Drake M, Global Supply Chain Management, (Business Expert Press, 2012) 
Elliot W F, A Treatise on the Law of Bailment and Carriers (The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 
1914)  
Fisher E, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2007) 
Fridman G H L, The Law of Agency (7th ed. Butterworths, 1996) 
Gilmore G and Black C, The Law of Admiralty (2nd ed., The Foundation Press, 1975) 
Gordon G, Paterson J and Üşenmez E, Oil and Gas Law - Current Practice and Emerging 
Trends (2nd ed., Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 
Hallebeek J and Dondorp H, Contracts for a Third-Party Beneficiary: A Historical and 
Comparative Account (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008) 
Hevia M, Reasonableness and Responsibility: A Theory of Contract Law (Springer Science & 
Business Media, 2012) 
Hoeks M, The Law Applicable to the Multimodal Contract for the Carriage of Goods (Kluwer 
Law International, 2010) 
Jephson C, Morgen H “Creating Global Opportunities: Maersk Line in Containerisation 1973-
2013,” Cambridge University Press 
Klein M, Unfinished Business: The Railroad in American Life (1st ed., University Press of New 
England, 1994) 
233 
 
Knauth A, The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading (4th ed., Baltimore, 1953) 
Leinbach T R and Capineri C, Globalised Freight Transport: Intermodality, E-
Commerce, Logistics and Sustainability (Edward Elgar, 2007) 
Lopez N J, Bes' Chartering and Shipping Terms (11th ed., London Barker & Howard Ltd, 
1992) 
Lowe D, Commercial Management: Theory and Practice (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) 
Mankabady S, The Hamburg Rules on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Brill Archive 1978) 
Merkin R, Privity of Contract, Privity of Contract: The Impact of the Contracts (Right of Third 
Parties) Act 1999 (Taylor & Francis, 2013) 
Midoro R and Parola F, Le Strategie delle Imprese di Linea nello Shipping ed Intermodalita: 
Dinamiche Competitive e Forme di Cooperazione (Franco Angeli, 2013) 
Nossal S, Bailment on Terms and the Carriage of Goods by Sea: The Mahkutai (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1994) 
Poole J, Contract Law (12th ed., Oxford University Press, 2014) 
Porter M E, Competitive Strategy (Free Press, 1980) 
Reynolds F M B and Bowstead W, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (18th ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2006) 
Ross D F, Distribution Planning and Control; Managing in the Era of Supply Chain 
Management (3rd ed., Springer, 2015) 
Scrutton T E, Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (19th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 
1984) 
Sealy L S and Hooley R J A, Commercial Law: Text Cases and Materials (4th ed., 
Butterworths, 1999) 
Soyer B, Tettenborn A, Offshore Contracts and Liabilities (Informa Law from Routledge 
2014). 
Stopford M, Maritime Economics (Routledge, 1997) 
Tetley W, Marine Cargo Claims (4th ed., Editions Yvon Blais, 2007) 
Todd P, Modern Bills of Lading (2nd ed., Blackwell Law, 1990) 
Treitel G QC, Trietel on Contract (8th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 1991) 
Uff J, Construction Law (11th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) 
 
 
Official publications 
BIMCO SUPPLYTIME Time charter for Offshore Service Vessels (2005): Clause 14 – 
Liabilities and Indemnities) 
BIMCO, ‘Revised Himalaya Clause for Bills of Lading and other Contracts’ (2010): Special 
Circular No. 6 
Budapest Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Inland 
Waterway, (2000): Article 4 
234 
 
Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail, as amended by the Protocol of 
Modification of 1999 COTIF-CIM (1999): Appendix 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (Montreal, 28 
May 1999) 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for the International Carriage by Air (1999): 
Article 39 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air 
(1929) 
Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (1956) 
Harter Act (1893): 27 Stat 445, codified at 46 USC Appendix 19 
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of 
Lading (1924) 
Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
Relating to Bills of Lading (1968, 1977) 
UNCTAD Secretariat, ‘Review of Maritime Transport’ (2003): United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, Geneva [UNCTAD/RMT/2003]. 
UNCTAD, ‘The Economic and Commercial Implication of the Entry into Force of the 
Hamburg Rules and Multimodal Convention’  
Uniform Rules Concerning International Carriage of Goods by Rail (1980): Article 270 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ‘Report of the Working Group on 
Transport Law’ 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ‘Report of Working Group III’ 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Preparation of a draft instrument on 
the carriage of goods [by sea] Addendum to compilation of replies to a questionnaire on door-
to-door transport and additional comments by States and international organizations on the 
scope of the draft instrument (Working Group III (Transport Law) 12th session Vienna, 6 – 17 
October 2003) A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.28/Add.1. 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Preparation of a draft instrument on 
the carriage of goods’ 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Report of the Working Group on 
Transport Law, 9th session’ (New York, 15-26 April 2002) A/CN.9/510. 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Report of the Working Group on 
Transport Law’ 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Report of Working Group III 
(Transport Law) on the work of its tenth session: Comments from the representative of the 
International Chamber of Shipping and the Baltic and International Maritime Council on the 
scope of the draft instrument’ (Thirty-sixth session Vienna, 30 June-11 July 2003 A/CN.9/525) 
Annex 1, 36.  
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Report of Working Group III 
(Transport Law) on the work of its nineteenth session’ (Fortieth session Vienna, 25 June-12 
July 2007) A/CN.9/621. 
235 
 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Report of Working Group III 
(Transport Law) on the work of its twelfth session’ (Vienna, 6-17 October 2003) (Thirty-
seventh session New York, 14 June-2 July 2004 A/CN.9/544).  
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Report of the Working Group on 
Transport Law on the work of its ninth session (New York, 15-26 April 2002) A/CN.9/510 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Summary Record of the 865th 
Meeting’ (Forty-first session 2008A/CN.9/SR.865) Only transport by sea. 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Transport Law: Preparation of a 
draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]: Proposal of the United 
States of America on the definition of “maritime performing party”’ (Nineteenth session New 
York, 16-27 April 2007).  
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Transport Law Preliminary Draft 
Instrument on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Working Group III (Transport Law) Ninth 
session New York, 15-26 April 2002 A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21/Add.1). 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group III (Transport Law)’ 
(Thirteenth session New York, 3-14 May 2004 A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.36). 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Inland Transport Committee, ‘Possibilities 
For Reconciliation And Harmonization Of Civil Liability Regimes Governing Combined 
Transport’ (Thirty-seventh session, 18 and 19 April 2002 TRANS/WP.24/2002/5). 
United Nations International Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, adopted in 
Hamburg on 31 March 1978. 
 
Book chapters 
 
Bell A P, ‘Sub-Bailment on Terms’ in N E Palmer and E McKendrick (eds), Interests in Goods 
(LLP, 1993) 
Bell A P, ‘The Place of Bailment in the Modern Law of Obligations’ in N E Palmer and E 
McKendrick (eds) Interest in Goods (2nd ed., 1998) 
Chuah J, ‘Impact of the Rotterdam Rules on the Himalaya Clause: the Port terminal Operators’ 
Case’ in Thomas D R (ed), The Carriage of Goods by Sea Under the Rotterdam 
Rules (Informa, 2010) 
Raz J, ‘Promises and Obligations’ in Hacker P M S and Raz J (eds) Law Morality, and Society 
(Oxford University Press, 1977) 
 
Journal articles 
 
Adams J and Brownsword R, ‘Privity and the concept of a network contract’ (1990) 10 Legal 
Studies 12 
Anderson H, ‘The Status and Associated Liability of Ocean Freight Forwarders’ (2009) 36 
Transportation Law Journal 121 
236 
 
Angus W D, ‘Legal Implications of “The Container Revolution” in International Carriage of 
Goods’ (1968) 14 McGill Law Journal 395 
Atamer K, ‘Construction Problems in the Rotterdam Rules Regarding the Performing and 
Maritime Performing Parties (2010) 41 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 4 
Baldwin K, ‘COGSA Carriers’ (2010-2011) 35 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 391 
Barnett R E, ‘Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory’ (1987) 75 California 
Law Review 1969 
Bovio M, ‘Ocean Carriers’ Duty of Care to Cargo in Port: The Rotterdam Rules of 2009’ 
(2008) 32 Fordham International Law Journal 4, 1160 
Buglass L J, ‘Limitation of Liability from a Marine Insurance Viewpoint’ (1979) 53 Tulane 
Law Review 1364  
Burnett J, ‘Avoiding Difficult Questions: Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors’ 
(2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 163 
Chitty J W, ‘Bareboat Charters: Can a Shipowner Limit Liability to Third Parties? Answers for 
Owners Attempting to Navigate the Unsettled Waters in the Eleventh Circuit’ (2008) 25 
Georgia State University Law Review 477 
Corcione C, ‘The Evolution of Third Parties Protection in Carriage of Goods by Sea: From the 
Himalaya Clause to the Himalaya Protection’ (2014) 49 European Transport Law Journal 3, 
271 
Costabel A M, ‘Himalaya Strain? A Forensic Examination of Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v 
James N Kirby, Pty Ltd and Doe v Celebrity Cruises, Inc.’ (2005) 29 Tulane Maritime Law 
Journal 217 
Coyne K P, and Dye R, ‘The Competitive Dynamics of Network-based Businesses’ (1998) 76 
Harvard Business Review 1 99 
De la Mare, W T L, ‘Jurisprudential Problems of Attribution of Liability in the Area of 
Admiralty Contracts for Carriage Following Norfolk Southern Railway v Kirby’ (2007) 22 
Connecticut Journal of International Law 203 
Dempsey P,S, ‘The Law of Intermodal Transportation: What It Was, What It Is, What It 
Should Be’ (2000) 27 Transportation Law Journal 367 
Denniston T,R, Gunn C T and Alfred E Yudes A E, ‘Liabilities of Multimodal Operators and 
Parties other than Carriers and Shippers’ (1990) 64 Tulane Law Review 517 
Egbochue C, ‘Reviewing “knock for knock” indemnities following the Macondo Well 
blowout’ (2013) 7 Construction Law International 4 
Ellram L M and Cooper C M, ‘Supply Chain Management, Partnership, and the Shipper – 
Third Party Relationship’ (1990) 1 The International Journal of Logistics Management, 2  
Erh-Soon Tay A, ‘The Essence of Bailment: Contract, Agreement or Possession?’ (1966) 
Sydney Law Review 239 
Evans I L, ‘The Harter Act and Its Limitations’ (1910) 8 Michigan Law Review 8, 637 
Ferrari C, Parola F and Benacchio M, ‘Network Economies in Liner Shipping: The Role of 
Home Markets’ (2008) 35 Maritime Policy and Management 2, 127 
Forbes R E, ‘Practical Approaches to Privity of Contract Problems’ (2002) 37 Canada Business 
Law Journal 357 
237 
 
Fujita T, ‘Performing Parties and Himalaya Protection’ (Colloquium on the Rotterdam Rules 
21 September 2009). 
Fujita T, ‘The Comprehensive Coverage of the New Convention: Performing Parties and the 
Multi-Modal Implication’ (2009) 44 Texas International Law Journal 3, 349 
Fujita T, The CMI International Working Group on the Rotterdam Rules, ‘Questions and 
Answers on The Rotterdam Rules’ (Ver. 2009.10.10);  
Gurley G, ‘The Ninth Circuit Breathes Life into a Vessel as a Himalaya Beneficiary: Mazda 
Motors of America, Inc. v MV Cougar Ace’ (2010) 34 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 619 
Guzmán J V, ‘The Limitation of Liability of the Carrier from an Allocation of Risks Point of 
View’ (Comite Maritime International 2012) 
Haak F and Hoeks M, ‘Intermodal Transport In The Field Of Conflicting Conventions’ (2004) 
10 Journal of International Maritime Law 5 
Healy H, ‘Carriage of Goods by Sea: Application of the Himalaya Clause to Subdelegees of 
the Carrier’ (1977) 2 The Maritime Lawyer 91 
Heaver T D, Meersman H, and Van de Voorde E, ‘Co-Operation and Competition in 
International Container Transport: Strategies for Ports’ (2001) 28 Maritime Policy and 
Management 3, 293 
Hellawell R, ‘Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and Carrier’ (1979) 27 American 
Journal Of Comparative Law 357 
Helmholz R H, ‘Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The Elusive Uniform Standard 
of Reasonable Care’ (1992) 41 University of Kansas Law Review 97 
Hooper C D, ‘Legal Relationships: Terminal Owners, Operators, and Users’ (1990) 64 Tulane 
Law Review 595 
Hummels D, ‘Transportation Costs and International Trade in the Second Era of Globalization’ 
(2007) 21 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 131 
Jaffey P, ‘A New Version of the Reliance Theory’ (1998) 49 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 
107 
Kahler L, ‘Contract-Management Duties As A New Regulatory Device’ (2013) 76 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 89 
Kumar G S, Shirisha P, ‘Transportation The Key Player In Logistics Management’ (2014) 3 
Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research 1 
Laidlaw W K, ‘Principles of Bailment’ (1932) 37 Commercial Law Journal 134 
Legros C, ‘Relations Between the Rotterdam Rules and the Convention on the Carriage of 
Goods by Road’ (2012) 36 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 725 
Lemon II R T, ‘Allocation of Marine Risks: An Overview of the Marine Insurance Package’ 
(2006-2007) 81 Tulane Law Review 1467 
Liang C, ‘Benefits and Burdens of Third Parties Under Exception Clauses in Bills of Lading’ 
(1999) 24 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 225 
Long A, ‘Port Community Systems’ (2009) 3 World Customs Journal 1 
Lopuski J, ‘Liability for Damage in Maritime Shipping under the Aspect of Risk Allocation’ 
(1979-80) 10 Pol. Y.B. Int’ 1 L.177 
238 
 
Lord Roskill E, ‘Half a Century of Commercial Law 1930 – 1980’ (1982) 7 Holdsworth Law 
Review 1 
Low H, ‘Shipowners’ Liabilities: Elder Dempster Revisited’ (1998) 13 Maritime Law 
Association of Australia and New Zealand Journal 1 42 
MacMillan C, ‘A Birthday Present for Lord Denning: The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act 1999’ (2000) 63 The Modern Law Review 5 721 
Mankabady S, ‘Rights and Immunities of the Carrier's Servants or Agents’ (1974) 5 Journal of 
Maritime Law and Commerce 111 
Marten B, ‘Multimodal Transport Reform and the European Union: A Treaty Change 
Approach’ (2012) 36 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 741 
Mason S J, Ribera P M, Farris J A and Kirk R G, ‘Integrating the Warehousing and 
Transportation Functions of the Supply Chain’ (2003) 39 Transportation Research Part E 141 
Matsusaka J, ‘Takeover Motives During the Conglomerate Merger Wave’ (1993) 24 RAND 
Journal of Economics, 3, 357 
Megens P, ‘Different Perspectives of Construction Risk - How Should it be Allocated?’ (1996) 
15 Ampla Bulletin 179  
Meng T P, ‘Circumventing the Privity Rule in Malaysia’ (2009) 4 International Journal of 
Information Technology and Decision Making 262 
Merkin R, Reforming Insurance Law: Is there a Case for Reverse Transportation? A Report for 
the English and Scottish Law Commissions on the Australian Experience of Insurance Law 
Reform (London, UK, Edinburgh, Scotland, Law Commission/Scottish Law Commission 
2006). 
Minichello D, ‘Who and What Are You Insuring? Cargo Transportation Liability Exposures 
Are Changing’ (2009) 21 University of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal 2 167 
Nikaki T, ‘The Statutory Himalaya-Type Protection under the Rotterdam Rules: Capable of 
Filling the Gaps?’ (2009) Journal of Business Law 1 
Notteboom T and Rodrigue J P, ‘The Corporate Geography of Global Terminal Operators’ 
(2011) 39 Maritime Policy and Management 3, 249 
Olivier D and Slack B, ‘Rethinking the Port’ (2006) 38 Environment and Planning A 8 1409  
Olivier D, Parola F, Slack B and Wang J J, ‘The Time Scale of Internationalisation: The Case 
of the Container Port Industry’ (2007) 9 Maritime Economics and Logistics 1 
Palmer N, ‘Ambulatory Bailments’ (1983) 36 Current Legal Problems 1, 91 
Palmer N, ‘Sub-Bailment on Terms’ (1989) Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 
466 
Palmer R W and Degiulio F P, ‘Admiralty Law Institute Symposium: Terminal Operations and 
Multimodalism Terminal Operations and Multimodal Carriage: History and Prognosis’ (1990) 
64 Tulane Law Review 281 
Panayides P M, ‘Economic Organization of Intermodal Transport’ (2002) 22 Transport 
Reviews 4 401 
Panayides P M, Lambertides N and Savva C S, ‘The Relative Efficiency of Shipping 
Companies’ (2011) Transportation Research Part E 47 681 
239 
 
Panzar J C and Willig R D, ‘Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly’ (1977) 8 
Bell Journal of Economics 1 
Panzar J C and Willig E D, ‘Economies of Scope’ (1981) 71 American Economic Review 
(Papers and Proceedings) 268 
Pritchard A C, ‘United States v O'Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell's Legacy for the 
Law of Insider Trading’ (1998) 78 Boston University Law Review 13 
Rajski J, ‘Limitation of Liability and Exclusion Clauses in International Contracts’ (2002) 3 
International Business Law Journal 4, 321 
Reynolds F, “The Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules” (1990) 7 
Maritime Law Association of Australia and New Zealand Journal 16 
Rodrigue J-P and Notteboom T, ‘The Terminalization of Supply Chains: Reassessing The Role 
of Terminals in Port/Hinterland Logistical Relationships’ (2009) 36 Maritime Policy and 
Management: The Flagship Journal of International Shipping and Port Research 2, 165 
Roseg E, ‘The Impact of Insurance Practises on Liability Conventions’ (2000) Marlus 283 
Ruiz F, ‘Legal Study of Sea Carrier Limitation of Liability According to Brazilian Law in 
Comparison to the Hague-Visby Regime’ (2010) 1 Lawinter Review 1 144 
Shatwell K O, ‘The Doctrine of Consideration in the Modern Law’ (1955) 1 Sydney Law 
Review 289 
Smeele F, ‘The Maritime Performing Party in the Rotterdam Rules 2009’ (2011) European 
Journal of Commercial Contract Law 1 
Smith S A, ‘Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties: In Defence of the Third-Party Rule’ 
(1997) 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 643 
Song D W and Panayides P M, ‘Global Supply Chain and Port/Terminal: Integration and 
Competitiveness’ (2008) 35 Maritime Policy and Management 1 73 
Stevens R, ‘The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999’ (2004) Law Quarterly Review 
120 
Sturley F M, ‘An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case’ 
(11997) 21 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 263 
Sturley F M, ‘Modernizing and Reforming U.S. Maritime Law: The Impact of the Rotterdam 
Rules in the United States’ (2009) 44 Texas International Law Journal 427 
Sturley M F, ‘International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic Law 
in Conflicts of Interpretation’ (1987) 27 Virginia Journal of International Law 729 
Sweeney J C, ‘Crossing the Himalayas: Exculpatory Clauses in Global Transport - Norfolk 
Southern Railway Co. v James N. Kirby’ (2005) 36 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 
155 
Talley K W, ‘Maritime Transport Chains: Carrier, Port and Shipper Choice Effects’ (2014) 
International Journal of Production Economics 151 174 
Taylor T, ‘Offshore Energy Construction Insurance: Allocation of Risk Issues’ (2013) 87 
Tulane Law Rev 1165 
Teece D J, ‘Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise’ (1980) 1 Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 3 223  
240 
 
Tetley W, ‘Case Note: Homburg Houtimport B.V. v Agrosin Private Ltd. (The Starsin) [2003] 
1 Lloyd’s 571, 2003 AMC 913 (HL) 121 (Bills of Lading)’ (2004) 35 Journal of Maritime Law 
and Commerce 1 
Tetley W, ‘Limitation, Non-Responsibility and Disclaimer Clauses’ (1986) 11 Maritime Law 
203 
Tetley W, ‘The Himalaya Clause – "Stipulation pour Autrui": Non-Responsibility Clauses and 
Gross Negligence under the Civil Code” (1979) 20 Le Cahiers de Droit 3 449  
Tetley W, ‘The Himalaya clause - Heresy or Genius?’ (2003) 9 Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce 111 113 
Tetley W, ‘The Himalaya Clause – Revisited’ (2003) 9 Journal of International Maritime Law 
40 
Theis W H, ‘Third-Party Beneficiaries in Multimodal Contracts of Carriage: Norfolk Southern 
Railway Co. v James N. Kirby (2005) 36 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 201 
Vlasto T and Julian Clark J, ‘The Effect of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 on 
Voyage and Time Charter Parties’ (2001) 25 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 519 
Wang C and Xie F, ‘Corporate Governance Transfer and Synergistic Gains from Mergers and 
Acquisitions’ (2007) 22 Review of Financial Studies 829 
Wyatt M J, ‘Contract Terms in Intermodal Transport: COGSA Comes Ashore’ (1992) 16 
Tulane Maritime Law Journal 177 
Yu Tseng Y, Long Yue W and Taylor M, ‘The Role of Transportation in the Logistic Chain’ 
(2005) 5 Proceedings of the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies 1657  
Zawitoski J, ‘Limitation of Liability for Stevedores and Terminal Operators Under the Carrier's 
Bill of Lading and COGSA’ (1985) 16 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 3 337 
 
Other print sources 
 
Berlingieri F, ‘A Comparative Analysis Of The Hague-Visby Rules, The Hamburg Rules And 
The Rotterdam Rules’ (2009) (Paper delivered at the General Assembly of the AMD, 
Marrakesh, 5-6 November 2009) 
Besong C, ‘Towards a Modern Role for Liability in Multilodal Transport Law’ (2007) (PhD 
thesis, University College London) 
Bjarnelöf-Sovtic S, ‘The Inter-Club Agreement - Certain Aspects’ (2006) (Master’s Thesis, 
University of Lund) 
Conrado I C, ‘Multimodal Aspect of the Rotterdam Rules: A Critical Analysis of the Liability 
of the MTO’ (2001) (PhD Thesis, University of Lund) 
Freight Transport Association, ‘Himalaya and other warranty and indemnity clauses’ (2015) 
Law Commission, ‘Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties: The Legal 
Systems of Most Member States of the European Union Allow Third Parties to Enforce 
Contracts’ (1996) Law Commission 242 
241 
 
Lin S M, Potter A, Pettit S and Nair R, ‘A Systems View Of Supply Network Integration In 
Maritime Logistics’ (2014) (19th Logistics Research Network Conference, Huddersfield, UK, 
3-5 September 2014) 
Liu O, ‘Efficiency Analysis of Container Ports and Terminals’ (2010) (PhD Thesis, University 
College London) 
Woo S,H, ‘Seaport Supply Chain Integration and Orientation, And Their Impact on 
Performance’ (2010) (PhD thesis, Cardiff University)  
Thomas R, “And then there were the Rotterdam Rules” Editorial of the Journal of International 
Maritime Law (JIML) (2008) 14 JIML 189-190 
 
 
Internet sources 
 
Alba M, Berlingieri F, Delebecque P, Fujita T, Honka H, Illescas R, Moellmann A, Sturley M 
and Von Ziegler A, ‘Montevideo Declaration: The Facts’ (2010) 
<https://asadip.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/rr-answer-to-montevideo-declaration-eng.pdf> 
Accessed 1 January 2013 
Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO) (2015) <https://www.bimco.org/> Accessed 
11 November 2014 
Brunner R, ‘Electronic Transport Documents and Shipping Practice Not Yet a Married Couple’ 
(2007) <http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/shiplaw/theses/brunner.pdf> Accessed 13 July 2011 
City of London Law Society, Insurance Law Committee, ‘Insurable Interest’ (Response to the 
English and Scottish Law Commissions’ Issues Paper 4 on Insurance Contract Law (2008) 
<http://www.citysolicitors.org.uk/attachments/article/117/Insurable-interest.pdf> Accessed 8 
February 2015 
Clarkson Research Services (reported in Shipping Review and Outlook (2015) 108-109 
http://www.crsl.com/acatalog/shipping-review-and-outlook.html Accessed 2 March 2016 
CLECAT, ‘RE: 2008 - United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage 
of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea – the “Rotterdam Rules”’ (2009) < 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/transport/rotterdam_rules/CLECATpaper.pdf> 
Accessed 1 September 2012 
CMI, ‘The Rotterdam Rules: An Attempt to Clarify Certain Concerns that have Emerged’ 
(2009) <http://comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Rotterdam%20Rules/5RRULES.pdf> Accessed 13 
December 2013 
CMI, ‘Yearbook’ (2000) <http://comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Yearbooks/Yearbook+2000.pdf> 
Accessed 24 January 2014 
CMI, ‘Yearbook’ (2001) <http://www.comitemaritime.org/uploads/yearbooks/ybk_2001.pdf> 
Accessed 8 January 2014 
Container Management (2015) http://container-mag.com/ Accessed 17 April 2016 
Debattista C, ‘UNCITRAL Colloquium on Rotterdam Rules: The Goods Carried – Who gets 
them and who controls them?’ (2009) 
242 
 
<http://www.rotterdamrules2009.com/cms/uploads/Def%20%20tekst%20Charles%20Debattist
a%2031%20OKT29.pdf> Accessed 18 September 2013 
European Commission, ‘Terminal Handling Charges During and After the Liner Conference 
Era’(Competition Reports, produced by Ben Hackett on behalf of Raven Trading Limited, 
European Commission, Brussels 2009). 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/transport/reports/terminal_handling_charges.pdf 
Accessed 7 June 2013 
European Shippers’ Council, ‘View of the European Shippers’ Council on the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Carrying of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea also known as the 
‘Rotterdam Rules’(2009) 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/transport/rotterdam_rules/ESC_PositionPaper_Marc
h2009.pdf Accessed 6 July 2012  
FIATA, ‘Position on the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods 
Wholly or Partly by Sea (The “Rotterdam Rules”)’ (2009) 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/transport/rotterdam_rules/FIATApaper.pdf> 
Accessed 1 September 2011 
HFW Ports & Terminals Group, ‘Expansion Into Logistics – A Risky Business’ (2010) 
<http://www.portstrategy.com/news101/administration/legal-
andinsurance/expansion_into_logistics_-_a_risky_business> Accessed 4 February 2014 
Holman Fenwick Willan, ‘Global Investment in Ports and Terminals’ (June 2011). 
https://www.hfw.com/downloads/HFW%20Ports%20and%20Terminals%20Report%20[A4]%
20February%202013.pdf Accessed 9 August 2013 
Holman Fenwick Willan, ‘Terminal Operators Face Claims “Front Line” in Rotterdam Rules’ 
(2010). This article first appeared in the February 2010 issue of the Lloyd’s List and is 
reproduced with their kind permission <www.lloydslist.com> 
Holman Fenwick Willan, ‘What Impact Will the Rotterdam Rules Have on Shipowners?’ 
(2010). This article first appeared in the July 2010 issue of Britannia News Conventions 
Supplement and is reproduced with their kind permission <www.britannia.co.uk> 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-09/amazon-is-building-global-delivery-
business-to-take-on-alibaba-ikfhpyes Accessed 29 February 2016 
Institute of Risk Management, ‘About Risk Management’ (2015) 
<https://www.theirm.org/about/risk-management/> Accessed 4 May 2015 
International Group of P&I Clubs (2015) <www.igpandi.org/> Accessed 11 November 2014 
International Port Community Systems Association, ‘Port Community Systems’ (2014) 
<http://www.epcsa.eu/pcs> Accessed 3 December 2015  
Jones P, ‘The Utility of Himalaya Clauses under the Rotterdam Rules’ (2009) 
<http://www.forwarderlaw.com/library/view.php?article_id=587> Accessed 15 August 2015 
London P&I Club 2016-2017 Rules 
<https://www.londonpandi.com/_common/updateable/downloads/documents/5rules2016.pdf>
Accessed 20 February 2016 
Lord D, ‘Insurable Interest: Is There a Rule?’ (2005) 
<http://clients.squareeye.net/uploads/3sb/events/121005_lord.pdf > Accessed 5 May 2013 
243 
 
Neil C R, ‘Maritime Contract Law Moves Inland: The Kirby Decision’ (2011) 
<http://lindsayhart.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Neil_Martime-Contract-Law.pdf> 
Accessed 3 September 2014 
Oxford Dictionary, ‘Third Party’ (2015) 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/third-party> Accessed 27 April 2015. 
Price Waterhouse Coopers, ‘Contract Management, Control Value and Minimise Risks’ (2015) 
<http://www.idii.com/wp/MembaPwContractMgmt.pdf> Accessed January 2015 
Spurin C H, ‘The Liability of Carriers to Cargo Owners’ (2004) 
<http://www.nadr.co.uk/articles/published/shipping/005CHAPTERFIVETRADE4.pdf> 
Accessed 27 March 2014 
Tetley W, ‘Chapter 1, Application of the Rules Generally’  <http://www.euro-
marine.eu/hague-VisbyRules.html> Accessed 29 June 2014 
The National Association of Marine Surveyors, Inc., ‘President’s Message’ (2010) 
<http://www.namsglobal.org/assets/92/20100127webnews.htm> Accessed 15 December 2014 
The Swedish Club, ‘Slot Charter Insurance’ (2007) 
<http://www.swedishclub.com/upload/174/02.slot-charterer-insurance.pdf> Accessed 11 
October 2014 
TradeWinds, ‘Saigon Port eyes IPO’ 
<http://www.tradewindsnews.com/finance/361525/saigon-port-eyes-ipo>, Accessed 5 June 
2015  
TT Club ‘Supply Chain Claims – The Same Old story’ (2015) http://www.ttclub.com/news-
events/articles/article/supply-chain-claims-the-same-old-story-133454/ Accessed 9 January 
2016 
TT Club, ‘Ship Operator Cover Liability, equipment and property insurance for ship operators 
(2015) http://www.ttclub.com/fileadmin/uploads/tt-
club/Publications___Resources/New_Document_Store_2015/Ship_Operator_Cover.pdf 
Accessed 11 February 2015  
Understanding P&I Club, A Presentation by Gillian Musgrave – Regional Claims Director, 
Standard Asia & David Heaselden – Loss Prevention Director, Shipowners’ Mutual. 
<http://www.gia.org.sg/pdfs/Industry/Marine/MKSS/SS18_Presentation.pdf> Accessed 14 
March 2015. 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, ‘How to develop a Port Community 
System’ (2011) 
<https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trade/Trade_Facilitation_Forum/BkgrdDocs/HowTo
DevelopPortCommunitySystem-EPCSAGuide.pdf> Accessed 3 December 2015 
US Legal Inc., ‘Distinction Between Joint Venture and Joint Enterprise’ (2014) 
<http://jointventures.uslegal.com/distinction-between-joint-venture-and-joint-enterprise/> 
Accessed 10 November 2015 
USC, ‘Title 46a, Ch 28 - Carriage Of Goods By Sea’  
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode46a/usc_sup_05_46_10_28.html> Accessed 1 
August 2015 
Wanigasekera A, ‘Comparison of Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules’ (1992) 
<http://www.juliusandcreasy.com/inpages/publications/pdf/comparison_of_hague_and_hambu
rg-AW.pdf> Accessed 13 April 2014 
244 
 
Warner G, ‘Suitability of CAR cover for offshore contractors’ (2012) <http://standard-
club.com/media/1557668/suitability-of-car-cover-for-offshore-contractors.pdf> Accessed 2 
March 2016 
Zerman M, ‘Liability for Stevedore Damage Claims’ (2012) 
<http://www.skuld.com/topics/legal/defence/liability-for-stevedore-damage-claims/> Accessed 
10 March 2014 
Zunarelli S, ‘Elementi Di Novita’ E Di Continuita’ Della Regolamentazione Della 
Responsabilita’ Del Vettore Marittimo Di Cose Nell’attivita’ Del Gruppo Di Lavoro Dell’ 
UNCITRAL’ (2008) <http://www.aidim.org/pdf/rel_zunarelli.pdf> Accessed 7 September 
2014 
 
 
